United States v. Rought

Decision Date24 August 2021
Docket NumberNo. 20-2667,20-2667
Citation11 F.4th 178
Parties UNITED STATES of America v. James Eugene ROUGHT, Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Ronald A. Krauss [ARGUED], Quin M. Sorenson, Office of the Federal Public Defender, 100 Chestnut Street, Suite 306, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Counsel for Appellant

Bruce D. Brandler, Acting United States Attorney, Stephen R. Cerutti II, Assistant United States Attorney [ARGUED], Office of United States Attorney, 228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754, Federal Building and Courthouse, Suite 220, Harrisburg, PA 17108, Michelle L. Olshefski, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of United States Attorney, 235 North Washington Avenue, P.O. Box 309, Suite 311, Scranton, PA 18503, Counsel for Appellee

Before: CHAGARES, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Defendant James Eugene Rought sold fentanyl to Dana Carichner, who provided some to Cara Giberson. Both overdosed. Giberson was revived with Narcan

; Carichner died. Rought was indicted for possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute resulting in death and serious bodily injury. A few days later, he was interrogated by the FBI. After being advised of his rights verbally and in writing, he answered questions about his drug use and his supplier, but said he did not want to talk about Carichner's death without a lawyer. The interrogating agents respected his wishes and turned the questioning to other subjects. In discussing those other subjects, however, Rought quickly brought the conversation back around to Carichner — and then made incriminating statements. Rought moved to suppress the statements he made to the FBI after he invoked his right to counsel. The District Court denied the motion, the statements were used against Rought at trial, and a jury convicted him. Rought now appeals, arguing that the court erred in denying his suppression motion and that he should receive a new trial in which the incriminating statements would not be admissible.

We will affirm. In Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), the Supreme Court held that invocations of the right to counsel during custodial interrogations can be "limited." Id. at 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 828. After a limited invocation, interrogation can continue on topics not covered by the invocation. If the suspect, without prompting from law enforcement, then voluntarily reinitiates discussion of a covered topic and waives her previously invoked rights, it "is quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment" for the suspect's statements about a covered topic to be admissible at trial. Id. at 529, 107 S.Ct. 828. Because that is what happened in this case, the District Court correctly denied Rought's suppression motion, and he is not entitled to a new trial.

I.

Rought sold fentanyl to Carichner on August 13, 2018. Giberson was there and witnessed the transaction. On August 15, Giberson asked Carichner to get her some fentanyl

from his source. Rought again sold fentanyl to Carichner on August 16, and the two of them used drugs together. That evening, Carichner delivered some of the fentanyl he acquired from Rought to Giberson at the Blogg, the restaurant where she worked, leaving it for her in her car. Carichner went home. After midnight, Giberson overdosed on fentanyl in the bathroom of the Blogg, but was revived with Narcan. Carichner died of a fentanyl overdose at home and in bed sometime after 2:00 a.m.

Law enforcement connected the overdoses to Rought. He was charged on October 16, 2018, in a one count indictment with distributing and possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute resulting in serious bodily injury and death. Three days later, Rought was interrogated for approximately one hour by Special Agent Larry Whitehead and Task Force Officer Shane Yelland of the FBI. The interrogation, which was videotaped and is the focus of this appeal, took place in an FBI interview room at the Scranton federal courthouse immediately prior to Rought's initial appearance on the federal charge. Rought was already in custody for state parole violations at the time of the interrogation.

At the outset, Whitehead confirmed that Rought had been arrested in the past and informed him of his Miranda rights. Whitehead also provided Rought with a written consent form describing his rights and gave Rought an opportunity to read it. Asked if he was willing to talk, Rought responded that he was, "to a point." Whitehead emphasized that Rought could "stop at any time," and that "those are the ground rules." Rought then signed the consent form, which among other things provided that Rought was willing to answer questions without a lawyer present.

