United States v. Stangland
Decision Date | 03 April 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 11738,11739.,11738 |
Citation | 242 F.2d 843 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ethan STANGLAND, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Max MUNK, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
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Robert E. Albright, Columbus, Ohio, Clifford E. Simon, Jr., Fort Wayne, Ind., for appellant.
Phil McNagny, Jr., U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., Neil Brooks, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Donald A. Campbell, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., J. Stephen Doyle, Jr., Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., John E. Logue, Asst. U. S. Atty., Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne, Ind., Robert W. Johnson, Attys., U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, and FINNEGAN and LINDLEY, Circuit Judges.
Defendants appeal from judgments entered in suits by the United States to recover penalties claimed to be due as a result of wheat grown by them in excess of their farm marketing quotas, as defined by the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1281 et seq. As the two causes involve similar facts and identical issues of law, they have been consolidated for disposition.
As announced in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122, the general purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, insofar as it relates to wheat, is to control production in order to avoid the problems resulting from deficits or surpluses. In furtherance of this objective, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to establish a national acreage allotment for each successive wheat crop, which, in turn, is apportioned among the farms of the nation. Secs. 1333, 1334. In addition, whenever in a given year the Secretary determines that the total crop will exceed normal production by more than 20%, a national marketing quota shall be established. Sec. 1335. The statute further provides for a referendum of farmers subject to the quota to determine whether they favor or oppose it. If more than one-third vote against it, the Secretary must suspend the operation. Sec. 1336. When the marketing quota is in effect, it is equivalent to the actual production of the acreage planted to wheat on the farm, less the farm marketing excess, which, in turn, is the normal or actual production of wheat, whichever is the lesser, in excess of the farm acreage allotment. Sec. 1340(1). Finally, while the marketing quotas are in effect, under the statute, any farmer who markets wheat in excess of his quota is subjected to a penalty.
In the cases before us, the national acreage allotment and a farm marketing quota having been established, each defendant was notified of his wheat acreage allotment, and, thereafter, of his marketing quota, his excess acreage of wheat, the normal yield per acre, and his marketing excess. Defendants, dissatisfied with their acreage allotments, filed applications to have them re-established by the local review committee, as provided by regulation. 18 F.R. 3163. After the committee had made a reallocation, defendants took no further steps questioning the action. They have not paid the resulting penalties imposed upon their farm marketing excess, or avoided them by storing their excess wheat under the regulations, or delivered such excesses to the Secretary of Agriculture.
To the Government's complaints, each defendant answered that he was neither directly nor indirectly engaged in interstate commerce, inasmuch as the excess wheat had been consumed on his farm, and, further, that he had in no way elected to accept any benefits under the Act. After sustaining objections to certain interrogatories submitted by defendants, the district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The interrogatories alluded to were directed primarily to the methods used in determining the wheat acreage allotment, the normal yield per acre, and the farm marketing excess. They are set forth in detail in the opinion of the court. D.C., 137 F.Supp. 539. In other words, these inquiries had to do with issues wholly within the scope of the determination of the marketing quota by the review committee, in a de novo hearing, from which no appeal has been taken. In this respect the statute prescribes the procedure which may be followed in order to review the quota. Thus, if the farmer expresses dissatisfaction, the quota must be reviewed by the local review committee. Sec. 1363. Further, unless application for review is made "the original determination of the farm marketing quota shall be final." Both defendants complied with the initial requirement of proceeding before the committee. However, the statute adds that if a farmer is dissatisfied with the latter's determination, he may, within 15 days after notice of the findings, institute review proceedings in the appropriate United States District Court or in the State Court. Sec. 1365. This judicial review is limited to questions of law, and the findings of fact by the committee, if supported by evidence, are conclusive. Sec. 1366. In addition, the statute provides that: Sec. 1367.
As previously indicated, no attempt was made by either defendant to obtain a review of the determination of the committee. Nevertheless, in these suits to enforce the penalty, which is necessarily equated to the farm marketing excess as found by the committee, defendants, for the first time, attempted to attack collaterally the findings of the committee by means of interrogatories. Under the explicit language of the statute, the procedure provided is exclusive. Any other method, be it direct or indirect, is without sanction in law. See Lee v. Roseberry, D.C., 94 F.Supp. 324. Inasmuch as defendants were precluded from questioning the findings of the committee in these suits, the district court properly sustained plaintiff's objections to the interrogatories.
Defendants assert that summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. should not have been granted, arguing that the rules are not applicable because of the nature of these proceedings. It is quite clear that an action to collect the penalty provided by this Act is civil rather than criminal in nature. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 45, 59 S.Ct. 648, 83 L.Ed. 1092; Shafer v. United States, 4 Cir., 229 F.2d 124, 129; United States v. West Texas Cottonoil Co., 5 Cir., 155 F.2d 463, 466; Usher v. United States, 4 Cir., 146 F.2d 369. In Usher, a suit to recover penalties for cotton grown in excess of an allotment, the court said, at page 371:
In this respect, defendants contend further that these actions fall within the exception set forth in Rule 81(a) (2), which provides inter alia, that: "In the following proceedings appeals are governed by these rules, but they are not applicable otherwise than on appeal except to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in actions at law or suits in equity; * * * forfeiture of property for violation of a statute of the United States." (Emphasis supplied.) Defendants suggest that enforcement of the penalty amounts to a "forfeiture of property" within the meaning of the rule,...
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