United States v. Subil
| Docket Number | 2:23-cr-00030-TL |
| Decision Date | 07 June 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DAVID SUBIL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
ORDER ON MOTION FOR REVIEW OF DETENTION ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Review and Revocation of Magistrate Judge's Detention Order (Dkt. No. 27) (“Motion for Review”) appealing the April 11, 2023, detention order (Dkt. No. 15). Having conducted a de novo review and considered the Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), the Indictment (Dkt. No. 3), the audio recording of the April 6 arraignment, the Pretrial Report of the Western District of Washington (Dkt. No. 13) the Pretrial Report of the Southern District of Florida (Dkt. No. 13-1), the transcript of the April 11 detention hearing (Dkt. No. 17), the Government's response (Dkt. No. 28) Mr. Subil's reply (Dkt. No. 29) and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Review, REVOKES the detention order, and ORDERS his release with conditions, for the reasons explained below.
Mr. Subil faces three charges related to the interstate transportation of stolen property. On March 1, 2023, a grand jury indicted Mr. Subil on one count of Conspiracy to Commit Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2314. See Dkt. No. 3. The charges concern allegedly fraudulent orders of seafood that were obtained in Washington State and then transported to Florida to be resold for a profit. Id. at 2. Mr. Subil was arrested in the Southern District of Florida on February 19, 2023.
The Government filed what appears to be a form motion seeking Mr. Subil's detention. Dkt. No. 10. Under “Eligibility of Case,” it selected only “Serious risk the defendant will flee,” and under “Reason for Detention,” it selected only “Defendant's appearance as required.” Id. at 1-2. At arraignment on April 6, the magistrate judge acknowledged receipt of the Government's motion for detention and asked the Parties if they were “prepared to argue the issue of detention today” or if they were seeking a continuance. Audiotape: Arraignment, Dkt. No. 11, at 8:13-8:23 (on file with the Court) (the “Audiotape”). The Government requested a three-day continuance. Id. at 8:24-8:26. Nothing else was said by the Government regarding the motion for detention, and defense counsel neither objected nor said anything in response to the motion. The magistrate judge granted the continuance and set the matter for a detention hearing five days later. Id. at 8:26-8:35. Mr. Subil was ordered detained pending the hearing, and the arraignment concluded. Id. at 8:59-9:08.
Pretrial Services in the Western District of Washington recommended that Mr. Subil be released pending trial on his personal recognizance under their supervision and with the special conditions outlined in the report. Dkt. No. 13 at 8. Pretrial Services in the Southern District of Florida also recommended that Mr. Subil be released with conditions. Dkt. No. 13-1 at 11. On April 11, the magistrate judge conducted a detention hearing and ordered that Mr. Subil remain detained because “there are no conditions which the defendant can meet which would reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required or the safety of any other person and the community.” Dkt. No. 15 at 1; see Dkt. No. 17 (transcript). The magistrate judge concluded that “defendant should be detained given his criminal history, the nature of the offense, and the risk of flight that defendant poses.” Id. at 2.
Mr. Subil now appeals the detention order and seeks his release pending trial “with a set of conditions as proposed by pretrial services plus GPS/EHM monitoring.” Dkt. No. 27 at 1; see Dkt. No. 29; 18 U.S.C. 3145(b). The Government opposes. Dkt. No. 28.
A person who is ordered detained by a magistrate judge “may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order.” 18 U.S.C.§ 3145(b). A district court then reviews the detention order de novo. United States v. Koenig, 912 F.2d 1190, 1191-93 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Bail Reform Act (“the Act”) requires that a court release a criminal defendant on personal recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond before trial unless there is a determination that such release “will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). This default requirement is in accord with the principle that “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial . . . is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The Ninth Circuit cautions that “[o]nly in rare cases should release be denied.” United States v. Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985)). Further, “doubts regarding the propriety of release are to be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Id. If a court determines that such release will not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance and the safety of the community, the court must impose “the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions,” that will reasonably assure these goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). The Act only requires detention where a court finds that no such condition or combination or conditions can do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).
Where the Government seeks pretrial detention of a defendant, it must first make a motion stating which ground(s) it asserts as a basis for detention. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The Government must then demonstrate that the defendant is eligible for a detention hearing. A defendant is eligible for a hearing only if the Government shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the case falls into one of the categories listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). See United States v. Fanyo-Patchou, 426 F.Supp.3d 779, 782 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1988) and United States v. Villatoro-Ventura, 330 F.Supp.3d 1118, 1124 (N.D. Iowa 2018)); see also United States v. Watkins, 940 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2019) ().[1]If a hearing is appropriate, it “shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance” unless the defendant or the Government seeks a continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). “[S]uch person shall be detained” during the continuance. Id.
If a defendant is eligible for a detention hearing, the court must then determine whether there are conditions of release that reasonably assure two goals: “the appearance of the defendant as required” and “the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). In making this determination, a court considers the following factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense involves a controlled substance; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including the defendant's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant's release. Id.
To obtain pretrial detention, the government bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that there are no conditions that will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required, and by clear and convincing evidence that there are no conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.[2]See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1); United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991).
To make its determination, the Court first determines whether Mr. Subil is eligible for a detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Then, the Court considers whether the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) support detention.
Mr. Subil argues that his case is not eligible for a detention hearing. Dkt. No. 27 at 7-9. He argues that the Government was required to show by a “clear preponderance of the evidence” that he poses a serious risk of flight, (id. at 7-8), but that the magistrate judge found that Mr. Subil posed only a risk of flight (id. at 9; Dkt. No. 15 at 2). In response, the Government argues that the hearing was proper because its motion was “properly filed and heard within the required timeframe ....” Dkt. No. 28 at 6. It also argues that the hearing evidence showed that Mr. Subil posed a serious risk of flight. Id. at 6-7.
The Act authorizes a detention hearing only in certain categories of cases; where a case does not fall under one of those categories, a detention hearing may not be held. 18 U.S.C §§ 3142(f)(1)-(2) (); see Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (“The [Act] carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes.”); United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992) (); United...
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