United States v. Lebman
Decision Date | 05 July 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71-2281.,71-2281. |
Citation | 464 F.2d 68 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hyman LEBMAN, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Joel W. Westbrook, Sheehy, Cureton, Westbrook, Lovelace & Nielsen, Waco, Tex., for defendant-appellant.
Seagal V. Wheatley, former U. S. Atty., Reese L. Harrison, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., Harry H. Ellis, Dallas, Tex., William S. Sessions, U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., James F. Gaulding, Asst. Regional Counsel, I. R. S., Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before WISDOM, GOLDBERG and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Hyman Lebman appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon a guilty plea to three counts of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b) (3), 922(b) (5), and 922(m), provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968. We affirm.
On September 11, 1970, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Lebman and two others charging seventeen counts of violations of Chapter 44, title 18, United States Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928, and one count of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371. Lebman was named in the first ten substantive counts and in the conspiracy count. Lebman entered a guilty plea on the first three substantive counts. The counts, all arising from the same transaction, charged Lebman with (1) aiding and abetting a licensed firearm dealer to sell and deliver a firearm "to a person not residing in the State of Texas whom he then and there knew and had reasonable cause to believe did not reside in the State of Texas, where such licensed firearms business was located, in violation of Section 922(b) (3), title 18, United States Code,1 (2) aiding and abetting a licensed firearm dealer to sell and deliver a firearm "to a purchaser and to fail to note in records required to be kept pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923, the name, age, and place of residence of such purchaser, in violation of Section 922(b) (5), title 18, United States Code",2 and (3) aiding and abetting a licensed firearm dealer "to make a false entry in records kept pursuant to Section 923, Title 18, United States Code, and regulations promulgated thereunder . . . in violation of Section 922(m), title 18, United States Code".3 Lebman's guilty plea was accepted and a judgment of conviction entered. After entry of the conviction, but prior to sentencing, Lebman filed a "Motion in Arrest of Judgment" urging grounds similar to those raised on this appeal. The motion was denied, and Lebman received a fine of five hundred dollars and a sentence of twelve months on each count to run concurrently. The sentences were suspended, and Lebman was placed on five years' unsupervised probation.
On appeal, Lebman challenges the constitutionality of the statutory provisions under which he was convicted. He argues, first, that 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b) (3), 922(b) (5), and 922(m) (see footnotes 1-3) are not supported by the commerce power of Congress in that the statutes do not require the proscribed conduct to have any relation to interstate commerce. Stated otherwise, Lebman contends that Congress may not, by criminal sanctions, regulate this intrastate transaction.
Lebman is, however, incorrect in his assertion that the power of Congress to regulate commerce under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution does not extend to intrastate transactions. "If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze". United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n., 1949, 336 U.S. 460, 464, 69 S.Ct. 714, 716, 93 L.Ed. 805, 811.
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See M\'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579. Cf. United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199, 39 S. Ct. 445, 63 L.Ed. 936.
United States v. Darby, 1941, 312 U.S. 100, 118, 61 S.Ct. 451, 459, 85 L.Ed. 609, 619. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824, 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23; National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 1937, 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893; Wickard v. Filburn, 1942, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 1964, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258.
Congress, in conjunction with the passage of Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,4 made detailed findings as to the effect of the proscribed intrastate conduct on interstate commerce.5 These findings, when examined against the evidentiary background upon which they were based,6 convince us that Congress intended to and had the authority, under its commerce power, to regulate the intrastate transactions at issue here. See Perez v. United States, 1971, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 1964, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed.2d 258.7 Lebman seeks to rely on United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (December 21, 1971) as authority for his argument that Congress was acting beyond its commerce power if it sought, by the statutory provisions at issue here, to regulate intrastate transactions. In Bass, the defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (App.)8 He argued that Section 1202(a) required that he possess a firearm "in commerce or affecting commerce". The Court, after concluding that "the statutory materials are inconclusive on the central issue of whether or not the statutory phrase `in commerce or affecting commerce' applies to `possesses' and `receives' as well as `transports' 92 S.Ct. at 522, adopted the narrower reading of the statute—"the phrase `in commerce or affecting commerce' is part of all three offenses, and the present conviction must be set aside because the Government has failed to show the requisite nexus with interstate commerce". 92 S.Ct. at 522.
In United States v. Nelson, 5 Cir. 1971, 458 F.2d 556, this Court, in a case dealing with the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (6),9 distinguished Bass with language equally applicable to the statutory provisions at issue in the present case.
See also United States v. Menna, 9 Cir. 1971, 451 F.2d 982. As in Nelson, §§ 922(b) (3), 922(b) (5), and 922(m), unlike § 1202(a), are unambiguous on their face, in that they contain no reference to interstate commerce, and are accompanied by legislative history and a statement of purpose10 and findings indicating a desire to reach intrastate transactions.11 The statutory interpretation of an ambiguous statute in Bass does not preclude the result we reach in the present case.12
Assuming that Congress, as we have held, could constitutionally enact the challenged statutes under the commerce power and intended to reach intrastate transactions under the statutes, Lebman argues that Section 922(b) (3) (see footnote 1), the basis of count one, is constitutionally defective in other respects. Lebman argues that the statute unconstitutionally inhibits the nonresident firearms purchaser's right to travel. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 1969, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600.13 Assuming, but not deciding, that Lebman has standing to raise the constitutional objection of a non-resident firearms purchaser, his argument must, nevertheless, fail. We are unable to discern any inhibition on the non-resident firearms purchaser's right to travel occasioned by a statute regulating the sale of firearms to a non-resident by a licensed dealer. Nor do we find that the distinction in Section 922(b) (3) between residents and non-residents is "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of Congress's . . . objective". McGowan v. Maryland, 1961, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399. This is particularly true...
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