United States v. One 1950 Buick Sedan
Decision Date | 12 March 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 11707.,11707. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. ONE 1950 BUICK SEDAN, Serial No. 56272505. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Eugene J. Bradley, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa. (W. Wilson White, U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.
Samuel Kagle, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before GOODRICH, McLAUGHLIN and STALEY, Circuit Judges.
The United States of America has appealed from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that dismissed a libel praying for forfeiture, under Section 782 of Title 49, U.S.C.A.,1 of one 1950 Buick sedan, serial No. 56272505, owned by claimants-appellees, Rosetta Brown and Juanita Young, that allegedly had been used to facilitate the transportation and sale of contraband in violation of Section 781 of Title 49 U.S.C.A.2
It is contended that the district court erred in holding that appellant had not shown probable cause for the institution of the action as required by Section 1615 of Title 19, U.S.C.A.3 That section provides that the burden of proof in a forfeiture action is on the claimant, provided that probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of the action.
The facts as found by the district court are 130 F.Supp. 409:
The district court concluded that Accordingly, the district court found that probable cause for forfeiture of the automobile had not been shown. We think the district court erred.
The facts and circumstances presented by the government and accepted by the district court showed that the arrangements for the sale and the handing over of the purchase money occurred in the automobile. The appellees have urged that this does not mean the automobile "facilitated" the sale within the meaning of the statute. The use of the automobile, they say, was incidental because the negotiations and the payment could easily have taken place on the sidewalk outside the car. The term "facilitate" is a term used in everyday transactions between people. There is no indication that Congress ascribed to this word any meaning other than its ordinary and accepted meaning. Webster defines facilitate as "to make easy or less difficult; to free from difficulty or impediment; as, to facilitate the execution of a task." Funk and Wagnalls says, "To make more or less difficult; free more or less completely from obstruction or hindrance; lessen the labor of." This ordinary meaning of "facilitate" has been accepted in cases similar to this one. See Platt v. United States, 10 Cir., 1947, 163 F.2d 165, 166-167; United States v. One 1949 Ford Sedan, D.C.N.C.1951, 96 F.Supp. 341, 343.
The question then is whether there was a reasonable ground for belief that the use of the automobile made the sale less difficult and allowed it to remain more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.
Negotiations for an illegal sale of narcotics do not take place openly and publicly. It is always convenient that some degree of privacy attend all phases of the sale. The automobile certainly provided a convenient place for conversation and payment. Of course, the parties might have talked on the sidewalk. By the same token, they could have transacted their business in a million other places. But that does not mean that the automobile did not facilitate the sale. The appellee's argument might have substance had the negotiations and payment taken place in an automobile parked in the middle of the desert miles away from any place or anyone, for then it would be doubtful whether the fact of negotiations and payment in rather than outside the automobile made the transaction less difficult or allowed more freedom. But the automobile here was parked in a street in the city of Philadelphia at 2 p. m. Under those circumstances, a reasonable belief is certainly warranted that the automobile facilitated the sale. Indeed, we think that the facts presented by the government were such that the judge would have been justified in submitting them to a jury considering the guilt of one indicted for violating Section 781.
But there is more in the facts to sustain a finding of probable cause. When Gaskins received payment, he told the parties that he had to go and get the narcotics and drove off in the car. Twenty minutes later, he arrived at the tavern with narcotics in his possession and gave them to the purchasers. He and the purchasers then left the tavern. Gaskins...
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