United States v. Superintendent of County Prisons

• Decision Date: 13 May 1940
• Docket Number: No. 7287.,7287.
• Citation: 111 F.2d 409
• Parties: UNITED STATES ex rel. DARCY v. SUPERINTENDENT OF COUNTY PRISONS OF PHILADELPHIA et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

111 F.2d 409 (1940)

UNITED STATES ex rel. DARCY v. SUPERINTENDENT OF COUNTY PRISONS OF PHILADELPHIA et al.

No. 7287.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

April 15, 1940.

Rehearing Denied May 13, 1940.

Louis F. McCabe and Philip Dorfman, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Franklin E. Barr, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Philadelphia, Pa., for Philadelphia.

Before MARIS, CLARK, and JONES, Circuit Judges.

MARIS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing a writ of habeas corpus. The relator was indicted in California on September 6, 1935, for perjury under Section 118 of the Penal Code of that state¹ for having on March 27, 1934, given false answers when registering as a voter. It is averred in the indictment that the answers were false in that the relator gave his name as Sam Darcy instead of Samuel Dardeck and his place of birth as New York instead of the Ukraine, Russia. At the time of the indictment the relator was no longer in California, having left that state in June, 1935. On September 19, 1939, the relator was arrested in Philadelphia and on October 16, 1939, the Governor of California signed the requisition for extradition. On November 2, 1939, the Governor of Pennsylvania signed the warrant for the rendition of the relator to the agent of California. On the same day the relator was taken into custody by the respondents.

On November 3, 1939, the relator petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition averred that the relator possessed all the qualifications necessary under the Constitution and laws of California to register and vote; that the statements even if false were immaterial and, therefore, not the subject of perjury; that the indictment and accompanying papers were fundamentally defective and did not substantially charge him with the commission of the crime of perjury; that prejudice existed against him because of his political beliefs and activities; that the prosecution and requisition were begun to punish him for his views and activities; that he was not subject to extradition under the Constitution and laws of the United States and was unjustly deprived of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. On November 30, 1939, the district court dismissed the writ and remanded the petitioner. The present appeal to this court is from that order.²

The right of the State of California to demand the rendition of the relator from the State of Pennsylvania is found in Article IV, Section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.³ This clause is not self executing but is made effective by Act of Congress.⁴ The Supreme Court has construed this act as placing the burden upon the governor of the asylum state to determine, before complying with the demand, whether the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime and whether he is a fugitive from justice.⁵ This determination may be made by the governor without a hearing, but if the alleged fugitive considers himself aggrieved by the order he may obtain a hearing upon writ of habeas corpus. The writ may be allowed either by a state or a federal court.⁶

Here, as in Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 401, 28 S.Ct. 714, 718, 52 L.Ed. 1113, "the only condition which it is insisted is absent is the charge of a crime". The issue in the present case is a narrow one, for the determination of whether the relator is charged with a crime is entirely dependent upon whether the facts to which the relator took oath were material within the meaning of the California perjury statute previously quoted. We may accept the relator's argument that since under the law of California he was entitled to adopt and use any name without legal proceedings,⁷ the statement that his name was Darcy was not untrue. However, the requisition papers clearly disclose that the relator's statement as to his birth place was in fact false. The relator argues that as a matter of law this statement is as to an immaterial fact, because had he told the truth he would nevertheless have been entitled to vote since the record discloses that he was a citizen by virtue of his father's naturalization during the relator's minority.

It may be that, insofar as the relator's right to vote is concerned, the outcome would have been the same had he told the truth. As to that right his misstatement as to his place of birth was perhaps immaterial inasmuch as he did possess the qualifications of a voter in California.⁸ Was it immaterial for all purposes? We think not. The Registrar of Voters was entitled to any information which would enable him to purge the lists of those not entitled to vote. Let us suppose that the relator, having been listed as Darcy, a native born citizen, had then obtained a second listing as Dardeck, a native of the Ukraine, who had derived his rights of citizenship through his father. The Registrar would thereby have been deprived of information to which he was entitled to enable him to determine whether the same person had registered twice. Or let us suppose some person, (other than the relator), not entitled to vote in his own right, was permitted to register as Dardeck, a native of the Ukraine, Russia. A fraudulent registration was thereby made possible by...