United States v. Nelson

• Decision Date: 11 February 2014
• Docket Number: Criminal Action No. 11–59 RWR
• Citation: 59 F.Supp.3d 15
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: United States of America v. Gregory Scott Nelson, Defendant.

59 F.Supp.3d 15

United States of America

v.Gregory Scott Nelson, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 11–59 RWR

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

February 11, 2014

Barry Wiegand, III, Julieanne Himelstein, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan Jeffress, Rosanna Margaret Taormina, Federal Public Defender for D.C., Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD W. ROBERTS, Chief Judge

Gregory Nelson pled guilty to traveling from Virginia to Washington, D.C. to engage in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and was sentenced to 25 months of imprisonment. Nelson's later 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence was granted on the ground that Nelson's guilty plea was involuntary since the government violated its duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to Nelson. The government now moves for reconsideration of the Memorandum Opinion and Order (“Opinion”) granting Nelson's motion. Because the government has failed to demonstrate a clear legal error, the government's motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

The facts are more extensively described in the earlier Opinion.

United States v. Nelson, No. 11–59(RWR), 979 F.Supp.2d 123, 2013 WL 5778318 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2013).

Briefly, Nelson pled guilty to traveling from Virginia to Washington, D.C. to engage in illicit sexual conduct and was sentenced to a 25–month term of imprisonment. A year after he was sentenced, Nelson filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that his guilty plea was “induced through the government's violation of its constitutional obligation to produce exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland ” because the government failed to disclose an e-mail (“1:44 p.m. e-mail”) and that Nelson “did not receive the effective assistance of counsel.” Petitioner Gregory Nelson's Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Nelson's § 2255 Mot.”) at 1. Nelson's Brady v. Maryland claims were fully briefed before the Opinion was issued, although briefing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims had not concluded.

Nelson's motion to vacate his conviction and permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea was granted in the Opinion issued on October 25, 2013. Nelson, 2013 WL 5778318. The Opinion concluded that “[b]ecause the prosecution suppressed exculpatory evidence before Nelson pled guilty, Nelson's due process rights were violated to his prejudice and his guilty plea was not voluntary and knowing.” Nelson, 979 F.Supp.2d at 135–36, 2013 WL 5778318 at *9. The Opinion suspended briefing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id.

The government now moves for reconsideration of the Opinion, arguing that (1) “the Order reflects an overly narrow reading of United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002), and draws a distinction between impeachment material and other exculpatory evidence which the text of that opinion does not support”; (2) “the Order inappropriately relieves defendant of the ramifications of his actual possession of the e-mail he claims the government withheld from him”; and (3) “the Order bypasses the well-recognized principles of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), and its progeny, which articulate the standard for assessing the voluntariness of a plea.” Govt.'s Mot. to Reconsider This Court's Order Granting Def.'s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Mot. (“Govt.'s Mot.”) at 2–3. The government asserts that “the court misunderstood the government's arguments and misconstrued the holding in United States v. Ruiz, with the result that the Court's ruling reflects a clear error of law.” Govt.'s Reply to Nelson's Opp'n to the Govt.'s Mot. to Reconsider This Court's Order Allowing Def. to Withdraw His Guilty Plea (“Reply”) at 3 n.2. Nelson opposes. Nelson's Opp'n to the Govt.'s Mot. to Reconsider This Court's Order Granting Def.'s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Mot. ( “Opp'n”).

DISCUSSION

The government did not identify a rule under which it is moving for reconsideration. However, the government “does not take issue with the [defendant's] suggestion that the proper avenue for a motion to reconsider should be found in the civil rules of procedure, rather than in this Court's criminal jurisprudence.” Reply at 2. Accordingly, the government's motion will be assessed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Id. at 3 (acknowledging that the “motion to reconsider is properly filed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) ” (citing Ackerland v. United States, 633 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir.2011) ); see also Owen–Williams v. BB & T Inv. Servs., Inc., 797 F.Supp.2d 118, 121–22 (D.D.C.2011) (“As a general matter, courts treat a motion for reconsideration as originating under Rule 59(e) if it is filed within 28 days of the entry of the order at issue and as originating under Rule 60(b) if filed thereafter.” (footnote omitted)).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a party may request that a court reconsider its earlier judgment. “While the court has considerable discretion in ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion, the reconsideration and amendment of a previous order is an unusual measure.” City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 244 F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.D.C.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A motion to alter the judgment need not be granted unless there is an intervening change of controlling law, new evidence becomes available, or there is a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (citing Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C.Cir.2006) ).

