United States v. Honeywell Int'l Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 08-0961 (PLF) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Defendant Honeywell International Inc. ("Honeywell") moves this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify for interlocutory appeal its November 25, 2020 order denying summary judgment. Defendant Honeywell International Inc.'s Motion for Certification Under 28 USC § 1292(b) ("Def. Mot.") [Dkt No. 235]. Plaintiff, the United States, opposes the motion. United States of America's Opposition to Honeywell's Motion for Certification of the Damages Part of the Court's November 25, 2020 Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) ("Gov't Opp.") [Dkt. No. 237]. Upon consideration of the parties' written submissions, the relevant case law, and the relevant portions of the record in this case, the Court will grant Honeywell's motion.1
The United States brought this action against Honeywell under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33, and the federal common law of unjust enrichment. Compl. ¶ 1; Am. Compl. ¶ 1. The United States alleges that Honeywell made false statements and omissions in relation to the sale of defective body armor containing a Honeywell product, Z Shield, which was sold to the United States and to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies funded in part by the United States. Compl. ¶ 1; Am. Compl. ¶ 1.
This action has been the subject of four prior opinions: United States v. Honeywell Int'l Inc. ("Honeywell I"), 798 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2011) (motion to dismiss); United States v. Honeywell Int'l Inc. ("Honeywell II"), 841 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2012) (motion to strike); United States v. Honeywell Int'l Inc. ("Honeywell III"), 318 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 2016) (); United States v. Honeywell Int'l Inc. ("Honeywell IV"), 502 F. Supp. 3d 427 (D.D.C. 2020) (). The Court has previously recounted the factual and procedural history of this litigation, most recently in its opinion denying Honeywell's motion for summary judgment. See Honeywell IV, 502 F. Supp. 3d, at 434-47. The Court therefore will limit its discussion here to the issues presented by Honeywell's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
On June 7, 2019, after the close of discovery, Honeywell moved for summary judgment, arguing that the United States could not succeed at trial under any theory of FCA liability or unjust enrichment and that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Def. Mot. SJ at 1. As relevant to this present motion, Honeywell argued that it was entitled to a pro tanto offset, or "dollar-for-dollar reduction," of its FCA statutory damages liability, based on amounts the United States had received through settlements with other defendants for common damages. Def. Mem. SJ. at 47. Honeywell contended that a pro tanto offset would entitle it to summary judgment, because the amount the United States had received through such settlements was greater than the amount of Honeywell's alleged FCA statutory damages liability, resulting in "no statutory damages left to be determined at trial." Id. at 50. The United States argued in response that the Court should apply the proportionate share methodology for calculating damages offsets, whereby "each defendant must pay its proportionate share of the damages as determined by the fact finder at trial." Gov't Opp. SJ at 45. Under the proportionate share approach, summary judgment would be inappropriate because the fact finder would still need to calculate Honeywell's proportionate share of common damages. See id. at 46.
On November 25, 2020, the Court issued its opinion and order denying Honeywell's motion for summary judgment. Honeywell IV, 502 F. Supp. 3d 427; Nov. 25, 2020 Order [Dkt. No. 232]. With respect to the measure of damages, the Court determined that the proportionate share approach to calculating damages offsets applies in an FCA case involving multiple alleged joint tortfeasors, and therefore, that a factual question remains as to Honeywell's FCA statutory damages liability. Honeywell IV, 502 F. Supp. 3d, at 485-86.
On December 18, 2020, Honeywell moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify for interlocutory appeal the Court's November 25, 2020 order denying summary judgment on the grounds that the proportionate share approach governs damages offsets. Def. Mot. at 1. On January 6, 2021, the United States filed its memorandum of law opposing interlocutory appeal, and on January 19, 2021, Honeywell filed its reply in support of certification. Gov't Opp.; Def. Reply.
Section 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This provision represents a departure from the "basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment," Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978) (citations omitted), and provides "an avenue for review" of certain nonfinal orders "in appropriate cases," Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 530 (1988).
Pursuant to Section 1292(b), the district court may certify an order for immediate appeal if it makes the following three findings: "(1) the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) a substantial ground for difference of opinion concerning the ruling exists; and (3) an immediate appeal would materially advance [the ultimate termination of] the litigation." Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 2003)). Interlocutory appeal is only appropriate if all three requirements are satisfied. See Swint v. Chambers Country Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 46 (1995) (); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1002 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (). "This screening procedure serves the dual purpose of ensuring that [interlocutory] review will be confined to appropriate cases and avoiding time-consuming jurisdictional determinations in the court of appeals." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 461.
The first requirement of Section 1292(b) is that the order contain "a controlling question of law." "A 'question of law is an abstract legal issue or what might be called one of 'pure' law, matters the court of appeals can decide quickly and cleanly without having to study the record.'" Arias v. DynCorp, 856 F. Supp. 2d 46, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Elkins v. District of Columbia, 685 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 n.2 (D.D.C. 2010)). Where "the crux of an issue decided by the Court is fact-dependent," however, certification is inappropriate as this "could only result in the court of appeals improperly wading into the factual pond of an ongoing matter." Keystone Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 217 F.R.D. 235, 238-39 (D.D.C. 2003).
The requirement that an issue be "controlling" means that a ruling on that issue "would require reversal if decided incorrectly or [] could materially affect the course of [the] litigation with resulting savings of the court's or the parties' resources." Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., 317 F. Supp. 3d at 4 (quoting Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Pol'y Dev. Grp., 233 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2002)). "[T]he resolution of an issue need not necessarily terminate an action in order to be controlling, but instead may involve a procedural determination that may significantly impact the action." Air Transp. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 317 F. Supp. 3d 385, 394 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 96). "The impact that the appeal will have on other cases is also a factor supporting a conclusion that the question is controlling." APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 96.
The second requirement of Section 1292(b), "substantial ground for difference of opinion," is "often established by a dearth of precedent within the controlling jurisdiction and conflicting decisions in other circuits," and "also exists where a court's challenged decision conflicts with the decisions of several other courts." APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 97-98; see also Gov't of Guam v. United States, No. 17-cv-2487, 2019 WL 1003606, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2019) (). "A mere claim that the district court's ruling was incorrect does not demonstrate a substantial ground for difference of opinion." Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
"It is not necessarily enough, however, that there are conflicting decisions in other circuits." Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., 317 F. Supp. 3d at 5. Similarly, "[t]he mere fact that a substantially greater number of judges have resolved the issue one way rather than another does not, of itself, tend to show that there is no ground for difference of opinion." APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (emphasis added) (quoting In Re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 99-197, MDL No. 1285, 2000 WL 33142129, at *2 (D.D.C...
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