United States v. Lamp

• Decision Date: 14 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. SA-84-CR-121(1).,SA-84-CR-121(1).
• Citation: 606 F. Supp. 193,79 ALR Fed 439
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Robert Lyle LAMP, Jr., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

606 F. Supp. 193

79 ALR Fed 439

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Robert Lyle LAMP, Jr., Defendant.

No. SA-84-CR-121(1).

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.

February 14, 1985.

Vincent D. Callahan, San Antonio, Tex., for defendant.

Mitchell Weidenbach, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SESSIONS, Chief Judge.

ON THIS DATE came on to be heard the Oral Motion of the Defendant, Robert Lyle Lamp, Jr., to be admitted to bail pending appeal of his conviction in the above-styled and numbered cause. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Defendant has met his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or present a danger to any person or the community, and that his appeal presents a substantial question of fact or law likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant's motion to remain free on bail pending appeal, subject to the terms and conditions already imposed upon the Defendant.

I INTRODUCTION

The Court begins its analysis by looking to the applicable statute, which was recently amended as part of the bail reform amendments to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), which provides:

RELEASE OR DETENTION PENDING APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT.—The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for certiorari, be detained, unless the judicial officer finds—

(1) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released pursuant to Section 3142(b) or (c); and

(2) that the appeal is not for purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.

If the judicial officer makes such findings, he shall order the release of a person in accordance with the provisions of Section 3142(b) or (c).

18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). The amended statute clearly sets forth a presumption that a defendant should not be allowed to go free on bail pending appeal unless he proves both that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the community and that his appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or a new trial. The predecessor to Section 3143(b) provided only that Defendant not pose a danger to the community or be likely to flee, and that the appeal was not "frivolous" or taken for purposes of delay. The practical result of the prior standard was that very few defendants were denied bail pending appeal on the grounds that such an appeal was "frivolous." See 3A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 767 (1982). The second requirement for release pending appeal, that the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact, represents a clear departure from the prior standard, and thus shall be considered first in the court's analysis.

II SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF FACT OR LAW

A. History

The procedural history surrounding the second prong of the test for bail pending appeal, whether the appeal presents a "substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal," should be helpful in analyzing the intent and scope of the recent bail amendments. Professor Wright succinctly sets forth the second element's history in his learned treatise on federal procedure:

The first of the circumstances in which § 3148 the predecessor to § 3143(b) allows the court to have a defendant detained pending appeal is if it appears that the appeal is frivolous. This requirement had previously appeared in Criminal Rule 46(a)(2), as it stood from 1956 to 1972, and should receive the same construction under the statute as under the rule. When Rule 46(a)(2) was originally adopted in 1946 it had allowed bail pending appeal "only if it appears that the case involves a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate court." The Supreme Court, acting on its own rather than on a recommendation from the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, amended that in 1956 to provide for bail "unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay." The new standard was intended to liberalize the granting of release pending appeal, and it is this lighter standard that was taken without change into the 1966 statute the Bail Reform Act of 1966.

3A C. Wright, supra at § 767 (fn.'s omitted).

This trend towards "liberalization" of the standard for allowing bail pending appeal was clearly checked by the bail reform amendments of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. This Court must now determine how stringent a test Congress intended to impose upon a defendant seeking bail pending appeal by its recent amendment of the relevant section.

B. The Statutory Provision

The issues in this case turn on the interpretation of the 1984 amendments to the Bail Reform Act, and in particular, the changes in the section pertaining to bail pending appeal. It is well established that the starting point in every case involving statutory construction is the language of the statute itself. If the statutory words are clear, there is neither need nor warrant to look elsewhere. See American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. I.C.C., 659 F.2d 452, 458-9 (5th Cir.1981), opinion clarified (on other issues), 666 F.2d 167, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022, 103 S.Ct. 1272, 75 L.Ed.2d 493 (1982). Section 3143(b)(2) requires the judicial officer to find "that the appeal is not for purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2). A court should not depart from the official text of the statute and seek extrinsic aids to its meaning unless the language is not clear or the apparent clarity of language leads to absurdity of result when applied. American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. I.C.C., supra at 459. Despite the apparent clarity of Section 3143(b)(2), the Court finds that a strict and literal application of the statute would lead to denial of bond in every appeal, and therefore, the Court must look further to effectuate the intent of Congress in amending the provisions for bail pending appeal. In so doing, the Court recognizes the Supreme Court's admonition that a court may not "interpret a statute so narrowly as to defeat its obvious intent." United States v. Braverman, 373 U.S. 405, 408, 83 S.Ct. 1370, 1372, 10 L.Ed.2d 444 (1963).

If the sub-section is taken literally, the Court should never grant bond unless the Defendant raises a substantial question that is "likely to result in reversal;" in effect, the section compels the Court to find that it has committed reversible error in the course of the trial in order to release a defendant pending appeal. If the Court finds that it committed reversible error, the proper course would be to grant a new trial or a judgment of acquittal rather than forcing the Defendant to appeal a conviction the Court knows is unjust. This inconsistency has been noted by the commentators, and has been the subject of much discussion by members of the federal judiciary. As one leading commentator has stated:

If "likely" means "probable," there will be almost no cases in which a trial judge could find that an appeal was "likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial" ... but if "likely" means something less than "probable" (such as a substantial possibility), it becomes easier to find that an appeal is likely to result in reversal but harder to find that a defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger.

A. Partridge, The Crime Control and Fine Enforcement Acts of 1984: A Synopsis at 27 (Federal Judicial Center 1985).

It is clear to this Court that if the words "likely to result in reversal" are taken literally, then this Court would be remiss in its duties under Rule 29(c) or Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in not granting a motion for acquittal or directing a new trial. It would be an absurd result for the Court to grant an appeal under this standard while simultaneously denying a motion for a new trial or for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the Court must look beyond the words of the statute to ascertain the true intent of Congress in amending this provision.

C. Statutory Construction

Faced with this apparent ambiguity, the Court has the ultimate responsibility to determine any issues of statutory interpretation. Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F.Supp. 78, 82 (N.D.Fla.1976), citing with approval, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261, 88 S.Ct. 929, 19 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1968). The presumption against interpreting a statute in a way which renders it ineffective is hornbook law and simply beyond peradventure. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir.1968). In seeking to construe this statute, the Court keeps in mind the basic axiom that "courts should construe all legislative enactments to give them some meaning...." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 415, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1219, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970).

In this case, if the Court construes "likely to result in reversal" to mean that it is more probable than not that the Court has committed reversible error, then a defendant would never be freed on bail pending appeal because the court should grant a new trial or judgment of acquittal. Thus, a literal interpretation of "likely to result in reversal" would result in the statute being a nullity: if the only cases where appeal is to be granted are those cases in which the Court should grant a new trial or a judgment of acquittal, then Section 3143(b) is not a standard for determining when bail should be granted on appeal, but is rather a directive that absent a new trial or judgment of acquittal, bail should not be granted....