United States v. Greenberg
Decision Date | 17 November 1971 |
Docket Number | Cr. No. 71-88. |
Citation | 334 F. Supp. 1092 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Meyer GREENBERG et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Peter M. Handwork, Asst. Atty. for the U. S., Toledo, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Robert J. Rotatori, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants.
Anthony J. Arnone, one of the defendants in this case, and his twelve co-defendants were charged in an indictment with both a conspiracy to violate Title 18 U.S.C. § 1955, thereby violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, and conducting an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 1955.
The grand jury returned a ten count indictment. Counts IV, VI, VIII and X charge this defendant with conspiracy. Counts III, V, VII, and IX contain the substantive violation of § 1955 against this same defendant.
This defendant has now moved to dismiss counts IV, VI, VIII and X on the ground that there exists a duplicity of offenses charged in the indictment. Arnone argues that where it is impossible under any circumstances to commit the substantive offense without cooperative action the preliminary agreement between the same parties to commit the offense is not an indictable conspiracy.
There is little dispute that conspiracy, by itself, constitutes a crime.
United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 85, 35 S.Ct. 682, 683, 59 L.Ed. 1211 (1914).
Commission of a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit such an offense are separate and distinct offenses. United States v. Sykes, 305 F. 2d 172 (6th Cir. 1962).
There are, however, several important exceptions to this general rule, not all of which need to be discussed in connection with this case. In all of them there seems to be a lack of judicial clarity as to their application to particular facts, which compounds the difficulties presented by defendant's motion.
A recognized exception important in the present case has been called the "identity of offenses" exception.
In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the Court enunciated the test to be used to determine the appropriateness of this exception. At page 304, 52 S.Ct. at page 182, the Court stated:
This test, although clearly delineated and often applied when two substantive offenses are involved, does not appear to have been affirmatively applied in any case involving conspiracy. This may be due in part to the fact that in those cases where it has arisen the substantive offense involved only required the action of one party, whereas the conspiracy offense required the combination of two persons. This would seem to constitute the additional fact required to establish a separate offense. This test does not lend itself to decisive application in this case since both the conspiracy and the substantive offense require a plurality of actors. In attempting to apply this test to these circumstances, the result is a hopeless semantic quagmire.
The second and perhaps most important exception, for purposes of this case is what is known as the "concert of action" rule. This has also come to be known as "Wharton's Rule", and is stated in Wharton, 2 Criminal Law § 1339 as follows:
This doctrine has at least been recognized by many courts, although in many cases it has been held to be inapplicable to the case presented.1 What is observed from all of the cases which touch upon this area is that the statutory requirements essential to the substantive offense must be taken into consideration.
The substantive crime involved here, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, reads in relevant part as follows:
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