United States v. Slatten

• Decision Date: 22 December 2017
• Docket Number: Criminal Case No. 14–107 (RCL)
• Citation: 286 F.Supp.3d 61
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Nicholas A. SLATTEN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

286 F.Supp.3d 61

UNITED STATES of America

v.Nicholas A. SLATTEN, Defendant.

Criminal Case No. 14–107 (RCL)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed December 22, 2017

T. Patrick Martin, Anthony Asuncion, Christopher Robert Kavanaugh, David Joseph Mudd, Fernando Campoamor–Sanchez, John Crabb, Jr., U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Steven A. Fredley, Thomas Gerard Connolly, Anne Katherine Bowling, Jared P. Marx, Harris, Wiltshire, & Grannis LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION: FINDINGS OF FACT AND STATEMENT OF REASONS IN SUPPORT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION

Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Nicholas Slatten's Motion for Release Pending Trial. ECF No. 693. Mr. Slatten seeks release pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and requests that the pretrial conditions of release set by the Court on May 13, 2014, be restored. In the alternative, he requests that additional conditions be imposed to ensure he appears for his trial. The government opposes Mr. Slatten's release and urges that he remain detained pending trial given that "there are no conditions or combinations of conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required or the safety of any other person and the community." ECF No. 695 at 1–2. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the oral representations of both parties at the detention hearing, the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court finds that Mr. Slatten is not eligible for release at this time. Accordingly, the Court WILL DENY Mr. Slatten's Motion for Release Pending Trial.

I. BACKGROUND

As this case has been summarized on numerous occasions—most recently by the Court of Appeals in United States v. Slatten , 865 F.3d 767, 810–11 (D.C. Cir. 2017) —the Court will only offer a brief outline of the factual and procedural background, with a focus on the facts most relevant to Mr. Slatten's Motion for Release.

Mr. Slatten and his codefendants were security contractors for Blackwater Worldwide ("Blackwater") in 2007, at which time Blackwater provided security services to the U.S. State Department in Iraq. Slatten , 865 F.3d at 776. Mr. Slatten and his codefendants were members of Raven 23, a Blackwater support team. On September 16, 2007, Raven 23 was called upon to evacuate a U.S. diplomat in Baghdad. In the course of that mission, the Raven 23 team attempted to "lock down" Nisur Square, a traffic circle in downtown Baghdad. In doing so, at least 31 Iraqi civilians were injured or killed.

On December 4, 2008, the government indicted Mr. Slatten and his codefendants for manslaughter, attempted manslaughter, and a firearms charge, all related to their conduct at Nisur Square on September 16, 2007. Following the indictments, the court released Mr. Slatten pending trial and set a number of conditions. After a year on pretrial release, during which time the case was moved from the District of Utah to this Court, Judge Urbina dismissed the charges on February 22, 2010.

Following the D.C. Circuit's reversal in United States v. Slough , 641 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the government indicted Mr. Slatten and his codefendants on substantially similar charges on October 17, 2013. Mr. Slatten was once again released pending trial. That period of supervision came to an end on April 23, 2014, when the charges were dropped for a second time against Mr. Slatten as a result of them being time barred.

Two weeks later, on May 8, 2014, a grand jury returned a third indictment against Mr. Slatten—this time for first-degree murder. For a final time, he was released pending trial. Trial began soon thereafter and a jury found Mr. Slatten guilty of first-degree murder on October 22, 2014, at which point he was detained.

Mr. Slatten appealed and on August 4, 2017, the D.C. Circuit issued an opinion vacating his conviction, finding that the Court erred in not allowing Mr. Slatten to introduce statements by his co-defendant in a separate trial. Slatten , 865 F.3d at 810–11. The D.C. Circuit held that co-defendant Slough's statements, made shortly after the attack at Nisur Square to State Department officials, were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 807 —the residual hearsay exception—because they were "were vital to Slatten's defense and possessed sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Slatten , 865 F.3d at 801. As such, Mr. Slatten's case should have been severed to allow him to present that evidence. Id. The D.C. Circuit issued the mandate on November 16, 2017.

The Court held an initial status hearing in this matter on November 21, 2017, at which point the government expressed its intention to retry this case. On December 1, 2017, Mr. Slatten moved for his release pending trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142. Following the government's response and Mr. Slatten's reply, the Court held a hearing on the motion on December 15, 2017.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. , provides that a defendant may be detained pending judicial proceedings if the district court finds that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." Id. at § 3142(e), (f). The government must first establish one of the predicates: (1) that, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, defendant poses a risk of flight, United States v. Xulam , 84 F.3d 441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ; or (2) that, by clear and convincing evidence, defendant has been shown to pose a risk to the safety of any person or the community, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) ; United States v. Peralta , 849 F.2d 625, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Court must then determine that the same evidence leads to the conclusion that no condition or conditions of release will reasonably protect against the risk that has been found.

The district court weighs the following four factors in making its determination: "[1] the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug; [2] the weight of the evidence against the person; [3] various personal information including character, employment, past conduct, and so on; and [4] the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release." United States v. Smith , 79 F.3d 1208, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) ).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court must address Mr. Slatten's contention that " Section 3142(f) prevents the government from reopening Slatten's original detention determination."

ECF No. 697 at 1. The relevant portion of 3142(f) provides as follows:

The hearing may be reopened, before or after a determination by the judicial officer, at any time before trial if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). According to Mr. Slatten, his initial detention determination on the present charge was made by the Court on May 13, 2014. At that time—which was a few days after Mr. Slatten was indicted on the murder charge and weeks before the start of trial—the Court ordered Mr. Slatten released pending trial on personal recognizance with a number of conditions attached. See ECF No. 11. According to Mr. Slatten, the government is now basing its conclusion that Mr. Slatten must be detained on evidence that was already known to the government at the time of the detention determination on May 13, 2014. Therefore, he argues that "[u]nder the law [ 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) ], none of that evidence can be the basis for reconsidering Slatten's detention, and Slatten should therefore be released." ECF No. 697 at 107. Essentially, Mr. Slatten posits that the Court is barred from reconsidering Mr. Slatten's detention and must reinstate the terms set before his trial in May 2014.

At the hearing before the Court on December 15, 2017, the government responded that this is the first detention hearing on the murder charge against Mr. Slatten. The government does not understand the teleconference hearing before the Court on May 12, 2014, to have been a detention hearing. Therefore, Section 3142(f) does not apply as the Court does not need to reopen any hearing; rather, it is ruling on detention for the first time on this particular charge. As such, the Court can consider any information, including his numerous arrests and dangerous actions and threats prior to his trial in 2014. See ECF No. 695 3–11.

However, the Court does not need to resolve whether the hearing on May 12, 2014, was a detention hearing. Even if the Court adopts Mr. Slatten's argument—that the terms of his release set in May 2014 can only be reexamined if there is newly discovered information—there is more than enough new information that has come to light allowing the Court to reconsider his detention. First and foremost, Mr. Slatten stood trial on his murder charge and the Court had the opportunity to hear the evidence against him. A jury convicted him on that charge and he has already served more than three years in custody since his trial. Those facts alone "have a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). In fact, the D.C. Circuit case cited by Mr. Slatten for the proposition that a court can "reopen the detention hearing when previously nonexistent, material information [is] brought to light," United States v. Peralta , 849 F.2d 625, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1988), speaks...