“[A] losing party may not use a Rule 59 motion to raise new issues that could have been raised previously.” Kattan by Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C.Cir.1993) ; see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir.1986) (“[Motions to alter or amend a judgment] cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.”). Rather, “ ‘where litigants have once battled for the court's decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.’ ” Hoffman v. District of Columbia, 681 F.Supp.2d 86, 90 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Singh v. George Wash. Univ., 383 F.Supp.2d 99, 101–02 (D.D.C.2005) ); Singh, 383 F.Supp.2d at 101–02 (denying motion for reconsideration because “the Court considered the cases that the [defendant] now cites” and the “attempt to re-litigate this issue will not be countenanced”). A Rule 59 motion is also “not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled.” New York v. United States, 880 F.Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C.1995) ; see also Miss. Ass'n of Coops. v. Farmers Home Admin., 139 F.R.D. 542, 546 (D.D.C.1991) (“[A] motion for reconsideration must address new evidence or errors of law or fact and cannot merely reargue previous factual and legal assertions.”).

I. RUIZ

The government argues that permitting Nelson to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis of a Brady v. Maryland violation is “both inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Ruiz ... and unsupported by the law” since the Court in Ruiz “declined to impose on the government a pre-plea obligation under Brady v. Maryland ” and the “balance of circuit precedent post- Ruiz weighs against an extension of Brady v. Maryland doctrine to the plea context.” Govt.'s Mot. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The government's arguments—that Ruiz should be read broadly to say that the government has few, if any, pre-plea Brady v. Maryland obligations, and that, post-Ruiz, other courts have refused to extend the Brady v. Maryland obligation to pre-plea situations—were both raised and rejected previously. See Govt.'s Response to “Brady” Claim in Def.'s Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Govt.'s Brady Opp'n”) at 15–16 (arguing that Ruiz makes it “unclear that [a] valid Brady [v. Maryland] claim justifies withdrawing [a] guilty plea”); id. (“Since Ruiz , a number of Courts have rejected defendant's argument [that he can withdraw his plea based on Brady [v. Maryland] violations].”); Govt.'s Supplemental Mem. on Def.'s “Brady” Allegation, Following Oral Argument (“Govt.'s Supp. Brady Mem.”) at 15 (arguing that the Supreme Court in Ruiz “concluded that the Constitution does not require the government to disclose Brady[ v. Maryland] impeachment evidence before entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant”); Nelson, 979 F.Supp.2d at 127–31, 2013 WL 5778318, at *3–5 (finding that Ruiz did not decide whether the government has a pre-plea obligation to disclose Brady v. Maryland materials, and that the “the balance of circuit court precedent and the purpose of Brady [v. Maryland] ” supported the finding that Nelson could assert his claim). While the government did not provide extensive analysis of this argument in its original briefing, a motion for reconsideration is not the appropriate time to “reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled,” New York, 880 F.Supp. at 38, to “raise new issues that could have been raised previously,” Kattan, 995 F.2d at 276, or to otherwise “re-litigate th[e] issue,” Singh, 383 F.Supp.2d at 101–102.

In any event, the government's arguments are unavailing. The Opinion explicitly analyzed Ruiz and concluded that Ruiz “did not decide whether a defendant is entitled to exculpatory evidence at the guilty plea stage.” Nelson, 979 F.Supp.2d at 129, 2013 WL 5778318, at *3 ; see also Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (“In this case we primarily consider whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendment require federal prosecutors, before entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose ‘impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses.’ ”); id. at 628, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (“The constitutional question concerns a federal criminal defendant's waiver of the right to receive from prosecutors exculpatory impeachment...