United States v. Hunter

• Decision Date: 28 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1751.,12–1751.
• Citation: 708 F.3d 938
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Casey Darrel HUNTER, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

708 F.3d 938

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Casey Darrel HUNTER, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 12–1751.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 27, 2012.

Decided Feb. 28, 2013.

John K. Mehochko, Attorney, Linda L. Mullen (argued), Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Rock Island, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

George F. Taseff (argued), Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Peoria, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before FLAUM and TINDER, Circuit Judges, and THARP, District Judge. ^*

TINDER, Circuit Judge.

The United States brings this interlocutory appeal from a district court order suppressing statements made by the defendant, Casey Darrel Hunter, to two law enforcement officers who were interrogating him. The district court granted Hunter's motion to suppress because it found that Hunter had unambiguously invoked his right to counsel before the interrogation with these officers had begun. We agree with the district court that Hunter had unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, and therefore, all questioning by law enforcement officers should have ceased under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Because the two officers here interrogated Hunter after he had unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, Hunter's statements during the interrogation are not admissible.

I

On the afternoon of May 3, 2010, Rock Island Police Officers Timothy Muehler and Jeff Key stopped a pickup truck after they witnessed the two occupants apparently engaging in a drug deal. Shortly after the truck stopped, the defendant, Hunter, fled from the passenger seat of the truck with something resembling a gun in his hand. Officer Muehler ordered Hunter to stop running, but Hunter continued to run. The officers then heard a gunshot. Officer Muehler immediately fired three shots at Hunter, striking him once in the left buttock and once in the foot. Hunter fell to the ground and was handcuffed. Police recovered a six-shot .38 revolver from the ground close to Hunter. The revolver had one spent shell casing in the cylinder.

Police arranged to have Hunter transported to Trinity Medical Center via ambulance so that he could receive treatment for his gunshot wounds. Rock Island Police Detective Gene Karzin, who had arrived at the scene shortly after the shooting, agreed to accompany Hunter in the ambulance and to “babysit” Hunter in the emergency room until the investigating officers arrived. Hunter was handcuffed to the hospital gurney at all times while receiving medical treatment. Although Hunter's injuries were not life-threatening, Hunter told the emergency room staff that his pain registered at a “ten out of ten,” and as a result, doctors administered morphine, fentanyl, and other narcotics to Hunter in the emergency room. Still, the nurse who had treated Hunter testified that he had remained “alert and oriented” throughout his time in the emergency room. (The district judge found that Hunter's alertness and capability of making a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights were not affected by either his injuries or his treatment. That finding is not implicated in this appeal.) While Hunter was receiving treatment, Detective Karzin sat silently in the room until Hunter initiated the following interaction (as recounted by Detective Karzin's testimony):

Q. Mr. Hunter asked if there were officers in the room, and you identified yourself?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. At that point is when you advised him of his Miranda rights?

A. Correct.

Q. And after you advised Mr. Hunter of his Miranda rights, what did he say?

A. ... one of the questions he asked me is what he was charged with.... He told me that he understood his rights. Then I asked him what occurred today. He said he didn't know. I asked him if he was willing to speak with me about the incident. He stated that he was willing to talk to me, but he just wanted a minute to think. At that point then he asked me what his charges were.... I walked out of the room because I didn't know at this point, and I talked to Sergeant Chadwick who, I believe, was waiting in the hallway out there. The only thing Sergeant Chadwick indicated to me was that they had found a gun at the scene.... So, I walked back in, told Mr. Hunter, I said, Well, they found a gun at the scene. Mr. Hunter then responded to me, So, you have me for being a felon in possession of a firearm? I indicated to Mr. Hunter that I believed that that was the case, as at that point I didn't know of any additional charges.... After that, at that point he asked to make some—several phone calls for him.

