United States v. Torres-Nieves, Case No. 3:17-cr-00386-SI
| Decision Date | 13 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cr-00386-SI |
| Citation | 367 F.Supp.3d 1235 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Adan TORRES-NIEVES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Billy J. Williams, United States Attorney, and William M. Narus and Lewis S. Burkhart, Assistant United States Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office, 1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600, Portland, OR 97204. Of Attorneys for United States of America.
John Gutbezahl, Law Office of John E. Gutbezahl, 5 Centerpointe Dr., Suite 400, Lake Oswego, OR 97035. Of Attorneys for Defendant.
Michael H. Simon, United States District JudgeDefendant Adan Torres-Nieves ("Torres") moves to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement during the execution of a search warrant and further moves to suppress all statements he made during a custodial interrogation and all evidence recovered as a result of Defendant's statements. The government opposes both motions. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on February 11, 2019. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motions are both DENIED.
The Fourth Amendment requires that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const., amend. IV. A search warrant is supported by probable cause if the issuing judge finds that, "given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). As the Court now tasked with reviewing the issuing judge's finding of probable cause, we must "simply ensure that the [issuing judge] had a ‘substantial basis for ... concluding’ that probable cause existed." Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Jones v. United States , 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) ). We give great deference to an issuing judge's finding that probable cause supports a warrant. United States v. Krupa , 658 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Gourde , 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) ().
An affidavit must consist of more than conclusory statements and bare-bones assertions. United States v. Underwood , 725 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). Instead, the affidavit "must recite underlying facts so that the issuing judge can draw his or her own reasonable inferences and conclusions; it is these facts that form the central basis of the probable cause determination." Id. Whether or not probable cause exists "depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including reasonable inferences, and is a ‘commonsense practical question.’ " United States v. Kelley , 482 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gourde , 440 F.3d at 1069 ). "[P]robable cause means ‘fair probability,’ not certainty or even a preponderance of the evidence." Gourde , 440 F.3d at 1069.
Even when a warrant is unsupported by probable cause, suppression of the fruits of an unconstitutional search is not necessary if the officers relied on the warrant in good faith. United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 919-20, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In Leon , the Supreme Court explained that, "where police conduct is ‘pursued in complete good faith,’ the [exclusionary] rule's deterrent function ‘loses much of its force.’ " United States v. Luong , 470 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Leon , 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405 ). The exclusionary rule thus does "not bar the government's introduction of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently invalidated." Id. The good faith inquiry is an objective one, requiring a court to ask "whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization." Leon , 468 U.S. at 922 n.23, 104 S.Ct. 3405.
United States v. Garibay , 143 F.3d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a valid Miranda waiver occurred. Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).
To satisfy this burden, the prosecution must introduce sufficient evidence to establish that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant was aware of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. The government's burden to make such a showing is great, and the court will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.
Garibay , 143 F.3d at 536-37 (citations and quotation marks omitted). "In determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, we consider, as one factor, any language difficulties encountered by the defendant during custodial interrogation." Id. at 537.
In applying the totality of the circumstances test, courts consider:
(1) whether the defendant signed a written waiver; (2) whether the defendant was advised of his rights in his native tongue; (3) whether the defendant appeared to understand his rights; (4) whether a defendant had the assistance of a translator; (5) whether the defendant's rights were individually and repeatedly explained to him; and (6) whether the defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system.
Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
The right to counsel established in Miranda does not arise under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings, but instead is one of a series of "procedural safeguards ... to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452, 456-57, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (internal citation omitted); see U.S. Const., amend. V. When a suspect knowingly and voluntarily waives his Miranda rights, law enforcement officers are free to question him. "But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation." Id. at 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350 ; see Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). This "prophylactic rule" requires courts to "determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel." Davis , 512 U.S. at 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis in original) (quoting Smith v. Illinois , 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam) ). "Although a suspect need not ‘speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,’ he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (internal citation omitted). If, however, a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney, police need not immediately cease questioning. Id.
In 2017, the Blue Mountain Enforcement Narcotics Team ("BENT") began to suspect that Defendant was a supplier of methamphetamine to Carlos Cisneros-Razo. Officers soon began to surveil Defendant and Cisneros-Razo.
On May 18, 2017, BENT investigators directed a confidential informant ("CI") to purchase methamphetamine from Cisneros-Razo. Investigators, however, directed the CI to request a greater amount of methamphetamine than Cisneros-Razo was believed to possess. BENT investigators met with the CI at a predetermined location near Milton-Freewater, Oregon. The CI then traveled to Cisneros-Razo's home and requested three ounces of methamphetamine. Cisneros-Razo told the CI that he only had one ounce of methamphetamine on hand, but that he could obtain more from his source of supply. The CI left Cisneros-Razo's house and returned to the BENT investigators and relayed this conversation to them.
During this same timeframe, investigators had set up surveillance at Defendant's house and along the route from Defendant's house to Cisneros-Razo's house. Investigators observed Defendant depart from his home and travel to Cisneros-Razo's home. Defendant met with Cisneros-Razo in his home. Defendant then left Cisneros-Razo's home and returned to his own home. Shortly thereafter, the CI received a phone call from Cisneros-Razo. Cisneros-Razo told the CI that he now possessed three ounces of methamphetamine. The CI traveled to Cisneros-Razo's home and purchased three ounces of methamphetamine for $ 1,200.
Investigators maintained their surveillance of Defendant. After the CI completed the controlled buy from Cisneros-Razo, investigators observed Defendant again leave his home and travel to Cisneros-Razo's house. Defendant parked his car in front of Cisneros-Razo's house and Cisneros-Razo got into Defendant's car. After a period of time, Cisneros-Razo got out of Defendant's car and returned to his house.
On May 19, 2017, investigators obtained search warrants for Cisneros-Razo's house, Defendant's house, and Defendant's vehicle from a Umatilla County Circuit Court Judge. Investigators planned to execute the search warrants on May 24, 2017. On that day, however, investigators observed Defendant leave his home with a duffel bag, place the duffel bag in the bed of his truck, and drive away from his home. It is unknown where Defendant went. Later that morning, the CI traveled to Cisneros-Razo's house...
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