United States v. Lkav

• Decision Date: 02 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–10483.,12–10483.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. LKAV, Juvenile Male, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

712 F.3d 436

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.LKAV, Juvenile Male, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 12–10483.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 15, 2013.

Filed April 2, 2013.

J. Ryan Moore (argued), D. Erendira Castillo–Reina, and Brian I. Rademacher, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Tucson, AZ, for Juvenile–Appellant.

Christina Cabanillas (argued) and Ann L. DeMarais, Assistant United States Attorneys, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 4:11–cr–02966–JGZ–CRP–1.

Before: JEROME FARRIS and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges, and TIMOTHY M. BURGESS, District Judge.^*

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

When the United States charges a juvenile with an act of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (the “FJDA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–42, the district court must follow 18 U.S.C. § 5037(e) if it commits the juvenile for a study of the juvenile's competency to stand trial. Because the district court in this case instead committed LKAV under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tribal authorities of the Tohono O'odham nation charged LKAV (age 17) with murder in May 2009.¹ After being charged, he remained in tribal custody from 2009 until 2011. While in custody, he was found incompetent, but was not sent to a treatment facility for restoration to competency. In late 2011, the United States filed its own charge against LKAV and obtained a writ of habeas corpus to remove him from tribal custody. To obtain federal jurisdiction over LKAV, the United States filed a “Certification to Proceed Against Juvenile Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 5032, as Amended.” The United States certified that LKAV's charge warranted federal jurisdiction and signaled the United States' intent to proceed against LKAV as an alleged juvenile delinquent under the FJDA.

In November 2011, the United States moved to commit LKAV, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, to an adult medical facility for psychiatric evaluation. LKAV did not oppose the United States' request to proceed under § 4241, but asked for a local evaluation. LKAV also requested a competency hearing take place before he was committed under § 4241. Deferring to these requests, the government withdrew its motion to proceed under § 4241, and the magistrate judge did not decide at that time whether § 4241 governed LKAV's commitment. The magistrate judge granted LKAV's request for a preliminary examination to take place in Phoenix, Arizona. After extensive neuropsychological examination, the examining psychologist deemed LKAV incompetent to stand trial.

LKAV then filed a motion to proceed with commitment under the FJDA, § 5037(e). At a status conference before the magistrate judge in July 2012, the United States stipulated to LKAV's incompetency. However, the United States maintained its position that LKAV should be committed to an adult facility under § 4241(d). The United States filed a motion to that effect the next day.

The magistrate judge granted the United States' motion to proceed under § 4241 and denied LKAV's motion to proceed under § 5037(e). The magistrate judge's Order of Commitment committed LKAV “to the custody of the Attorney General to be hospitalized in a suitable facility for a reasonable period of time, NOT TO EXCEED FOUR (4) MONTHS, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed.” In its own written order (the “Order”), the district court affirmed the Order of Commitment. LKAV filed a timely, interlocutory appeal of the Order, challenging his § 4241(d) commitment.

After the appeal was filed, the United States transported LKAV to FMC–Butner, an adult medical facility, pursuant to the Order. FMC–Butner completed its competency evaluation of LKAV in January 2013. FMC–Butner's report concluded that LKAV was incompetent to stand trial. However, the report further concluded that, “with an additional period of hospitalization and treatment,” LKAV could be restored to competency. The report also suggested a 120–day extension of the previous commitment deadline (set to expire in January 2013) for such hospitalization and treatment. The United States filed a motion for the requested extension, based on the report. On LKAV's motion, the district court decided to hear the motion for extension of time (rather than refer it to the magistrate judge). On February 11, 2013, the district court granted the United States' motion and extended LKAV's commitment for up to an additional 120 days.

JURISDICTION

We ordinarily hear appeals “only from a district court's final decision.” United States v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731, 742 (9th Cir.2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). However, under the collateral order doctrine, we review “a district court's preliminary or interim decision when it ‘(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003)).

Here, LKAV's challenge to the Order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine, and no party challenges our jurisdiction. The Order conclusively determines LKAV's rights with respect to his pre-adjudication commitment. Further, the issue before us—whether § 4241(d) applies to LKAV—is completely separate from the ultimate issue of LKAV's delinquency. Finally, delay would render the Order effectively unreviewable. LKAV seeks only release from commitment at FMC–Butner. LKAV's release from FMC–Butner would obviate the need for our court to issue an order and could render LKAV's appeal moot.²See id. at 743 (“Finally, the issue is effectively unreviewablebecause [b]y the time of trial [Loughner] will have undergone forced medication—the very harm that he seeks to avoid.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court's interpretation of §§ 4241(d) and 5037(e) de novo. See United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th Cir.2012) (“We review a district court's construction or interpretation of a statute de novo.”).

DISCUSSION

“As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.” United States v. Harrell, 637 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To aid our inquiry, we rely on our established rules of statutory construction....” Id. We also look to similar provisions within the statute as a whole and the language of related or similar statutes to aid in interpretation. See Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1006–07, 1011 (9th Cir.2006). “[S]tatutory interpretations which would produce absurd results are to be avoided.” Arizona St. Bd. for Charter Schs. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a statute is ambiguous, we may “consult the legislative history, to the extent that it is of value, to aid in our interpretation.” Merkel v. Comm'r, 192 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir.1999). Finally, in some cases, a statute's “purpose” may shed light on the interpretive question. See Jonah R., 446 F.3d at 1005, 1010–11.

We conclude that each of the foregoing “tools” of statutory interpretation indicate that the district court should have applied § 5037(e), rather than § 4241(d). The plain language of § 5037(e) makes clear that it applies to commitment and study of alleged juvenile delinquents like LKAV. Other textual “evidence” supports this conclusion as well. Our interpretation would not lead to an absurd or irrational result. Finally, even assuming that the statutory language is ambiguous, commitment under § 5037(e) (rather than § 4241(d)) is consistent with the purpose of the FJDA, as evidenced by the statute's legislative history.

1. Plain Language

Words in statutes usually carry “their plain, natural, ordinary and commonly understood meanings.” United States v. Romo–Romo, 246 F.3d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir.2001). In addition, courts “try to avoid, where possible, an interpretation of a statute that renders any part of it superfluous and does not give effect to all of the words used by Congress.” Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 681 (9th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The United States acknowledges that it filed a certification to proceed against LKAV as an alleged juvenile delinquent pursuant to § 5032, thereby invoking the FJDA. Indeed, the United States conceded at oral argument that § 5037(e) applies to alleged juvenile delinquents. However, the United States argues that § 5037(e) does not mention competency and, thus, cannot “supplant the mandatory competency evaluation and commitment procedure for all defendants set forth in § 4241.” This argument overlooks the plain language of § 5037(e).

Section 5037(e) provides:

If the court desires more detailed information concerning an alleged or adjudicated delinquent, it may commit him, after notice and hearing at which the juvenile is represented by counsel, to the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study by an appropriate agency. Such observation and study shall be conducted on an outpatient basis, unless the court determines that inpatient observation and study are necessary to obtain the desired information. In the case of an alleged juvenile delinquent, inpatient study may be ordered only with the consent of the juvenile and his attorney. The agency shall make a complete study of the alleged or adjudicated delinquent to ascertain his personal traits, his capabilities, his background, any previous delinquency or criminal experience, any mental or physical defect, and any other relevant...