United States v. One Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Receiver/Frame

• Decision Date: 22 July 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15–2202 (consolidated). 1
• Citation: 115 F.Supp.3d 544
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. ONE PALMETTO STATE ARMORY PA–15 MACHINEGUN RECEIVER/FRAME, UNKNOWN CALIBER, SERIAL NUMBER LW001804, defendant and Watson Family Gun Trust, claimant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

115 F.Supp.3d 544

UNITED STATES of America

v.ONE PALMETTO STATE ARMORY PA–15 MACHINEGUN RECEIVER/FRAME, UNKNOWN CALIBER, SERIAL NUMBER LW001804, defendantandWatson Family Gun Trust, claimant.

Civil Action No. 15–2202 (consolidated). ¹

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed July 22, 2015.

J. Alvin Stout, III, Jacqueline Christine Romero, U.S. Atty's Office, Philadelphia, PA, for United States of America.

David Ryan Scott, J. Scott Watson PC, Glen Mills, PA, for Claimant.

MEMORANDUM

DALZELL, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Ryan S. Watson applied to the ATF to make and possess a machine gun² , but his application was ultimately denied for violating several Federal statutes. He therefore brings this action for declarative and injunctive relief, claiming that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o ), 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq., which codifies the National Firearms Act ("NFA"), and the implementing regulations 27 C.F.R. § 479.1 et seq. unconstitutionally ban the transfer or possession of machine guns, impermissibly tramples upon the Commerce Clause under Article I of the United States Constitution, and violate his Second, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.³ He challenges the constitutionality of the statutes facially and as-applied.

Defendants Lynch and Brandon (collectively, "the Government") seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, move for summary judgment. The Government contends we lack subject matter jurisdiction over Watson's constitutional claims because he lacks standing to assert them. It also maintains that the challenged laws are consistent with the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause, were enacted under Congress's Commerce Clause power. The Government urges that we dismiss Watson's Equal Protection and detrimental reliance claims because it contends he has failed to establish the necessary elements.

We have jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346 because Watson's claims arise under the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States and the Government is the defendant.

For the reasons detailed below, we will deny the Government's motion in part and grant it in part. We conclude that Watson has standing to challenge Section 922(o ) and the NFA prohibitions on the manufacture and possession of machine guns. But we also hold that his Second Amendment challenge to those statutes fails facially and as applied to him under well-established principles from our Court of Appeals, as does his claim that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting those laws. We also find his due process and equal protection challenges fail for the reasons detailed below, and his claim of detrimental reliance has no merit.

Accordingly, we will grant the Government's motion to dismiss Watson's complaint, but will await definitive action from the Government as to its forfeiture action against the machine gun.

II. Standard of Review

The Government filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, and we will therefore discuss the legal standards as they apply to the arguments before us.

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

A district court considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) must first determine whether that motion presents a "facial" attack or a "factual" attack on the claim at issue "because that distinction determines how the pleading must be reviewed." Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir.2014). A facial challenge contests the sufficiency of the complaint because of a defect on its face—such as lack of diversity among the parties or the absence of a federal question. See Mortensen v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977). In a facial challenge, we must consider the allegations of the complaint as true and consider only those allegations in the complaint, and the documents attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to see whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. See Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir.2000) ; see also United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir.2007) (terming a facial attack as "an alleged pleading deficiency"). Thus we apply the identical standard of review that we use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

A factual attack, on the other hand, challenges the actual failure of the plaintiff's claims to "comport with the jurisdictional prerequisites." Pa. Shipbuilding, 473 F.3d at 514. Such an evaluation may occur at any stage of the proceeding, but only once the defendant has filed an answer. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. When a Court is confronted with a factual attack, "[it] is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case," and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Id. Thus, a district court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, Gould Elecs. Inc., 220 F.3d at 176 (internal citation omitted), and no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, such that the existence of disputed material facts does not preclude a Court from evaluating the merits of jurisdictional claims. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.

A motion to dismiss for want of standing is properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because standing is a jurisdictional matter. Aichele, 757 F.3d at 357 (internal citation omitted).

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A defendant moving to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) bears the burden of proving that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ; see also, e.g., Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.2005). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint and "[t]he question, then, is whether the facts alleged in the complaint, even if true, fail to support the claim." Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Our Court of Appeals obliges district courts considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to engage in a two-part analysis:

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The district court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a district court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a 'plausible claim for relief.'

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences must be drawn in his favor. See McTernan v. City of York, PA., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

C. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is warranted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To that end, the movant must inform the district court of the basis for its argument by "identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the movant is the defendant or the party that does not have the burden of proof on the underlying claim, it "has no obligation to produce evidence negating its opponent's case," National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir.1992). The movant need only point to the lack of evidence supporting the non-movant's claim. Id.

The reviewing court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir.2006). A factual dispute is "genuine" if it turns on "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. That is, "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude" summary judgment. Boyle v....