United States v. Mandell
| Decision Date | 03 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12 CR 842 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. STEVEN MANDELL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Defendant Steven Mandell has moved for a judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, a new trial on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Six of the Superseding Indictment. For the reasons explained in detail below, the Court denies Defendants' motions.
On November 1, 2012, a grand jury returned an Indictment against Steven Mandell ("Mandell", or the "Defendant") and his co-defendant, Gary Engel ("Engel"), charging them with two counts of extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). (R. 13.) The Court subsequently granted the government's motion to dismiss co-defendant Gary Engel from the indictment after he was found dead in his prison cell. (R. 24.)
On March 21, 2013, a grand jury returned an eight-count Superseding Indictment against Defendant Mandell. (R. 38, Sup. Ind.) The Superseding Indictment charged Mandell with conspiracy to commit kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Count I); conspiracy and attempted extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Counts Two and Three); possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Four);being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count Five); obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (Count Six); and murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (Counts Seven and Eight). The Superseding Indictment also contained a forfeiture allegation. Defendant pled not guilty to each of the counts in the Superseding Indictment.
After extensive pretrial litigation, Defendant proceeded to a two week jury trial. During the course of the trial, the government called the following witnesses:
Defendant Steven Mandell also testified at trial. Defendant did not call any additional witnesses.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Defendant on Counts One through Six of the Superseding Indictment and not guilty on Counts Seven and Eight of the Superseding Indictment. Defendant now moves for a judgment of acquittal or new trial on the counts of conviction1.
Rule 29(a) provides that, "[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). When, as here, a defendant makes a Rule 29(a) motion at the close of the government's case, andthe court reserves decision, the court "must decide the motion on the basis of the evidence at the time the ruling was reserved." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(b).
"In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, [a defendant] bears a heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, burden." United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339-40 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Berg, 640 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Dinga, 609 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2009). The reviewing court will view the "evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution," and the defendant "'must convince' the court that, even in that light, 'no rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Warren, 593 F.3d at 546 (quoting United States v. Moore, 572 F.3d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Eller, 670 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Doody, 600 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2010) (). In other words, a court will "set aside a jury's guilty verdict only if 'the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed,' from which a jury could have returned a conviction." United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d 691, 704 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Moses, 513 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also Warren, 593 F.3d at 546.
It follows that under Rule 29, courts "do not reassess the weight of the evidence or second-guess the trier of fact's credibility determinations." United States v. Arthur, 582 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Severson, 569 F.3d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 2009). This strict standard is recognition that "[s]orting the facts and inferences is a task for the jury." Warren, 593 F.3d at 547. The Seventh Circuit teaches that:
[t]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moore, 572 F.3d at 337 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)).
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a); see also Berg, 714 F.3d at 500; United States v. Smith, 674 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2012) (); United States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 979 (7th Cir. 2005). "'[C]ourts have interpreted [Rule 33] to require a new trial in the interests of justice in a variety of situations in which the substantial rights of the defendant have been jeopardized by errors or omissions during trial.'" United States v. Eberhart, 388 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 1989)), overruled on other grounds, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S. Ct. 403, 163 L. Ed. 2d 14 (2005).
"'A jury verdict in a criminal case is not to be overturned lightly, and therefore a Rule 33 motion is not to be granted lightly.'" Eberhart, 388 F.3d at 1048 (quoting United States v. Santos, 20 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)). The court may grant a new trial if the jury's verdict is 'so contrary to the weight of the evidence that a new trial is required in the interest of justice.'" United States v. Washington, 184 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 1999) ( ); see also United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2011). Put another way, "[t]he court should grant a motion for a new trial only if the evidence 'preponderate[s] heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.'" United States v. Swan, 486 F.3d 260, 266 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Reed, 875 F.2d 107, 113 (7th Cir. 1989)). See also United States v. Presbitero, 569 F.3d 691, 706 (7th Cir. 2009).
Defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts against him on Counts One through Six. The Court disagrees. During the course of the trial, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that Mandell plotted with his co-defendant Gary Engel as follows:
Mandell and Engel developed a plan to kidnap and extort Steven Campbell ("Campbell"), an owner of a significant number of rental properties. Mandell and Engel agreed to pose as law enforcement officers, and arrest Campbell with a fake warrant Engel had created bearing the forged signature of a federal judge. They planned to take Campbell to 5308 West Devon in Chicago, a location that Defendants outfitted for the express purpose of killing Campbell and that Mandell chillingly referred to as "Club Med." Once they brought...
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