For the next twenty-four minutes, Rought answered questions about his drug use, his drug supplier, his criminal history, and his relationship with Carichner, among other topics. Rought insisted that he was not a drug dealer. He believed that "the situation at hand is completely blown out of proportion" and noted that he and Carichner worked together and "got high together every day." He insisted again that he did not sell drugs to Carichner. Rought explained that Carichner was his "best friend" and that they had grown up together. Whitehead told Rought the interview was about understanding "both sides" of what happened, because law enforcement only had one side of the story so far. Rought responded that "really you don't know any side" because Giberson (who claimed to have seen Rought sell drugs to Carichner and whose name was "on the paperwork") "wasn't even there" and Rought "couldn't even tell you what this chick looked like." Whitehead commented that "a tragedy resulted from your actions ... and not just yours. ... this is what's going on daily in the community."

Whitehead told Rought that the federal criminal justice system can be "unforgiving" for violent crimes, but that it "rewards cooperation," and that the FBI was interested in Rought's suppliers. Rought explained that his primary supplier went by "L.B." and that Rought would buy from him in Wilkes-Barre. If L.B. was unavailable, Rought would connect with other "random" suppliers in the area in order to meet the needs of his addiction — three or four bundles of fentanyl per day at that point. Rought explained that he would buy a brick of fentanyl from L.B. in order to get bulk pricing, and then "split it" with the people he got high with, including Carichner. Because he worked with Carichner "every day ... most days we would split it." Rought also said that the quality of the drugs was "really good since somebody died." Whitehead asked Rought "why fentanyl?" Rought explained that it was "what we wanted" because, at that time, state parole drug tests did not test for fentanyl. Rought told Whitehead that L.B. was always on the lookout for guns, and would trade drugs for guns. One person who traded guns to L.B. was Stan Derby, a friend of Rought's that died of an overdose, "probably" from drugs he acquired from L.B.

Rought and Whitehead discussed how Wilkes-Barre was a "cesspool" of drug dealing and how society is "plagued" by drugs and addiction. Whitehead emphasized his understanding that addiction is a difficult lifestyle to escape and brought up drug rehabilitation programs with Rought. Rought said he was once able to stop using drugs for a week after coming home from a five-day detox program, but began using them again because many of the people around him were using drugs, including Carichner.

About twenty-four minutes into the interrogation, after Rought mentioned Carichner's drug use, Whitehead asked, "So let's talk about Dana [Carichner]. What happened there?" Rought replied, "I mean, I don't really want to talk about that aspect without my lawyer. ... That's a serious situation. I mean, they're trying to roof me."1 Whitehead immediately responded that he understood and that "those are the ground rules. ... That's your right, and I respect that."

Whitehead then turned the conversation back to L.B. and reiterated that he was interested in the people "above" Rought. He explained that people "caught in a bad spot," like Rought, could help themselves and also help law enforcement "clean up the community." Whitehead then referenced Rought's previous comment that his friend Stan Derby had overdosed. That prompted Rought to acknowledge the toll that drug addiction had taken on those around him, including the lives of several friends and acquaintances who died of overdoses; Rought said "you're not losing the effect on me." Whitehead responded that he understood that toll and reiterated that he wanted Rought to share information that would help law enforcement in "going up the ladder" after L.B. and "whoever else there is."

In response, and just a few minutes after invoking his right to counsel, Rought stated that he did not like addiction any more than Whitehead and that drug dealers are "killing my friends just as much as, right now, you're trying to say that I killed my friend [Carichner]." Whitehead responded that he was not saying that Rought killed Carichner but that Rought "had a role and that's unfortunate, it is." He noted that Rought must "feel like shit" about Carichner's death, to which Rought responded, "Absolutely." Whitehead informed Rought that he did not believe Rought had "intent or malice" and that Carichner's death was an "unfortunate tragedy." Rought then expressed anger about how he was being treated like a drug dealer when he did not sell drugs. He asked "[j]ust because somebody that I worked with also got high and we got high together ... how is that a crime? ... [H]ow am I being charged with serious bodily injury [and] death?" Rought expressed incredulity that "the same dope that he snorted a bag of and died, I shot ten bags of right next to him." He also explained that he initially did not believe that Carichner had overdosed because it did not make sense that Carichner "got high, drove all the...

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