United States v. Kibble

• Decision Date: 01 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-7009,20-7009
• Citation: 992 F.3d 326
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Ryan Scott KIBBLE, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

992 F.3d 326

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Ryan Scott KIBBLE, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-7009

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 29, 2021

Decided: April 1, 2021

ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer Rada Herrald, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Michael B. Stuart, United States Attorney, Jennifer Rada Herrald, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KEENAN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published per curiam opinion. Chief Judge Gregory and Judge Quattlebaum wrote concurring opinions.

PER CURIAM:

Ryan Kibble began serving a 57-month term of imprisonment at FCI Elkton shortly after he pled guilty to one count of traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), (e). After the coronavirus began infecting staff and incarcerated persons at FCI Elkton, Mr. Kibble sought compassionate release. He argued that his chronic health conditions placed him at a heightened risk for contracting and suffering severe complications from the disease

. The district court denied the motion for compassionate release. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I.

On March 1, 2019, Mr. Kibble logged onto an app called "Meet Me" and began talking with several "presumably single adult women." J.A. 66. He "matched" with and started talking to someone who identified herself as an 18-year-old female. But upon learning that she was only 14, Mr. Kibble kept talking to her. He engaged her in sexual conversations: first via text message, then over the phone. Ultimately, the two arranged to meet in person and have sex.

As planned, Mr. Kibble left his Belpre, Ohio office the next day and drove to a parking lot in Parkersburg, West Virginia. There Mr. Kibble was greeted, not by a 14-year-old girl, but by law enforcement who immediately arrested him. The teenage girl that Mr. Kibble thought he was talking to was actually an undercover federal agent.

A grand jury indicted Mr. Kibble. Initially, the district court remanded him to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. But a month later, it released him on his own recognizance. While out on bond, Mr. Kibble negotiated a plea agreement with the Government, in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct and the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining count in the indictment. The parties also agreed that a sentence of 46–78 months, coupled with a 15-year term of supervised release, was appropriate. The district court conditionally accepted the negotiated plea.

Mr. Kibble remained out on bond for ten months in between his change-of-plea hearing on March 18, 2019 and his sentencing hearing on January 14, 2020. At sentencing, the district court calculated Mr. Kibble's guidelines range as 46-57 months’ imprisonment. J.A. 133. The court rejected Mr. Kibble's request for a low-end sentence and imposed a 57-month term of imprisonment instead. In selecting this sentence, the court explained:

[A] sentence at the top of the guidelines was called for because of the egregious nature of the defendant's misconduct. Not only did the defendant express a willingness and a desire to engage in an illicit sexual relationship with a minor, he engaged in a conversation that even without consummating a sexual act would certainly contribute to, for want of a better word, the delinquency of the minor.

I find the defendant's behavior despicable and inexcusable. And I think this cries out for a sentence at the top of the guidelines, particularly to impose the maximum deterrent impact on others who might be tempted to engage in similar conduct.

The Court believes that sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary to adequately punish the defendant for his serious offense behavior, to instill within the defendant and the public a proper respect for the law, and to provide for a proper period of incapacitation and a suitable opportunity for rehabilitation. J.A. 152.

The court also imposed a 15-year term of supervised release and ordered Mr. Kibble to pay a $5,000 special assessment. After imposing this sentence, the district court, without objection from the Government, continued Mr. Kibble's bond and allowed him to self-report. J.A. 154. Mr. Kibble began his prison sentence on February 14, 2020.

To Mr. Kibble's misfortune, he entered FCI Elkton only shortly before COVID-19 did. Mr. Kibble was born with tricuspid atresia

, a heart condition that has required two open heart surgeries, a cardiac catheterization procedure, and a surgery to redirect blood from his lower body to his lungs. Mr. Kibble also has non-alcohol related cirrhosis of the liver. Concerned that these underlying conditions would make him more susceptible to contracting COVID-19 and suffering serious complications, Mr. Kibble filed an emergency motion for compassionate release. He contracted the virus shortly thereafter.

The district court acknowledged that Mr. Kibble's medical conditions, when viewed in conjunction with the dire infection rate at FCI Elkton, presented "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for granting a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). It nonetheless denied Mr. Kibble's motion, finding that he posed a danger to the safety of others and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors counseled against early release. Mr. Kibble timely appealed.

II.

To date, we have not decided in a published opinion what standard governs our review of a grant or denial of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Several of our sister circuits review for an abuse of discretion, finding that "the standard applicable to other motions for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2) [ ] instructive." United States v. Chambliss , 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020) ; see also United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1112 (6th Cir. 2020) United States v. Rodd , 966 F.3d 740, 747–48 (8th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Pawlowski , 967 F.3d 327, 330–31 (3d Cir. 2020). We now follow suit.

Section 3582(c)(2) ’s language mirrors § 3582(c)(1) ’s in relevant respects. Like § 3582(c)(1), it provides that a "court may reduce [a] term of imprisonment," upon considering the § 3553(a) factors, if certain conditions are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). Like our prior unpublished decisions on this issue, we see no reason to adopt different standards for these parallel provisions.¹ We therefore review the district court's denial of Mr. Kibble's motion for abuse of discretion.

III.

Before 2018, district courts could only reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) "upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2002). BOP used its power to identify candidates for compassionate release with noted infrequency. United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing U.S. Dep't of Just. Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Compassionate Release Program 1 (2013), https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/e1306.pdf) (last visited March 25, 2021) (saved as ECF opinion attachment). For years, BOP resisted congressional efforts to expand eligibility for compassionate release. Id. ; United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1110 (6th Cir. 2020). So, when Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, it amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See First Step Act, Pub. L. 115-391 § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018) (titled "Increasing the Use and Transparency of the First Step Act"). As amended, § 3582(c) permits incarcerated persons to file motions for compassionate release directly with the district court so long as they first exhaust their administrative remedies. Id.²

Relevant here, § 3582(c)(1)(A) permitted the district court to reduce Mr. Kibble's term of imprisonment if it first found that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ed] such a reduction," then considered the § 3553(a) factors, and ultimately determined that the requested reduction was consistent with the "applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) ; Chambliss , 948 F.3d at 693–94. The district court enjoyed broad discretion in conducting this analysis. Jones , 980 F.3d at 1112 ; Brooker , 976 F.3d at 237–38 ; Chambliss , 948 F.3d at 693.

The district court concluded that Mr. Kibble's health conditions, within the context of a high-spread facility like FCI Elkton, amounted to extraordinary and compelling circumstances, a finding that the Government does not challenge on appeal. The district court nonetheless denied Mr. Kibble's motion, holding that a sentence reduction would not be consistent with USSG § 1B1.13, p.s. and that the § 3553(a) factors counseled against a sentence reduction. Although the district court erred in applying USSG § 1B1.13, p.s. to Mr. Kibble's motion, it did not abuse its discretion in applying the § 3553(a) factors to Mr. Kibble's case.

A.

Section 3583(c)(1) requires that a sentence reduction be "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Here, the district court held that USSG § 1B1.13 was "applicable" to Mr. Kibble's request. USSG § 1B1.13 renders an incarcerated person ineligible for a sentence reduction if the district court determines that he is "a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)." The district court found that Mr. Kibble posed a danger to the public and concluded that he did not qualify for § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief.

But we have since held that USSG § 1B1.13 only applies when a request for...