United States v. Greathouse

• Decision Date: 19 April 1897
• Docket Number: No. 234,234
• Citation: 166 U.S. 601,17 S.Ct. 701,41 L.Ed. 1130
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. GREATHOUSE
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

166 U.S. 601

17 S.Ct. 701

41 L.Ed. 1130

UNITED STATES

v GREATHOUSE.

No. 234.

April 19, 1897.

Asst. Atty. Gen. Dodge, for the United States.

John C. Fay, for appellee.

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought in the court of claims on the 24th day of April, 1894.

The claimant, Greathouse, was appointed consul general of the United States at Kanagawa, Japan, and served in that capacity from August 1, 1886, to March 31, 1889. Since the last-named date he has continuously resided in foreign countries, and had not, when this cause was heard below, returned to the United States.

During the above period he collected $1,795 from sundry persons for certifying invoices of goods shipped through the United States in transit to foreign countries, and $61 from other persons for certifying the value of Japanese currency attached to such invoices.

Under the rules and regulations of the state and treasury departments the fees so collected were 'accounted for and paid' to the United States, the first payment being made on January 27, 1887, and the last on July 18, 1889.

On the foregoing facts found by the court of claims, the majority of that court held as a conclusion of law that the claimant was entitled to recover from the United States $1,856, which was the aggregate amount of the above payments to the United States.

As it is a condition or qualification of the right to a judgment against the United States in the court of claims that, except where the claimant labors under some one of the disabilities specified in the statute, the claim must be put in suit by the voluntary action of the claimant, or be presented to the proper department for settlement within six years after suit could be commenced thereon against the government (Finn v. U. S., 123 U. S. 227, 232, 8 Sup. Ct. 82), it is contended that the court below erred in not holding that all demands for sums paid by the claimant into the treasury prior to April 24, 1888, were barred by limitation, and that judgment should not have been rendered for any sum in excess of the aggregate amount paid by claimant into the treasury after that date.

By section 1069 of the Revised Statutes of the United States it is provided that: 'Every claim against the United States, cognizable by the court of claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement thereof is filed in the court, or transmitted to it by the secretary of the senate or the clerk of the house of representatives as provided by law, within six years after the claim first accrues: provided, that the claims of married women first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one years first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued, entitled to the claim, shall not be barred if the petition be filed in the court or transmitted, as aforesaid, within three years after the disability has ceased; but no other disability than those enumerated shall prevent any claim from being barred, nor shall any of the said disabilities operate cumulatively.'

It will be observed that by this section 'persons beyond the seas,' having claims against the United States cognizable by the court of claims, were entitled to sue within three years after the disability of absence was removed. As Greathouse was beyond the seas during the whole period covered by his claim, and up to the institution of this action, the limitation of six years would not apply to this case, if the exception made by the Revised Statutes of 'persons beyond the seas' is still in force.

It is contended that since the passage of the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505, c. 359), entitled 'An act to provide for the bringing of suits against the United States,' known as the 'Tucker Act,' the limitation of six years is applicable to all claims against the United States cognizable by any court, under whatever disability the claimant may have labored.

That act provides: 'The court of claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters: First. All claims founded upon the constitution of the United States or any law of congress, except for pensions, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the government of the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States, either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty, if the United States were suable: provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to either of the courts herein mentioned, jurisdiction to hear and determine claims growing out of the late Civil War, and commonly known as 'war claims,' or to hear and determine other claims, which have heretofore been rejected, or reported on adversely, by any court, department, or commission authorized to hear and determine the same. Second. All set-offs, counterclaims, claims for damages,...