United States v. Moore
| Decision Date | 12 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:08-cr-310-01-RCL |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JERMAINE C. MOORE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Defendant Jermaine Moore has filed a pro se motion to vacate set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 67. In 2009, Moore pleaded guilty to three counts of a superseding indictment: two counts of transporting minors to engage in prostitution, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), and one count of simple assault violating D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(1). See 05/29/09 Min. Entry; Judgment, ECF No. 38. Now, years later Moore objects to his guilty-plea proceedings. Moore concedes that he served as a pimp for two minors-but, he says, he is innocent because he did not know they were minors. See ECF No. 67 at 22. Moore also raises three purported procedural defects: (1) that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel, (2) that the sentencing judge's court lacked jurisdiction, and (3) that he pleaded guilty unknowingly and involuntarily. Id. at 14.
The government opposes Moore's § 2255 motion. ECF No 81. It urges the Court to summarily deny Moore's claims as untimely or meritless. See id. at 5. The Court agrees. Upon consideration of Moore's motion, the government's response, applicable law, and the record as a whole, the Court will DENY Moore's § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.
In 2007 and 2008, Moore trafficked a 15-year-old girl and 17-year-old girl. Statement of Offense 1-2, ECF No. 27. Moore brought both girls across state lines into Washington, D.C., required them to engage in sex acts for money, and physically abused them when they failed to meet his nightly quotas. Id. at 1-3. The girls told Moore that they were 15 and 17 years old. Id. at 1-2. Moore had the girls stay at various hotels in Maryland while working for him as prostitutes. Id. at 2.
On November 25, 2008, a grand jury charged Moore with (1) sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or coercion, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1); (2) transporting minors to engage in prostitution, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); (3) simple assault, violating D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(1); and (4) witness tampering, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 14. On May 29, 2009, Moore pleaded guilty to two of the § 2423(a) counts for transporting minors and to the § 22-404(a) count for simple assault. See 05/29/09 Min. Entry.
On October 29, 2009, Judge Henry H. Kennedy, Jr. sentenced Moore to 204 months' incarceration, concurrently, for the two § 2423(a) counts for transporting minors and imposed a consecutive 180-day term for the § 22-404(a) simple-assault count. Sent'g Tr. 62:14-19, ECF No. 63. Judge Kennedy also imposed a life term of supervised release. Id. at 62:20-24.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed Moore's conviction in its entirety. United States v. Moore, 555 Fed.Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014). On May 19, 2014, the D.C. Circuit denied Moore's petition for rehearing en banc. Id. Moore did not file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. ECF No. 67 at 2. Years later, on October 25, 2020, Moore filed the present § 2255 motion. Id. at 11.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence if (1) the sentence was imposed “in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States”; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence “was in excess of the maximum authorized by law”; or (4) the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). The prisoner bears the burden to prove his right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Baugham, 941 F.Supp.2d 109, 112 (D.D.C. 2012). A district court need not hold an evidentiary hearing when “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
Per the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), § 2255 motions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). This limitations period begins on the latest of the date when (1) “the judgment of conviction becomes final,” (2) an “impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution” or statutes is removed, (3) the Supreme Court newly recognizes a right and makes it “retroactively applicable” to collateral proceedings, or (4) “the facts supporting the claim ... could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Id. In most cases, the limitations period ends when the “judgment of conviction becomes final.” Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005). “[A] judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction.” Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003).
The Supreme Court has left open a “gateway” to this statute of limitations-actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). If a defendant can prove that he is actually innocent of the charged offense, procedural bars and AEDPA's statute of limitations will not apply. Id. But “tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare.” Id. A defendant must demonstrate that “in light of... new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Adams v. Middlebrooks, 640 Fed.Appx. 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Actual innocence “means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). And “[i]n cases where the Government has foregone more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, [a defendant's] showing of actual innocence must also extend to those charges.” Id. at 624.
Defendant Moore brings four arguments before the Court: (1) that he “was denied effective counsel during the plea process”; (2) that “[t]he Court failed to establish jurisdiction”; (3) that his guilty plea “was unknowingly and involuntarily” given; and (4) that he is actually innocent of his § 2423(a) convictions for transporting minors to engage in prostitution. ECF No. 67 at 14. The government contends that these claims are time-barred and that Moore's actual-innocence argument misrepresents the record. ECF No 81 at 7-11. The Court agrees with the government. Moore's claims are untimely by more than five years. And Moore, in his actual-innocence argument, misinterprets § 2423(a) and misunderstands actual-innocence doctrine.
To start, Moore's § 2255 claims arrive years too late. Under AEDPA, a defendant must bring any § 2255 claims within one year of when the “judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). A judgment of conviction is “final” when a defendant's time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari expires. Clay, 537 U.S. at 525. If an appellate court denies a petition for rehearing, the defendant has 90 days from the date of that denial to file his certiorari petition with the Supreme Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 13. Since the D.C. Circuit denied Moore's petition for rehearing on May 19, 2014, Moore had until August 17, 2014 to file his certiorari petition. Per § 2255(f)(1), Moore was required to file any desired § 2255 claims by August 17, 2015. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1); Clay, 537 U.S. at 525. Moore did not bring these claims until October 25, 2020-five years after this deadline. The Court, accordingly, will deny these untimely claims.
Nonetheless Moore tries to leap over this procedural hurdle through an actual-innocence argument. Moore contends that he is actually innocent of his § 2423(a) convictions “[b]ecause he had no knowledge of the fact [that] the females were minors when he transported them across state lines.” ECF No. 67 at 22. This argument fails.
First, a § 2423(a) conviction does not require knowledge of a minor's age. The statute reads:
A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). The key clause is “knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.” Id. Moore assumes that “knowingly” modifies both phrases-that to violate § 2423(a), a defendant must know (1) that he is transporting an individual and (2) that the individual is less than 18 years old. See ECF No. 67 at 22; ECF No. 81 at 8-10. Though the D.C. Circuit has not answered this question, other circuits have. An “overwhelming number” of the federal courts of appeals “have concluded that ‘knowingly' does not extend to the victim's age.” United States v. Tyson, 947 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).[1]
The Tyson court recognized that Congress's intent in enacting § 2423(a) was to provide minors with “a heightened protection against sexual exploitation.” Id. at 144. Moore's interpretation would require the Court to ignore Congress having “eliminated offenders' opportunity to prey on children without consequence by claiming ignorance of the victim's age.” Id. (citing United States v Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 540 (2006)). Section 2423(a) therefore falls into a limited category of “special contexts”: exceptions to the traditional rule of extending a mens rea term to all...
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