United States v. Strandquist
| Decision Date | 14 July 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-72-Cr. 123.,4-72-Cr. 123. |
| Citation | 345 F. Supp. 217 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Robert Adler STRANDQUIST, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Stephen G. Palmer, Asst. U. S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.
John R. Graham, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.
Defendant was indicted on March 10, 1972, for failing to comply with an order of his local selective service board to report for and submit to induction into the Armed Forces, in violation of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 App. U.S.C. § 462. The matter was tried to the Court on May 19, 1972.
Defendant originally registered with the Selective Service System in January 1965. He was classified II-S until he graduated from college in June 1969. Following his graduation, defendant signed a contract to teach in the Malta, Montana, Public School System during the 1969-70 academic year. On the basis of this contract defendant sought a II-A occupational deferment from his local board. The local board, however, rejected defendant's application and on August 12, 1969, classified him I-A. Defendant appealed his I-A classification to the Montana State Appeal Board, which on February 17, 1970, reversed the local board's determination and classified defendant II-A.
In April 1970 defendant signed a contract to continue to teach in the Malta Public School System during the 1970-71 academic year. On the basis of this contract he sought a continuation of his II-A deferment. The local board, however, again rejected defendant's application and on May 5, 1970, reclassified him I-A. Defendant again appealed this determination to the Montana State Appeal Board. This time, however, the appeal board agreed with the local board and classified defendant I-A. This action by the appeal board took place on September 22, 1970. Neither the local board nor the appeal board set forth a statement of reasons for their denials of defendant's request to be classified II-A.
Thereafter, by letter dated September 30, 1970, defendant was ordered to report for induction on October 12, 1970. This induction date, however, was postponed to permit defendant to complete his teaching duties during the 1970-71 academic year. Following the completion of the 1970-71 academic year defendant was ordered to report for induction on June 21, 1971. On the specified date defendant reported at the induction station, but refused to submit to induction. It was this refusal which brought about the instant prosecution.
Following trial defendant presented various arguments for judgment of acquittal. Since the Court has determined that one of these arguments is meritorious and does require a judgment of acquittal, only that argument will now be discussed.
Defendant's argument concerns the failure of the local board to set forth a statement of reasons for its denial in the summer of 1970 of his request for a II-A classification. In this regard, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that a local board's failure to set forth a statement of its reasons for its denial of a I-O (conscientious objector) classification, where the registrant had first established a prima facie case for such a classification, constituted a fatal procedural error and required the Court to grant a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Hanson, 460 F.2d 337 (8th Cir., 1972). This same conclusion has recently been reached by the United States Supreme Court and, prior to that, by at least three other Circuit Courts of Appeals. See Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 1274, 31 L.Ed.2d 473 (1972); Fein v. Selective Service System, 405 U.S. 365, 92 S.Ct. 1062, 31 L.Ed.2d 298 (1972); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3rd Cir. 1970); United States v. Broyles, 423 F. 2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969). After thoroughly examining the rationale of these various decisions, this Court has concluded that, absent a contrary directive from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court, the rule enunciated in Hanson should be applied to cases such as the instant case, in which the classification sought by the registrant was II-A, rather than I-O.
The rationale of the rule requiring a statement of reasons for the denial of a conscientious objector classification is that written reasons are necessary to provide the registrant with a basis for meaningful appeal within the Selective Service System and review in the Courts. This rationale applies equally as well to the denial of a request for a II-A classification. For example, using the facts in the instant case, had the local board provided the defendant with a statement of reasons for the denial of his request to be classified II-A, the defendant and his employer could then have made an attempt to provide the appeal board with additional facts to refute those reasons. In the absence of such a statement of reasons, however, such an attempt would have been fruitless, because the defendant and his employer were completely uninformed as to what aspects of defendant's application were considered by the local board to be deficient, and thus had no idea of what type of additional facts they should present. They therefore were effectively precluded from making a meaningful appeal within the Selective Service System.
Furthermore, just as in conscientious objector cases, a board's failure to set forth a statement of reasons for its denial of a request for a II-A deferment prevents the registrant from obtaining meaningful review of the board's decision in the courts, because the courts are unable to determine whether the board...
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