United States v. Phillips, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 13-286 SECTION "R"
| Decision Date | 30 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 13-286 SECTION "R" |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DUANE PHILLIPS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is defendant Duane Phillips's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.1 Upon review of the entire record, the Court has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, the Court denies the motion.
On April 20, 2015, defendant Duane Phillips pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(c) and 1591(a).2 Phillips waived his right to appeal and collaterally challenge his conviction and sentence, but he retained the right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in an appropriate proceeding.3 The Courtaccepted the plea agreement and sentenced Phillips to 251 months of imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release.4
Phillips appealed his judgment to the Fifth Circuit.5 On direct appeal, Phillips raised the following issues: (1) his ten-year term of supervised release was above the statutory maximum; (2) the Court erred in applying a cross-reference to United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 2A3.1; (3) the Court erred in holding that injuries inflicted by other defendants fell within the scope of Phillips's agreement to the conspiracy; and (4) the Court erred in imposing enhancements from United States Sentencing Guidelines Sections 2A3.1(b)(4) and 3D1.4. See United States v. Phillips, No. 16-30767, Doc. No. 00513832379 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2017). The Fifth Circuit denied Phillips's appeal except that it reduced his term of supervised release from ten years to five years.6 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 30, 2017.7 On May 29, 2018, Phillips moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that a federal prisoner serving a court-imposed sentence "may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Only a narrow set of claims are cognizable on a Section 2255 motion. The statute identifies four bases on which a motion may be made: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is "otherwise subject to collateral attack." Id. A claim of error that is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional is not cognizable in a Section 2255 proceeding unless the error constitutes "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
When a Section 2255 motion is filed, the district court must first conduct a preliminary review. "If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion . . . ." Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, Rule 4(b). If the motion raises a non-frivolous claim to relief, the court must order the Government to file a response or to take other appropriate action. Id. The judge may then order the parties to expand the record as necessary and, if good cause is shown, authorize limited discovery. Id., Rules 6-7.
After reviewing the Government's answer, any transcripts and records of prior proceedings, and any supplementary materials submitted by the parties, the court must determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted. Id., Rule 8. An evidentiary hearing must be held "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). No evidentiary hearing is required if the prisoner fails to produce any "independent indicia of the likely merit of [his] allegations." United States v. Edwards, 442 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Ultimately, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims of error by a preponderance of the evidence. Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980). For certain "structural" errors, relief follows automatically once the error is proved. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993). For other "trial" errors, the court may grant relief only if the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence" in determining theoutcome of the case. Id. at 637-38 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Chavez, 193 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) (). If the court finds that the prisoner is entitled to relief, it "shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
Phillips argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because (1) the Court imposed a ten-year term of supervised release, which was over the statutory maximum; (2) he argues that the Court calculated his guideline range incorrectly; and (3) Phillips expected to receive a lower sentence based on his conversations with his attorney and the government.8 Phillips argues that the representations by his lawyer and the government at the time he agreed to plead guilty made his plea unknowing and involuntary.9 He therefore argues that he should not continue to be bound by his ex-ante waiver of appeal rights.10
A defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal as part of a plea agreement. United States v. Henderson, 72 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995). A waiver of post-conviction relief such as under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is valid if the waiver is informed and voluntary. United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994). The defendant must know that he had a "right to appeal his sentence and that he was giving up that right." United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992)). It is the responsibility of the district court "to [e]nsure that the defendant fully understands [his] right to appeal and the consequences of waiving that right." United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Baty, 980 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Phillips's waiver of his appeal rights was knowing and voluntary. Phillips's signed plea agreement contains an express waiver of his right to appeal or seek relief under Section 2255.11 During Phillips's rearraignment, the Court explained to him the crime to which he was pleading guilty.12 The Court explained the correct statutory maximum sentence and term of supervised release.13 Phillips confirmed that he understood the terms of theplea agreement and had reviewed it with his lawyer.14 Phillips acknowledged that his attorney had advised him of his appeal rights and the effect of waiving his appeal rights.15 Further, the Court specifically confirmed that Phillips understood the waiver of appeal rights in the plea agreement.16 Phillips's attorney stated he was satisfied that Phillips was pleading guilty voluntarily, understandingly, and with full knowledge of the consequences of his plea, and he represented to the Court that he had explained to Phillips his appeal rights and the effect of waiving those rights.17 Phillips's and his attorney's "[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). The Court therefore finds that Phillips fully understood the waiver of his right to appeal and the waiver of his right to file postconviction motions when his plea was accepted.
The Court finds no merit in Phillips's argument his plea was unknowing because he expected to receive a different sentence. Phillips acknowledged at his rearraignment hearing that the maximum sentence that Court could impose was life in prison.18 He also acknowledged that hislawyer had discussed this maximum sentence with him.19 He stated that his lawyer had discussed the sentencing guidelines with him.20 He acknowledged that the Court could impose a sentence that was different than any estimate that his lawyer gave him.21 Finally, he acknowledged that the Court could impose a sentence that was more severe than the recommended guideline range for his offense.22 Phillips chose to plead guilty with full knowledge that the Court could impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum. Even if he thought or hoped that the Court would calculate his guideline range differently, this does not make his plea involuntary. "Regarding sentencing consequences, the defendant must know only his 'maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged.'" United States v. Diaz, 516 F. App'x 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996). Phillips was clearly instructed of his maximum prison term and acknowledged his understanding of the maximum term at his rearraignment hearing. His plea was therefore knowing and voluntary despite his disagreement with the Court's calculation of his guideline range.
Finally, Phillips's initial sentence of a ten-year term of supervised release does not render his decision to plead guilty or his waiver of appeal rights involuntary, because he was correctly informed of the consequences of his guilty plea at his rearraignment,23 his plea agreement contained the correct maximum sentence,24 and his sentence has been corrected to reflect a five-year term of supervised release. Further, Phillips raised the argument that his plea was invalid on direct appeal, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed his appeal without making any such finding. The...
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