United States v. James
| Decision Date | 04 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:15-CR-00049-TBR |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. KENYATTA TYRONE JAMES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
A single-count indictment charges Kenyatta Tyrone James with being a felon-in-possession of a firearm. Rather than proceed with the benefit of counsel, James has decided to mount his own defense. Over the course of the past three months, he has done just that: He has commenced an energetic motion practice generating, for purposes of this opinion, eight motions on subjects ranging from dismissing the indictment against him to obtaining various items of discovery. The Court has carefully and thoughtfully considered the litany of motions before it. For the reasons explained more fully below, the Court DENIES all but one.
On May 20, 2015, Kenyatta Tyrone James was indicted on one charge of violating the federal felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The only count of the indictment reads:
For some time prior to that date, James was confined at the Roederer Correctional Complex in LaGrange, Kentucky based on a state court conviction. R. 7 at 1 (Petition for Writ). After securing the indictment, the Government obtained an arrest warrant and filed a detainer for James with the Warden.1 R. 70 at 1 (Government's Response to Third Motion to Dismiss). When the Government learned that the Warden would not honor the detainer, it petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on July 1, 2015.2 R. 64 at 1 (Government's Response to Second Motion to Dismiss); see also R. 7. The writ issued on July 2, see R. 8 (Writ), and James was appointed a federal defender at his arraignment on July 28 before Magistrate Judge Lindsay, see R. 10 at 1 (Magistrate Judge's Order of July 29, 2015).
The following day, citing a conflict of interest, James' federal defender moved to withdraw as counsel of record. R. 9 at 1 (Motion to Withdraw). Magistrate JudgeLindsay granted that motion, appointed new counsel for James, and held his detention hearing (which James waived) on July 30. See R. 11 at 1 (Magistrate Judge's Order of July 30, 2015); R. 15 at 1 (Magistrate Judge's Order of July 31, 2015).
Subsequently, the Court held a telephonic status conference with the parties on August 28. Counsel informed the Court that each side was in the process of reviewing discovery, and the Court orally scheduled a subsequent telephonic status conference for October 2. See also R. 20 at 1 (Order of September 3, 2015).
On August 31, however, James filed various papers (pro se) to dismiss the indictment against him, to waive his right to counsel, and to compel the production of grand jury materials. See R. 17 (First Motion to Dismiss); R. 18 (Motion to Waive Right to Counsel); R. 19 (Motion to Compel Grand Jury Materials). Meanwhile, on September 12, James (through counsel) moved to suppress the Glock .40 caliber pistol on which the Government based the felon-in-possession charge. See R. 23 (Motion to Suppress). Only two days later, on September 14, James (pro se, again) moved to compel the Government to produce a host of information. See R. 25 (First Motion for Discovery); R. 26 (Second Motion for Discovery); R. 27 (Third Motion for Discovery). The Government sought to strike James' pro se filings on September 14, R. 30 (Motion to Strike), but asked to withdraw that request on the same day, R. 31 (Motion to Withdraw Motion to Strike).
The litany of papers—some filed pro se, others filed through counsel—caused considerable confusion. During the telephonic status conference held on October 2, defense counsel informed the Court that James was adamant about representing himself. Accordingly, the Court scheduled a Faretta hearing for November 16. Out of fairness tothe Government, and in the interest of justice, the Court also granted the Government additional time to respond to James' various pleadings.
Adding to his energetic motion practice, on October 28, James filed a renewed motion to dismiss. See R. 50 (Second Motion to Dismiss). Then, on November 13, he filed a third motion to dismiss. See R. 63 (Third Motion to Dismiss). The Court held the Faretta hearing on November 16, subsequently found that James knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and scheduled an in-person further proceedings hearing for December 11. See R. 65 (Order of November 23, 2015). The Court later moved the in-person further proceedings to December 10. See R. 66 at 1 (Order of November 24, 2015).
From then on, James' extensive motion practice has continued unabated. James asked to withdraw the motion to suppress filed by his former attorney on November 30. See R. 69 (Motion to Withdraw Motion to Suppress). In addition, James filed papers seeking prompt disposition of his outstanding filings on December 7. See R. 71 (Motion for Prompt Disposition). Following the December 10 hearing, the Court granted James' request to withdraw the motion to suppress. See R. 74 at 1, ¶ 6 (Order of December 22, 2015). Most recently, on December 15, James asked to strike supposed "surplusage" from the indictment returned against him. See R. 72 (Motion to Strike Surplusage from Indictment). James' case is set for trial on February 16, 2016. R. 74 at 1, ¶ 1.
James moves to dismiss with prejudice the indictment against him. R. 17 at 1. He advances four arguments in support of his motion. None are persuasive.
First, James points to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (), and says that because more than seventy days have passed since the grand jury indicted him, the indictment must be dismissed. See R. 17 at 1, ¶ 1; see also R. 17-1 at 2-5 (Memorandum in Support).3 While James' factual premise is correct, his legal conclusion isn't. In short, contrary to James' understanding, the statutory time period has not elapsed.
The Speedy Trial Act is not simple. To start, the seventy-day "limit for trial begins to run from the latter of two days: when the defendant is indicted, or when the defendant is arraigned." United States v. Blackmon, 874 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) . The endpoint for the calculation is the date on which the defendant last moved to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds. See United States v. Tinson, 23 F.3d 1010, 1012 (6th Cir. 1994) ; United States v. Peterson, 411 F. App'x 857, 862 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Payton, 257 F. App'x 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2007).
But even once the clock starts, the seventy-day period "is subject to numerous exclusions." United States v. Smith, 510 F. App'x 390, 394 (6th Cir. 2013); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). Some exclusions are automatic. See Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 203 (2010). For example, the seventy-day clock is tolled when a party files a pretrial motion and remains tolled while the Court awaits filings from either party on that issue. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); see also United States v. Robertson, 260 F.3d 500, 503-04 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 438-39 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Moran, 998 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1993). If the motion requires a hearing, then "the entire period between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the hearing" is excludable. Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 329 (1986); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). In either situation, once the Court has received all the papers it reasonably expects, the motion is taken "under advisement," and the seventy-day clock remains tolled for no more than thirty days following. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H); see also Robertson, 260 F.3d at 504; Jenkins, 92 F.3d at 439; United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 327 (6th Cir. 1988).
Others exclusions require the Court to make specific findings on the record. See Bloate, 559 U.S. at 203; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7). One such exclusion results from a continuance "granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Such a continuance "must be based on a court's 'findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.'" United States v. Williams, 753 F.3d 626, 634 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)).
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