United States v. Koons

Decision Date10 March 2017
Docket Number No. 15-3854,No. 15-3794, No. 15-3825, No. 15-3894, No. 15-3880,15-3794
Citation850 F.3d 973
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Timothy D. KOONS, Defendant–Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Kenneth Jay Putensen, Defendant–Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Randy Feauto, Defendant–Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Esequiel Gutierrez, Defendant–Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Jose Manuel Gardea, Defendant–Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellants was Joseph Herrold, AFPD, of Des Moines, IA.

Pamela Wingert, of Spirit Lake, IA filed a brief on behalf of Esequiel Gutierrez (15–3880). Joseph Herrold filed a brief on behalf of all other defendant/appellants.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Patrick J. Reinert, AUSA, of Cedar Rapids, IA. The following attorney appeared on the appellee brief; Shawn Wehde, AUSA, of Sioux City, IA.

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In these consolidated appeals, five defendants convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses appeal denial of their motions for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). For all five, the initial advisory guidelines range was entirely below the statutory mandatory minimum, and each was sentenced below that minimum after the district court granted government motions for § 3553(e) substantial assistance departures. The question is whether § 3582(c)(2) relief is now available because Amendment 782 to the Guidelines retroactively reduced by two levels the base offense levels assigned to drug quantities, lowering the advisory guidelines range for most drug offenses. We conclude that these defendants are not eligible for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction because their sentences were not "based on" a guidelines range subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of sentencing reductions on a different ground.

I.

In November 2012, Randy Feauto pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture and distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm. Feauto's advisory guidelines range was 168 to 210 months in prison, but the conspiracy offense mandated a statutory minimum 20–year sentence, which became his guidelines sentence under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). The government moved for a substantial assistance downward departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) ; U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The government recommended a ten percent reduction because Feauto had continued dealing drugs while assisting law enforcement by making controlled buys from drug dealers. The district court imposed a 132–month sentence, 45 percent below the mandatory minimum.

After Amendment 782 became effective on November 1, 2014, the district court initiated a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding to determine whether Feauto was eligible for a sentence reduction. The United States Probation Office calculated his amended guidelines range to be 121 to 151 months in prison, disregarding § 5G1.1 of the Guidelines, as U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) instructs. Promulgated by the Commission in Amendment 780, § 1B1.10(c) provides, with emphasis added:

Cases Involving Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Substantial Assistance . If the case involves a statutorily required minimum sentence and the court had the authority to impose a sentence below the statutorily required minimum sentence pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities, then for purposes of this policy statement the amended guideline range shall be determined without regard to the operation of § 5G1.1 (Sentencing on a Single Count of Conviction) and § 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction).

This appeared to make Feauto eligible for discretionary § 3582(c)(2) relief that could reduce his sentence to as low as 67 months, a reduction comparable to the initial 45 percent substantial assistance reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.4.

At the § 3582(c)(2) motion hearing, the district court commented, "I don't see how a retroactive guideline can essentially trump a mandatory minimum like it does in this case," and ordered briefing on the issue. The government and Feauto agreed he was eligible for a reduction, but disagreed as to whether the district court should exercise its discretion to reduce his sentence. After giving the parties an opportunity to comment on its tentative decision, the court ruled that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating a guideline, § 1B1.10(c), that nullifies the statutory minimum sentence, or that Congress violated the non-delegation doctrine and separation-of-powers principles if it granted that authority. Accordingly, the district court concluded, Feauto was not eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief because he "was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence exceeding both his original guideline range and his amended guideline range." United States v. Feauto , 146 F.Supp.3d 1022, 1041 (N.D. Iowa 2015). This decision was consistent with controlling Eighth Circuit precedent prior to the adoption of § 1B1.10(c) in November 2014. See United States v. Moore , 734 F.3d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 2013).

The other four appellants were likewise convicted of drug conspiracy offenses mandating statutory minimum sentences greater than their entire advisory guidelines ranges—Timothy Koons (20–year mandatory minimum), Kenneth Jay Putensen (life), Jose Gardea (10 years), and Esequiel Gutierrez (20 years). Each was granted a substantial assistance reduction below the mandatory minimum sentence—Koons to 180 months (25 percent); Putensen to 264 months (35 percent); Gardea to 84 months (30 percent); and Gutierrez to 192 months (36 percent). Amendment 782 lowered their amended guidelines ranges further below the mandatory minimum, calculated in accordance with § 1B1.10(c). The district court denied § 3582(c)(2) sentencing reductions, relying on its ruling in Feauto . These appeals followed. We review defendants' eligibility for § 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions de novo . United States v. Bogdan , 835 F.3d 805, 807 (8th Cir. 2016).

II.

Providing a rare exception to the finality of criminal judgments, § 3582(c)(2) allows a district court to reduce the sentence of "a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission ... if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." The applicable policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, provides that a defendant is eligible for a discretionary § 3582(c)(2) reduction if his applicable guidelines range is lowered by a retroactive amendment listed in § 1B1.10(d), such as Amendment 782. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a). The extent of a § 3582(c)(2) reduction is normally limited to the bottom of the amended guidelines range, but if the defendant initially received a sentence below the initial guidelines range by reason of a substantial assistance reduction, "a reduction comparably less than the amended guideline range ... may be appropriate." § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B).

For a defendant to be eligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a), Amendment 782 must lower his applicable guideline range. A conflict in the circuits developed regarding how to determine eligibility when the applicable guidelines range is affected by a mandatory minimum sentence. Some circuits held that a retroactive amendment did not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guidelines range because, by reason of § 5G1.1(b), the amended and original range were both determined by the mandatory minimum. See, e.g. , United States v. Joiner , 727 F.3d 601, 608–09 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1357, 188 L.Ed.2d 357 (2014) ; United States v. Johnson , 732 F.3d 109, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2013) ; United States v. Baylor , 556 F.3d 672, 673 (8th Cir. 2009). In promulgating § 1B1.10(c), the Commission explained that "circuits are split over what to use as the bottom of the [amended] range." The Commission "generally adopt[ed]" the approach of the Third Circuit and the D.C. Circuit—when a defendant's initial guidelines range was entirely below the mandatory minimum, "the bottom of the amended range [is] ... the bottom of the Sentencing Table guideline range," disregarding § 5G1.1(b). U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 780, at 56 (Supp. 2015), citing United States v. Savani , 733 F.3d 56, 66–67 (3d Cir. 2013), and In re Sealed Case , 722 F.3d 361, 369–70 (D.C. Cir. 2013).1

The government's interpretation of § 1B1.10(c) makes defendants eligible for § 3582(c)(2) reductions, contrary to our controlling prior precedents. See Moore , 734 F.3d at 838 ; Baylor , 556 F.3d at 673. On appeal, the government argues that § 1B1.10(c) requires us to reexamine these precedents and urges us to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in United States v. Williams , 808 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2015). Defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582(c)(2) reductions, the government argues, because § 3582(c)(2) authorizes a reduction based on a defendant's substantial assistance if it is "consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."

As we noted in Bogdan , 835 F.3d at 807, the government, like the Commission, ignores a critical "threshold question" raised by the plain language of § 3582(c)(2), namely, whether each defendant was sentenced "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added); see Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 821, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). Like the defendants in this case, Joseph Bogdan's guidelines range was entirely below the mandatory minimum, and he received an initial sentence below the mandatory minimum...

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