United States v. Vega

• Decision Date: 18 March 2022
• Docket Number: 1:21-cr-00210-DCN
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL VEGA, Defendant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
DANIEL VEGA, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cr-00210-DCN

United States District Court, D. Idaho

March 18, 2022

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DAVID C. NYE CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the issue of whether Defendant Daniel Vega's prior conviction for Idaho domestic battery with traumatic injury constitutes a “crime of violence” under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2(a)(1) for purposes of sentencing in this case. If Vega's prior conviction is a crime of violence, his base offense level is 20. If his prior conviction is not a crime of violence, his base offense level is 14.

II. BACKGROUND

On August 10, 2021, Vega was indicted for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and Possession of a Firearm with an Obliterated Serial Number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).^[1] Dkt. 1. On December 1, 2021, Vega entered pleas of guilty to both counts without a plea agreement. Dkts. 25-27.

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United States Probation subsequently prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). In the Initial PSR, Probation calculated Vega's base offense level as 14, after finding Vega's prior conviction for Idaho domestic battery with traumatic injury (“felony domestic battery”) did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a)(1). Dkt. 29, ¶ 18.^[2] The Government objected to the Initial PSR, arguing felony domestic battery in Idaho constitutes a “crime of violence” under the Guideline because it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The issue is critical because § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for anyone who is convicted of possessing a firearm “subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of … a crime of violence.” As such, the Government argued Vega's base offense level should be 20 pursuant § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Dkt. 30, at 6.

Vega responded to the Government's objection, maintaining the Initial PSR correctly determined his prior conviction for felony domestic battery is not a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1), and that his base offense level is 14. See generally, Dkt. 33. Probation ultimately agreed with the Government and amended the Initial PSR to change Vega's base offense level from 14 to 20 in the Final PSR. Dkt. 34-1.

In his Sentencing Memorandum, Vega objected to the Final PSR's calculation of his base offense level as 20. Dkt. 36. The Government responded to Vega's objection in its Sentencing Memorandum, arguing Probation correctly determined Vega's prior conviction

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constituted a crime of violence, and that his base offense level is 20. Dkt. 37. During Vega's scheduled sentencing on February 16, 2022, the Court heard persuasive argument from both sides on the issue, and, after advising the parties that it would issue the instant written decision on whether Vega's prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1) of the Guidelines, ultimately continued Vega's Sentencing to March 16, 2022.^[3]

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The operative definition of “crime of violence” is set forth in § 4B1.2(a)(1), which is known as the “elements” or “force” clause of the Guideline.^[4] In order to determine whether Vega's prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence as defined in § 4B1.2(a)(1), the Court applies the “categorical approach” outlined in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990). “Under this categorical approach, if the state statute of conviction criminalizes more conduct than the federal generic offense, then the state offense is not categorically included in the definition of the federal generic offense.” Rodriquez-Castellon v. Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “If the state statute of conviction criminalizes the same conduct or less conduct than the federal generic offense, then it qualifies as a generic federal offense.” United States v. Perez, 932 F.3d 782, 784-85 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Barragan-Lopez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2013)).

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The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the “key” to the categorical comparison is only the “statutory definitions-i.e., the elements-of a defendant's prior offense[]” and not “the particular facts underlying” the prior conviction. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). Under the categorical approach, the Court must presume Vega's prior conviction “rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts criminalized” under his Idaho statute of conviction. United States v. Baldon, 956 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2020) (brackets in original) (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-191 (2013)).

However, when a prior conviction is for violating a “divisible statute”-that is, if the statute “lists alternative sets of elements, in essence several different crimes”-the Court may employ the “modified categorical approach.” United States v. Werle, 815 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Under this approach, the Court may “consult a limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury instructions, to determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant's prior conviction, ” and then apply the categorical approach to the subdivision under which the defendant was convicted. Id. (quoting Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Government argues Vega's prior conviction categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. If the Court finds otherwise, the Government contends the Idaho statute is nevertheless divisible, and the Court should then apply the modified categorical approach to find the subsection under which Vega was convicted qualifies as a crime of violence. Vega disputes both contentions, and the Court addresses each in turn.

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A. Categorical Approach

In applying the categorical approach, the Court first construes the generic federal definition of “crime of violence” under the elements clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1). This section defines “crime of violence” as “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[.]” Id. In interpreting this language, the Supreme Court has defined “physical force” to mean “violent force- that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).^[5]Clarifying this definition, the Supreme Court later explained that “the force necessary to overcome a victim's physical resistance is inherently ‘violent' in the sense contemplated by Johnson.” Stokeling v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 544, 553 (2019).

In addition, the Supreme Court has held the use of force must be intentional, requiring “active employment” and a “higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). “The bedrock principal of Leocal is that to constitute a federal crime of violence an offense must involve the intentional use of force against the person or property of another.” Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has also recently held that the elements clause does not include offenses which criminalize reckless conduct.

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Borden v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 1817, 1825 (2021) (plurality).^[6] Accordingly, for Vega's state criminal conviction to constitute a “crime of violence” as defined in § 4B1.2(a)(1), “it must have as an element the intentional ‘use, attempted use, or threatened use' of violent physical force against another person.” Perez, 932 F.3d at 786 (emphasis added).

The Court turns next to Vega's state crime of conviction: Idaho felony domestic battery. This crime is defined as follows: “Any household member who in committing a battery, as defined in section 18-903, Idaho Code, inflicts a traumatic injury upon any other household member is guilty of a felony.” Idaho Code § 18-918(2)(a). Battery, in turn, is defined in Idaho Code § 18-903 as any:

a. Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another; or

b. Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person against the will of the other; or

c. Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual. Idaho Code § 18-903.

Traumatic injury “means a condition of the body, such as wound or external injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by physical force.” Idaho Code § 18-918(1)(b). Finally, Idaho felony domestic battery is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to ten years. Idaho Code § 18-918(2)(b).

While the Government argues Idaho felony domestic battery is categorically a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a)(1), Vega contends this crime requires neither the

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mens rea, nor actus rea, necessary to qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Guideline. Because the Court agrees with Vega's former contention, it does not further address the latter.

1. Mens rea

The Government argues Idaho Code § 18-903 requires a heightened mens rea for all three forms of battery. Specifically, § 18-903(a) “requires a showing that the accused purposely used force or violence upon the victim's body.” State v. Billings, 54 P.3d 470, 473 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002). Section 18-903(b) “requires proof of intent to touch or strike another person.” Id. Last, § 18-903(c) requires proof of “intent to cause bodily harm to a person.” Id. As such, the Government maintains Idaho battery cannot be committed negligently or recklessly, and that the mens rea is the same for both a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a)(1), and battery under Idaho Code § 18-903.

Vega counters that the Supreme Court's decision in Borden...