United States v. Saboonchi

• Decision Date: 28 July 2014
• Docket Number: Criminal Case No. PWG–13–100.
• Citation: 48 F.Supp.3d 815
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Ali SABOONCHI, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

48 F.Supp.3d 815

UNITED STATES of America
v.
Ali SABOONCHI, et al.

Criminal Case No. PWG–13–100.

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division.

Signed July 28, 2014.

48 F.Supp.3d 815

Christine Manuelian, Rod J. Rosenstein, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for United States of America.

Elizabeth Genevieve Oyer, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, MD, for Ali Saboonchi, et al.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PAUL W. GRIMM, District Judge.

Defendant Ali Saboonchi is alleged to have violated Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (the “ITSR”) promulgated under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (the “IEEPA”). Previously, Saboonchi moved to suppress the fruits of warrantless forensic searches of his smartphones and flash drive performed under the authority of the border search doctrine after they were seized at the U.S.-Canadian border. Following a hearing on September 23, 2013, I sought supplementary briefing and issued a written opinion denying the motion on April 7, 2014. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F.Supp.2d 536 (D.Md.2014). However,

48 F.Supp.3d 816

on June 25, 2014 the Supreme Court issued Riley v. California, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), holding that the warrantless search of a suspect's cell phone fell outside of the Fourth Amendment's warrant exception for searches incident to arrest, id at 2485–86. Saboonchi now moves for reconsideration of my previous ruling in light of Riley. Because Riley's holding did not touch on the border search exception and my reasoning in Saboonchi largely accords with that of the Court, Defendant's Motion to Reconsider will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Saboonchi and his wife were stopped by United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) agents on March 31, 2012 at the Rainbow Bridge outside of Buffalo, New York when returning from a daytrip to the Canadian side of Niagara Falls. Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Evid. 2, ECF No. 58. Saboonchi and his wife were questioned before eventually being released, but CBP seized several electronic devices with the intent to search them: an Apple i Phone, a Sony Xperia phone, and a Kingston DT101 G2 USB flash drive (the “Devices”). Id. at 3. The Devices were sent to Baltimore, where Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) agents imaged and forensically searched each device using specialized software. See ICE Report of Investigation Continuation (the “ICE Reports”), Def's Mot. to Suppress Ex. A., ECF No 58–1. Saboonchi moved to suppress the fruits of the warrantless searches of the Devices, along with the statements he made to investigators on April 13, 2012. Def.'s Mot. to Suppress 1.

Following an evidentiary hearing, I sought supplemental briefing from the parties. H'rg Tr. 37:10—42:25, September 23, 2013, ECF No. 89. On April 7, 2014, I issued a lengthy opinion in which, after a thorough analysis of both the relevant law and realities of modern technology, I held that a forensic search of a computer or electronic device constituted an nonroutine search even when performed at the international border and that such a search must rest on reasonable, particularized suspicion. Saboonchi, 990 F.Supp.2d at 539, 548–49 ; see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985). Because I found that CBP and HIS officers had reasonable suspicion to search Saboonchi's devices, I denied the motion to suppress. Saboonchi, 990 F.Supp.2d at 570–71. Saboonchi now moves for reconsideration, arguing that that the Supreme Court has changed the relevant Fourth Amendment law in Riley v. California. Def.'s Mot. to Reconsider 1, ECF No. 157.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Riley v. California

Subsequent to my ruling, the Supreme Court issued Riley v. California, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), on June 25, 2014. In Riley, the Court addressed the question of “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.” Id. at 2480. It considered the history of the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, identifying a trilogy of cases that analyzed the principles behind the exception and set forth the rules for applying it: Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) ;

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United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) ; and Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). In Chimel, the Court recognized that an arresting officer reasonably may search a suspect for weapons to protect the officer's safety and to preserve evidence the suspect may be carrying and able to conceal or destroy. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63, 89 S.Ct. 2034. In Robinson, the Court held that these justifications did not require a case-by-case analysis and that, when a suspect lawfully was arrested based on probable cause, the search of his person did not require further justification. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S.Ct. 467. Finally, in Gant, the Court limited the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, holding that concerns regarding officer safety and preservation of evidence only applied to such a search when the arrestee was unsecured and within reaching distance of a car's passenger compartment during the search. Gant, 556 U.S. at 338, 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710.

In Chimel and Robinson, the Court weighed the strength of the government interests in the search against the diminished, but still existent, expectation of privacy held by an arrestee. Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2484–85, 2488 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) ). But in Riley, the Court held that the government interests at stake did not outweigh even a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to cell phones because of the immense quantity and scope of information modern phones contain, which was “nearly inconceivable” when Chimel and Robinson were decided. Id. at 2484–5, 2489. While the Court recognized that an officer justifiably could search the physical aspects of a phone for concealed weapons, “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer.” Id. at 2485. The Court similarly was unpersuaded by the alleged need to protect any such digital evidence from either remote wiping or data encryption, “hav[ing][ ] been given little...