United States v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas

• Decision Date: 16 August 1911
• Docket Number: 77.
• Citation: 189 F. 954
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. OF TEXAS,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

189 F. 954

UNITED STATES v. ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO. OF TEXAS,

No. 77.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Waco Division.

August 16, 1911

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Charles A. Boynton, U.S. Atty., and Philip J. Doherty, Special Asst. U.S. Atty.

E. B. Perkins, Daniel Upthegrove, and Scott, Sanford & Ross, for defendant.

MAXEY District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

When counsel for the respective parties submitted their able and interesting briefs in this cause, there were pending in the Supreme Court the two cases of the United States v. A.T. & S.F. Railway Company, 220 U.S. 37, 31 Sup.Ct. 362, 55 L.Ed. 361, decided March 13, 1911, and B. & O. Railroad Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612, 31 Sup.Ct. 621, 55 L.Ed. 878, decided May 29, 1911. The former involved the construction of the hours of service act, and the latter, among other questions, its constitutionality. In the present case counsel for the defendant contend, as the court understands their objections, that the act is repugnant to the Constitution in the following particulars: (1) In attempting to regulate the hours of labor of employes on interstate railways; (2) that it restrains the right of contract in violation of the fifth amendment of the Constitution, in that it arbitrarily and capriciously interferes with the right of the employer and employe to contract with reference to personal service; and (3) that the discrimination between telegraphers in stations that are 'continuously operated night and day' and 'stations that are continuously operated only during the daytime ' is an arbitrary classification, rendering the proviso of the act void.

Reference will be hereinafter made to other objections of counsel which affect the construction of the act as applied to the facts of this particular case.

1. Consideration will be first given to the constitutional questions.

At the outset it is well to state that the defendant, a Texas corporation, is engaged in both interstate and intrastate, or domestic, commerce, as shown by the stipulation of counsel, and that its telegraph operators, Scarff and Alford, upon the dates mentioned in the petition, handled dispatches, reports, and orders affecting the movements of trains that were handling both intrastate and interstate freight and passenger traffic. The defendant is clearly subject to the provisions of the statute, and the question to determine is whether the act itself is in harmony with the Constitution. In view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Baltimore & Ohio Case, extended discussion of the constitutional questions would seem to be unnecessary. Counsel in their elaborate briefs have presented every phase of these questions in an exceedingly interesting manner, and have submitted a large number of authorities which they claim support their contention that the statute was beyond the constitutional power of the Congress to enact. But the Supreme Court has otherwise decided. In the Baltimore & Ohio Case a bill was filed by the railroad company to annul an order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Discussing the question, Mr. Justice Hughes, as the organ of the court, said:

'Although the question was not specifically raised by the bill, it is now contended that the statute is unconstitutional in its entirety, and therefore no action of the commission can be based upon it. It is said that it goes beyond the power which Congress may exercise in the regulation of interstate commerce; that, while addressed to common carriers engaged in interstate transportation by railroad to any extent whatever, its prohibitions and penalties are not limited to interstate commerce, but apply to intrastate railroads and to employes engaged in local business. The prohibitions of the act are found in section 2. This provides that it shall be 'unlawful for any common carrier, its officers or agents, subject to this act to require or permit any employe subject to this act to be or remain on duty' for a longer period than that prescribed. The carriers and employes subject to the act are defined in section 1 as follows: 'That the provisions of this act shall apply to any common carrier, or carriers, their officers, agents, and employes, engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad in the District of Columbia or any territory of the United States, or from one state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia to any other state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States. The term 'railroad' as used in this act shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any common carrier operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement or lease; and the term 'employe' as used in this act shall be held to mean persons actually engaged in or connected with the movement of any train.'

'No difficulty arises in the construction of this language. The first sentence states the application to carriers and employes who are 'engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad' in the District of Columbia or the territories, or in interstate or foreign commerce.

The definition in the second sentence, of what the terms 'railroad' and 'employes' shall include, qualify these words as previously used, but do not remove the limitation as to the nature of the transportation in which the employes must be engaged in order to come within the provisions of the statute. If the definition in the last part of the sentence of the words used in the first part be read in connection with the latter, the meaning of the whole becomes obvious. The section in effect thus provides: 'This act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers, their officers, agents, and employes (meaning by 'employes' persons actually engaged in or connected with the movement of any train), engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad (meaning by 'railroad' to include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad) in the District of Columbia or any territory * * * or from one state * * * to any other state,' etc. In short, the employes to which the act refers, embracing the persons described in the last sentence of the section, are those engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad in the district, territorial, interstate, or foreign commerce defined; and the railroad, including bridges and ferries, is the railroad by means of which the defined commerce is conducted.

'The statute, therefore, in its scope, is materially different from Act June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 33 Stat. 232 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1148), which was before this court in the Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 28 Sup.Ct. 141, 52 L.Ed. 297. There, while the carriers described were those engaged in the commerce subject to the regulating power of Congress, it appeared that, if the carrier was so engaged, the act governed its relation to every employe, although the employment of the latter might have nothing whatever to do with interstate commerce. In the present statute the limiting words govern the employes as well as the carriers.

'But the argument undoubtedly involves the consideration that the interstate and intrastate operations of interstate carriers are so interwoven that it is utterly impracticable for them to divide their employes in such manner that the duties of those who are engaged in connection with interstate commerce shall be confined to that commerce exclusively. And thus many employes who have to do with the movement of trains in interstate transportation are by virtue of practical necessity also employed in intrastate transportation. This consideration, however, lends no support to the contention that the statute is invalid; for there cannot be denied to Congress the effective exercise of its constitutional authority. By virtue of its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, Congress may enact laws for the safeguarding of the persons and property that are transported in that commerce and of those who are employed in transporting them. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1, 25 Sup.Ct. 158, 49 L.Ed. 363; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 177, 178, 28 Sup.Ct. 277, 52 L.Ed. 436; St. Louis & Iron Mountain Railway Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 28 Sup.Ct. 616, 52 L.Ed. 1061; Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railway Company v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 31 Sup.Ct. 612, 55 L.Ed. 582, decided May 15, 1911, The fundamental question here is whether a restriction upon the hours of labor of employes who are connected with the movement of trains in interstate transportation is comprehended within this sphere of authorized legislation. This question admits of but one answer. The length of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency of the human agencies upon which protection to life and property necessarily depend. This has been repeatedly emphasized in official reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and is a matter so plain as to require no elaboration. In its power suitably to provide for the safety of employes and travelers Congress was not limited to the enactment of laws relating to mechanical appliances, but it was also competent to consider, and to endeavor to reduce, the dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of duty on the part of engineers, conductors, train dispatchers, telegraphers, and other persons embraced within the...