Q. And what specifically did the defendant say?

A. Best I can recollect, he said, Hey, can you call my mother and my father? I said, Okay. Do you have numbers for them—names and numbers? And he provided me the names and numbers. And then he says, Can you call my attorney? Told me Mr. Schultz was his attorney. Hospital personnel were still working on him. They were doing their thing. I asked him—after that, I asked him, What do you want me to tell these people? He stated, Tell them that I've been shot.

Detective Karzin never made any “attempt to contact Attorney Herbert Schultz,” even though Schultz was a well-known criminal defense attorney with whom Karzin had worked on several previous cases. Instead, he waited for Illinois State Police Investigator Dyan Morrisey and Milan Police Detective Chris George, who were assigned to investigate the case, to arrive at the emergency room. At that time, Karzin “indicated to Investigator Morrisey and George the information that [Hunter] provided and that he requested, that we contact three individuals and inform them that he had been shot.” Morrisey and George did not remember Karzin telling them to call Schultz, so without any further action, they entered Hunter's hospital room and began interrogating him less than two hours after he had been shot.

Investigator Morrisey and Detective George began the interrogation by reading Hunter his full Miranda rights from a pre-printed card. Hunter did not ask Morrisey and George to call his attorney, nor did Hunter mention his earlier request that Karzin call his attorney. However, Hunter did ask Morrisey and George, “Do you know my attorney, Herb Schultz?” Morrisey and George did not view Hunter's question as an invocation of the right to counsel, and proceeded with their questioning. During the interrogation that followed, Hunter made incriminating statements, including an admission that he was in the pickup truck because “he was actually making a gun transaction with [the driver,] Buddy.”

Hunter's incriminating statements to Morrisey and George combined with the evidence found at the scene of the shooting led to Hunter's indictment on June 22, 2011 for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2). Soon after his indictment, Hunter filed a motion to suppress his statements to Morrisey and George, claiming that he had “clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel under Miranda by telling Detective Karzin, immediately upon receiving the Miranda admonishments, ‘to call my mother, my father, and my lawyer, Herb Schultz.’ ” Hunter argued that because he had made a clear and unequivocal request for counsel to Detective Karzin, he should have never been subject to Morrisey and George's subsequent interrogation.

The district court agreed with Hunter, finding “no reasonable dispute” that Hunter's question, “Can you call my attorney?” was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. The district court further rejected the government's argument that Hunter's request should be interpreted in light of his subsequent behavior:

The government argues that, in telling his attorney that he has been shot, he is not invoking his Miranda rights. This argument fails, because once he stated that he wanted them to call his attorney, he had invoked his Miranda rights, and once done, the police could not go on to question him without a clear indication from him that he did not wish to have an attorney present.

As a result, the district court granted Hunter's motion to suppress his statements to Investigator Morrisey and Detective George on January 27, 2012.

A month later, the government filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its January 27, 2012 order suppressing Hunter's statements. The government emphasized that Edwards did “not require police officers to cease all conversation or communication with a defendant once a defendant requests counsel; rather, it requires that interrogation cease.” Detective Karzin's question, “What do you want me to tell these people?” did not amount to interrogation, the government argued, because it “was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Consequently, the government asserted that consideration of Hunter's response, “Tell them that I've been shot,” was appropriate when determining whether Hunter unambiguously invoked his right to counsel.

Once again, the district court rejected the government's argument. On February 28, 2012, the district court denied the government's motion to reconsider, finding that “What do you want me to tell these people?” amounted to interrogation. The court reasoned, “[W]hat answer could [Hunter] give that—other than perhaps the one he did—that would not be incriminatory? Or ... what would this detective ... have expected that this guy was going to say to that question?” After the district court held for a second time that it would suppress Hunter's statements to Investigator Morrisey and DetectiveGeorge, the government filed this timely interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we review the district court's decision on Hunter's motion to suppress “de novo ..., but we review all findings of historical fact and credibility determination deferentially, under the clear error standard.” United States v. Johnson, 170 F.3d...