United States v. Pina
| Decision Date | 04 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 3:20-CR-78(1) DRL-MGG |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. FABIAN PINA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
The government charged Fabian Pina with conspiracy to distribute over 500 grams of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. On September 17, 2020, Mr. Pina sought to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement the day of his arrest. The court held an evidentiary hearing on October 26, 2020 given the factual discrepancies. See United States v. Coleman, 149 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991). The court now denies the motion to suppress.
On a clear and sunny August 1, 2020, Indiana State Police Trooper Andrew Rasala sat in the median of I-94 at the 27.6-mile marker where he routinely parked to observe eastbound traffic (Tr. 7-8). He had a clear view from his vantage point out about 250 feet (Tr. 9, 45). Around 11:40 a.m., he observed a white Chevy Silverado—driven by Fabian Pina—approach in the inside left lane and make an abrupt lane change to the middle lane without using a turn signal (Tr. 9).
Considering this a traffic violation under Indiana law, Trooper Rasala decided to stop the vehicle. Traffic was dense, so he had to wait to merge onto the highway. Trooper Rasala took about seven miles (8-10 minutes) to catch up safely with Mr. Pina's truck, though he never lost sight of it (Tr. 9-10). After nearing the truck, Trooper Rasala continued to follow it for a while longer because they were then in a construction zone. He left his lights and siren off for the moment (Tr. 10).
In the construction zone (unmanned because it was the weekend), Trooper Rasala saw the truck move into the left lane without activating a turn signal until its left tires were already in the other lane, which Trooper Rasala believed to be a violation of state law because a turn signal wasn't activated in advance (Tr. 11). Mr. Pina testified that he initially switched lanes to avoid a vehicle in front of him that was swerving and almost collided into construction zone cones (Tr. 74-75). According to Trooper Rasala, the white Silverado moved back into the right lane without activating its turn signal until it was partially in the right lane (Tr. 11).
Trooper Rasala turned on his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop for what he testified were three lane violations (Tr. 11). The truck complied. Trooper Rasala approached the passenger window to speak with Mr. Pina (Tr. 13). Mr. Pina sat in the driver's seat, and Luis Gonzalez sat in the front passenger seat. Mr. Gonzalez had been sleeping until the car was pulled over. Trooper Rasala immediately smelled the odor of burnt marijuana in the truck at the window, though he didn't tell either occupant (Tr. 13). Trooper Rasala informed Mr. Pina that the reason he stopped him was for improperly changing lanes (Tr. 39-40). He obtained licenses from both gentlemen, returned to his squad car to run standard checks on the truck and licenses, and ordered Mr. Pina to join him outside the car to facilitate communication (Tr. 13-15, 29).
Trooper Rasala asked Mr. Pina about their travel plans, and Mr. Pina said that they had left Texas the day before and were heading to Holland, Michigan for migrant work (Tr. 15-16). Trooper Rasala asked if there was anything illegal in the truck (Tr. 16). Mr. Pina said no, "[g]o ahead and search it"—referring to the truck (Tr. 16). Trooper Rasala told Mr. Pina about smelling burnt marijuana in the truck (Tr. 16). Mr. Pina replied that he doesn't smoke marijuana but said Mr. Gonzalez does (Tr. 16). Because Trooper Rasala smelled burnt marijuana, he called backup. Master Trooper Council and Trooper Thomas Maymi later arrived on scene.
Before other law enforcement arrived, Trooper Rasala walked back to the truck and spoke with Mr. Gonzalez, asking him about his marijuana use (Tr. 16). Mr. Gonzalez admitted that he had smoked marijuana in the truck in the past—saying smoking marijuana is "all he does"—but he couldn't remember the last time he smoked it in the truck (Tr. 16-17). Mr. Gonzalez testified at the suppression hearing that, when he was asked why the truck smelled like marijuana, he told Trooper Rasala that "[he] smoked" (Tr. 66). Mr. Gonzalez confirmed that he had smoked marijuana two or three days beforehand; and he had done so in the truck about a week before, after which the truck had been cleaned (Tr. 68-70). Mr. Gonzalez provided a different account of his travel plans (Tr. 17).
When Trooper Maymi arrived, he too smelled the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the truck (Tr. 55). Trooper Rasala searched the truck and discovered a duffle bag in the back seat that contained Dearfoams® loafers (Tr. 19, 31-32). Before any Miranda warnings, Trooper Rasala questioned Messrs. Pina and Gonzalez about the bag and loafers, who made statements unspecified on this record (Tr. 32-33). Trooper Rasala pulled the loafers out of the duffle bag and discovered cocaine in their soles (Tr. 32). Later, he found cocaine stored in the shoes Mr. Gonzalez was wearing (Tr. 32). Both men were arrested.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes the people's right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." As the constitutional text suggests, the "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). The Fourth Amendment protects a person in his home and on the street, in his room and in his car. It protects people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
Evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment rights must be excluded. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231 (2011). The admissibility of evidence seized in violation of the FourthAmendment is governed by federal law. United States v. Wilderness, 160 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1998) (). Accordingly, the court doesn't consider whether the evidence here would be excluded under state law; what matters is federal law.1
Law enforcement may stop a driver when it has probable cause to believe he violated a traffic law. United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2006). Probable cause is "not a high bar." Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014). It "does not require an actual showing of criminal activity, or even that the existence of criminal activity is more likely true than not." United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). By definition, probable cause looks to probabilities—"examining the totality of the circumstances in a common sense manner," United States v. Schaafsma, 318 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003), and the "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act," Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
Probable cause is determined by reasonable conclusions drawn from the facts known to the officer at the time of the search or arrest. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). A law enforcement officer may act based on firsthand observations or the collective knowledge of law enforcement when officers communicate with each other. United States. v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252-53 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ellis, 499 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2007). The court needn't decide whether Mr. Pina actually committed these traffic violations, only whether law enforcement had probable cause to believe he did. See McDonald, 453 F.3d at 960.
Even seemingly minor traffic violations can provide law enforcement officers probable cause to stop a vehicle. See United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2019) (); United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000) (); United States v. Smith, 668 F.3d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 2012) (); United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1996) (); United States v. Willis, 61 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1995) (speeding).
In Indiana, a driver must use his turn signal at least 200 feet before changing lanes or 300 feet if traveling at least 50 miles per hour. See Ind. Code § 9-21-8-25. An officer may stop a driver he observes violating this law. See Shorter v. State, 144 N.E.3d 829, 836-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Trooper Rasala reasonably believed he saw Mr. Pina violate this law by changing lanes on a highway without signaling at all and then changing lanes two additional times without adequate advance signaling.
The court credits Trooper Rasala's testimony concerning Mr. Pina's abrupt lane change near the 27.6-mile marker while traveling on I-94 given Trooper Rasala's credibility on the stand, previous experience with this precise location on I-94, his recall of details from the interaction, his line of sight, the day's conditions, and his focus on approaching traffic. Mr. Pina's testimony that he "always" uses his turn signal doesn't indicate that he did so here 300 feet beforehand (given his speed at this location), nor is it credible in light of Trooper Rasala's testimony that the lane change was abrupt.
In addition, though a law enforcement officer would have cause to recall his observation here—the very moment he observed a traffic violation and based on his training—Mr. Pina would have no cause to recall this particular lane change among many during his long trip from Texas given that it occurred 8-10 minutes before Trooper Rasala...
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