United States v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 18 July 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 3:17-cr-00114,3:17-cr-00114
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SHAMAIN JOHNSON and DEANTHONY BRYANT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SHAMAIN JOHNSON and DEANTHONY BRYANT, Defendants.

NO. 3:17-cr-00114

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

July 18, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Government's motion to reconsider (Doc. No. 213) the part of the Court's June 20, 2019 Memorandum and Order (Doc. Nos. 192-193) that granted Defendant Johnson's motion to suppress evidence from the February 13, 2017 Wal-Mart traffic stop. The Government asks the Court to reconsider its legal conclusion that Johnson was seized when his car was blocked by the car of the Metro detectives, arguing instead that he was seized several seconds later when the officers made contact with him in his car. The Government further contends that this correction should lead to a finding of reasonable suspicion sufficient to defeat the motion to suppress. Johnson opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 219.) For the following reasons, the motion to reconsider will be granted.

I. Legal Standard

Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure make no provision for motions to reconsider, "[c]ourts adjudicating motions to reconsider in criminal cases typically evaluate such motions under the same standards applicable to a civil motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 59(e)." United States v. Robinson, 5 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting United States v. Titterington, No. CR-2-20165, 2003 WL 23924932, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. May 22, 2003)). Under Rule 59(e), the Sixth Circuit has held motions to alter or amend judgment may be granted if there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999)). "A Rule 59(e) motion 'may not be used to argue a new legal theory.'" Roger Miller Music, Inc. v. Sony/ATV Publ'g, LLC, 477 F.3d 383, 395 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting FDIC v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992)). The motion "is proper only if it contains 'an argument or controlling authority that was overlooked or disregarded in the original ruling, presents manifest evidence or argument that could not previously have been submitted, or successfully points out a manifest error of fact or law.'" Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-260, 2012 WL 124080, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 17, 2012).

II. The Court's June 20 Order

In the June 20 Order, the Court concluded that Metro detectives did not have reasonable suspicion at the time they seized Johnson's vehicle. In doing so, the Court examined the testimony of Detectives Moore and Irwin and concluded that reasonable suspicion did not exist at the time the driver of the red truck exited his vehicle. (Doc. No. 192 at 16-19.) The Court then considered whether subsequent developments tipped the totality of the circumstances in favor of reasonable suspicion. (Id.) The Court held that reasonable suspicion needed to exist by the time the police detectives "engaged their vehicle lights and blocked Johnson's car, not after when they exited the police vehicle and approached his car on foot." (Doc. No. 192 at 16.)

The Court concluded that the testimony of Detective Irwin was "neither consistent nor credible." (Id. at 19.) Detective Moore's testimony did not pose this problem. Moore explained that it was only after he exited the parked police car that he witnessed suspicious behavior betweenthe two individuals in the tan car. (Id.) The Court granted the motion to suppress because the detectives had not articulated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity "when they crossed the aisle, engaged their lights, and blocked Johnson's vehicle." (Id. at 20.)

The Court's conclusion regarding the time of the seizure arose, in part, because it did not appear to be a disputed issue. The Government's opposition brief, for example, appeared to focus on the detectives having sufficient facts to conclude that Johnson was engaged in criminal activity prior to blocking his car. (See Doc. No. 73 at 6-7.) This approach continued at the motions hearing, where Government's counsel and its witnesses appeared to agree concerning when Johnson was seized. For example, the Government inquired of Moore: "After you seized Mr. Johnson, or they're not free to leave because your lights are on, what did you do next?" Moore replied, "I exit the vehicle to make contact with the front passenger - front seat occupant Mr. Johnson." Likewise, the Government had this exchange with Irwin:

Q: Typically, when you cut on your lights on your police car, is someone free to go?

A. No.

Q. So they're seized at that point?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. So when you cut your lights on in this video, Mr. Lee and Mr. Johnson were not free to leave?

A: No.

(Doc. No. 203 at 28.) These inferences, of course, are not dispositive if there is contrary controlling authority that must be applied by the Court.

III. Analysis

The Government argues that the seizure did not commence until Johnson became alerted to the detectives' presence when the detectives approached the vehicle and Johnson submitted to the detectives' show of authority. (Doc. No. 213 at 2-6.) The Government further argues that a change in the time of seizure should alter the reasonable suspicion totality of the circumstancesanalysis in its favor. (Id. at 7-9.) Johnson argues that authority supports denying motion on the ground that he passively submitted to the police. (Doc. No. 219.)

A. The Terry Principle and Measuring When a Seizure Occurs

It is axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids "unreasonable searches and seizures." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). In service of this rule, the Supreme Court endorsed the principle that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). However, the court cautioned that "not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Id. at 19 n. 16; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) ("[T]he crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would "have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.") "[W]hat constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to leave will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a defendant cannot be "seized" unless a show of authority has been communicated by the police and the defendant has concluded that he or she is not free to leave. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) ("[T]here is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned."); United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2010) ("In order for a seizure to occur, the encounter must not be consensual and the officers must use physical force or the individual must submit to the officers' show of authority."); United States v.Jones, 562 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 2009) (passengers in vehicle are "seized" only to the extent that they submit to officers' show of authority); United States v. McCauley, 548 F.3d 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2008) (defendant was not "seized" until the point that he had complied with officers' orders and submitted to a show of authority).

A defendant's awareness of the police's show of authority is implicit in the oft-cited trio of cases in which the Sixth Circuit has concluded that a seizure occurred when a police car blocked in the car of a defendant. Johnson contends that, in these cases, the police seized the defendants solely by virtue of blocking their cars. (Doc. No. 219 at 4.) However, a closer examination reveals that, under the circumstances of each of these cases, the defendant was alerted to the police action that the court found to be the seizure, and this awareness necessarily contributed to the court's conclusion that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt free to leave. See United States v. Young, 707 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that seizure occurred when police vehicle blocked car, officers shined flashlights into defendants' car, and defendant responded); United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding seizure occurred when police vehicle blocked car, officers shined spotlight into defendant's car, and officers "observed the passenger react"); United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding seizure occurred when police vehicle parked in front of, and thus in clear sight of the passengers in, the defendant's vehicle that was backed into a parking spot).

Notably, Johnson does not dispute the importance of being alert to the police show of authority. (See Doc. No. 219 (agreeing that the measuring point for his seizure is when "a reasonable person in the car would believe that she was free to leave or to terminate contact with the police; and, that submission to police authority is necessary before there is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis added).) It is true, as Johnson indicates, that the Supreme Courthas noted that "what may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to...