United States v. Maiello

• Decision Date: 19 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 15–10532.,15–10532.
• Citation: 805 F.3d 992
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael Paul MAIELLO, Jr., a.k.a. M.P., Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

805 F.3d 992

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Michael Paul MAIELLO, Jr., a.k.a. M.P., Defendant–Appellant.

No. 15–10532.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 19, 2015.

Susan Hollis Rothstein–Youakim, Michelle Thresher Taylor, Arthur Lee Bentley, III, Adelaide G. Few, W. Stephen Muldrow, Yvette Rhodes, U.S. Attorney's Office, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Conrad Benjamin Kahn, Rosemary Cakmis, Donna Lee Elm, Federal Public Defender's Office, Orlando, FL, for Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. D.C. Docket No: 8:07–cr–00454–JSM–TGW–11.

Before MARTIN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and PROCTOR,^* District Judge.

Opinion

PROCTOR, District Judge:

On April 10, 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission voted unanimously to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) to lower the base offense levels (found in the Drug Quantity Table in USSG § 2D1.1 ) by two levels across all drug types. The vehicle for this change was Amendment 782, which went into effect on November 1, 2014. A difficult issue that the Commission confronted in adopting Amendment 782 was whether it should be applied to eligible incarcerated offenders on a prospective basis only. Instead, the Commission opted to apply Amendment 782 retroactively, with one important exception: eligible offenders who are currently incarcerated are not eligible for release before November 1, 2015. This one-year “delay,” promulgated at USSG § 1B1.10(e), is very significant for certain prisoners. There are a number of offenders who, if given the benefit of the two level guideline reduction (without the section 1B1.10(e) delay), would otherwise be eligible for quicker relief (and, in some cases, immediate release). But these prisoners are now required to wait until November 2015 to be released from custody. Michael Paul Maiello, Jr. is one of those prisoners. He challenges the district court's decision to apply the one year delay contemplated by section 1B1.10(e) to his motion for a sentence reduction.

This case presents a straightforward question: Did the district court err when it applied section 1B1.10(e) to the motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 filed by Maiello? After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that it did not. Therefore, we affirm the district court's ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

After voting to amend the sentencing guidelines to reduce the base offense levels for most drug offenses (Amendment 782), the Commission asked for public comment on the question of retroactivity and it received more than 60,000 letters in response. That correspondence came from members of Congress, the judiciary, advocacy groups, inmates, as well as other groups and individuals. The Commission also held a public hearing and heard from representatives of the judicial and executive branches, the defense bar, law enforcement, and certain advocacy groups.

A major concern expressed at the public hearing was the impact retroactivity would have on public safety, particularly given the burdens retroactivity would place on the criminal justice system and the risks posed by the predicted early release of thousands of drug offenders.¹ Some law enforcement groups opposed retroactivity altogether, noting (among other things) concerns that early release of drug offenders would have a deleterious effect on public safety and crime rates. The Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference expressed concerns about the burdens that retroactive application of Amendment 782 would impose on an already strained probation and pretrial services system. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons detailed the laborious task of recalculating the new projected release dates, formulating release plans, and arranging for residential reentry center custody or home confinement as inmates prepared to reenter society.

A compromise was reached and Amendment 788 was passed, making Amendment 782 retroactive, albeit with a delayed effective date. USSG App. C, Amend. 788 (2014). Amendment 782 became effective immediately for defendants sentenced on or after November 1, 2014. But for defendants who were sentenced prior to the effective date, the Sentencing Commission promulgated section 1B1.10(e), which prohibits any order granting relief under Amendment 782 from taking effect prior to November 1, 2015. That is, section 1B1.10(e) prohibits district courts from reducing a “term of imprisonment based on Amendment 782 unless the effective date of the court's order is November 1, 2015, or later.” USSG § 1B1.10(e).

The Commission determined that under this framework, the administrative burdens of applying Amendment 782 retroactively, although significant, would be “manageable given the one-year delay in the effective date, which allows courts and agencies more time to prepare.” USSG App. C, Amend. 788 at 87 (Reason for Amendment). The Commission also stated that such a delay was needed for additional reasons:

(1) to give courts adequate time to obtain and review the information necessary to make an individualized determination in each case of whether a sentence reduction is appropriate,

(2) to ensure that, to the extent practicable, all offenders who are to be released have the opportunity to participate in reentry programs and transitional services, such as placement in halfway houses, while still in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, which increases their likelihood of successful reentry to society and thereby promotes public safety, and

(3) to permit those agencies that will be responsible for offenders after their release to prepare for the increased responsibility.

Id. at 88.

II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

Maiello is a prisoner who was sentenced before November 1, 2014. In 2008, he pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine. Maiello is currently serving a 108 month sentence. Based upon that sentence, his release date is February 5, 2016.

On February 3, 2015, Maiello moved for a reduction of his sentence pursuant to section 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782. Maiello requested that the reduction be granted “without application of USSG § 1B1.10(e).” The district court granted Maiello's motion in part. The court reduced Maiello's sentence “from 108 months to 80 months or time served, whichever is greater;” however, the court declined to suspend the application of section 1B1.10(e), such that Maiello's projected early release date is now November 2, 2015.² If given a 28–month sentence reduction, and had the one year delay not been applied, Maiello would have been eligible for immediate release. On appeal, he argues that the district court's application of section 1B1.10(e) was in error and that he should have been immediately released from prison based on time served.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's legal conclusions about the scope of its legal authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir.2013) (citing United States v. James, 548 F.3d 983, 984 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam)); United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir.2008) (citing United States v. White, 305 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir.2002) (per curiam)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Maiello argues that the district court, in granting his motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), erred in applying the effective-date limitation. In support of this argument, Maiello asserts that: (1) the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) by declining to suspend the application of section 1B1.10(e) ; (2) the Sentencing Commission exceeded its statutory authority in passing section 1B1.10(e) ; (3) the Sentencing Commission's selection of November 1, 2015 as the earliest possible Amendment 782 release date is arbitrary and capricious; and (4) section 1B1.10(e) violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The court addresses each of these arguments, in turn.

A. The District Court Did Not Violate 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a)

Maiello contends that, by applying section 1B1.10(e), the district court in effect lengthened or imposed a greater sentence on him (as measured by the difference in time between the date his motion for a sentence reduction was granted in part and November 2, 2015). He further argues that the district court committed error because this delayed effective date was enacted because of rehabilitative concerns in violation of Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011). Both of Maiello's assertions are off the mark.

1. There Was No Imposition or Lengthening of Maiello's Sentence

The Sentencing Commission explained its reasons for delaying the effective date of Amendment 782 until November 1, 2015. In doing so, the Commission stated in part that retroactivity was intended:

to ensure that, to the extent practicable, all offenders who are to be released have the opportunity to participate in reentry programs and transitional services, such as placement in halfway houses, while still in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, which increases their likelihood of successful reentry to society and thereby promotes public safety.

USSG App. C, Amend. 788 (2014).

In Tapia v. United States,³ the Supreme Court held that, under section 3582(a), a sentencing court “may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.”131 S.Ct. at 2393 (emphasis added). We conclude that Maiello's reliance on section 3582(a) is misplaced as that code section has a materially different purpose than section 3582(c) which applies here.

Tapia and section 3582(a) address the factors courts may properly consider when imposing a term of imprisonment. However, neither Tapia nor section 3582(a) in any way limit the factors that the Sentencing Commission may consider in...