United States v. Hyde

Citation132 F. 545
Decision Date02 September 1904
Docket Number4,198.
PartiesUNITED STATES v. HYDE et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Francis J. Heney, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Arthur B. Pugh and Oliver E. Pagin, Sp. Asst. U.S. Attys., and Marshal B. Woodworth U.S. Atty.

Garret W. McEnerney and Bert Schlesinger, for defendant Frederick A Hyde.

Samuel Knight, for defendant Henry P. Dimond.

DE HAVEN, District Judge.

This is an application under section 1014 of the Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 716), for a warrant to remove the defendants Hyde and Dimond from the Northern District of California to the District of Columbia for trial upon an indictment found by the grand jury of the Supreme Court of that District. The indictment contains 42 counts. The first is the only one that it will be necessary to consider. It is therein charged that on December 30, 1901, Frederick A. Hyde John A. Benson, Henry P. Dimond, and Joost H. Schneider entered into a conspiracy in the district of Columbia to defraud the government of the United States out of its title to large tracts of the public lands open to selection under the laws of the United States, in lieu of lands included within the limits of fores- reservations established and to be established in the states of California and Oregon; that the object of this conspiracy was to be accomplished 'by means of a false and fraudulent practice, whereby the said Frederick A. Hyde and John A. Benson were to obtain fraudulently from the said states of California and Oregon title to and possession of school lands lying within the limits of such forest reserves and open to purchase from those states by residents thereof, respectively, * * * upon application being made to the proper authorities of the said states, respectively, by any such resident, supported by his affidavit, showing * * * his intention to purchase such lands in good faith and for his own benefit, and that he has made no contract or arrangement to sell the same, which said school lands were to be so obtained from the said states by making and filing with the said authorities applications for the purchase of the same, and assignments of the same, and of the certificates of purchase thereof, in the names of fictitious persons, and in the names of persons not really desiring and not qualified to purchase the same, * * * and by supporting such applications with forged and fraudulent affidavits and affidavits false, and known to the said Frederick A. Hyde And john A. Benson were to cause to be relinquished, * * * by means of false and forged * * * conveyances, to the said United States, either directly or indirectly, either through the said Frederick A. Hyde, or through divers agents and attorneys of the said Frederick A. Hyde and John A. Benson, * * * as would be found convenient or necessary, the pretended rights of such fictitious persons, respectively, and require and procure such real persons to make * * * conveyances, either directly or indirectly, * * * to the said United States, of the titles to and possession of such school lands so by the use of the names of such real persons fraudulently to be obtained from the said states, and this, in either case, in exchange as aforesaid of public lands to be selected, and for titles thereto by patent to be obtained, by and on behalf of the said Frederick A. Hyde and John A. Benson, in the names of such fictitious or real persons, or in the names of the said Frederick A. Hyde, * * * as would be found convenient or necessary, from the public lands of the United States, in lieu of such lands lying within the limits of such forest reserves as aforesaid.'

1. The defendants resist removal, and insist that the facts set out in the enactment do not sufficiently charge them with a conspiracy to defraud the United States, within the meaning of section 5440 of the Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901 p. 3676). It is well settled that, in an application for a warrant of removal under section 1041 of the Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 716), it is the duty of the judge to inquire into the sufficiency of the indictment, when the application for removal is based upon the indictment alone, and, if in such case the indictment does not charge an offense, the warrant should be refused. The first question then for consideration at this time is that which relates to the sufficiency of the indictment. Do the facts set forth in the first count show that defendants entered into a conspiracy to defraud the United States out of the title to any of its public lands? It is claimed by the government that the indictment should be construed as charging, in addition to other matters, that the defendants conspired together to obtain from the states of California and Oregon patents for school lands in the names of fictitious persons, and then to exchange the apparent title so obtained for lands of the United States, and, for the purpose of effecting such exchange, were to give to the United States forged conveyances executed in the names of such fictitious patentees, purporting to convey to the United States land covered by such patents, and also deeds executed by apparent grantees of such fictitious persons, purporting to convey to the United States other portions of such patented land. If such is the true construction of the indictment, there can be no doubt that it sufficiently charges the defendants with a conspiracy to defraud the United States out of the title to the lands which it might give in exchange for such fictitious titles, for in the case of such an exchange the government would receive no title at all to the lands apparently conveyed to it. A patent issued in the name of a fictitious person conveys no title. It is no simply voidable, but is absolutely void. Moffat v. United States, 112 U.S. 24, 5 Sup.Ct. 10, 28 L.Ed. 623; United States v. Southern Colorado Coal & Town Co. (C.C.) 18 F. 273. The title to the lands covered by such void patents would therefore still remain with the states which issued them. But it is not clear that the contention of the government as to the construction of the indictment in this respect can be sustained. Its most direct and certain allegation is that the conspiracy contemplated that the defendants 'Frederick A. Hyde and John A. Benson were to obtain fraudulently from the said states of California and Oregon title to and possession of school lands lying within the limits of forest reserves open to purchase from those states. ' The indictment then proceeds to set forth that one of the ways by which such title was to be fraudulently acquired was for Hyde and Benson to make and file 'with the said authorities applications for the purchase thereof, in the names of fictitious persons. ' If this allegation means anything at all, it is that the...

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8 cases
  • Wormward v. Taylor
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 11 Julio 1950
    ...interest, right or title in any other. Malone v. Peay, 157 Tenn. 429, 7 S.W.2d 40; Arnd v. Lerch, 162 Md. 318, 159 A. 587; United States v. Hyde, D.C., 132 F. 545; Black's Law Dictionary. From such a complaint, the defendant, Ryckman, would be justified in assuming that the plaintiff claime......
  • Williams v. McCann
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 24 Septiembre 1963
    ...See Antley v. Antley, 132 S.C. 306, 128 S.E. 31. Also Gladstone Mountain Mining Co. v. Tweedell, 132 Wash. 441, 232 P. 306; U. S. v. Hyde, D.C.Cal., 132 F. 545, affirmed, 199 U.S. 62, 25 S.Ct. 760, 50 L.Ed. 90; 31 C.J.S. Estates § 8. So we say in another way that the right of alienation is ......
  • Jackson v. Jackson
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 14 Marzo 1952
    ...inheritance, free from any and every qualification or condition. Security Trust Co. v. Moberley, 199 Ky. 703, 706, 251 S.W. 964; U. S. v. Hyde, D.C., 132 F. 545; Gourley v. Countryman, 18 Okl. 220, 90 P. 427. It is clear that the deed under which appellant claims his interest in the propert......
  • Borgquist v. Ferris
    • United States
    • New Jersey Court of Chancery
    • 2 Febrero 1933
    ...and absolute interest and property in land; it means an indefeasible legal title; the entire title and interest in land. United States v. Hyde (D. C.) 132 F. 545. affirmed 199 U. S. 62, 25 S. Ct. 760, 50 L. Ed. The word "seizin" precludes an equitable title. Chancellor Vroom in Disborough v......
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