United States v. Vitek

• Decision Date: 21 June 1968
• Docket Number: No. 16418.,16418.
• Citation: 395 F.2d 478
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Larry RICHARDSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Joseph C. VITEK, Warden, Illinois State Penitentiary, Pontiac, Illinois, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

395 F.2d 478 (1968)

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Larry RICHARDSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Joseph C. VITEK, Warden, Illinois State Penitentiary, Pontiac, Illinois, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16418.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

May 21, 1968.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1968

Howard T. Savage, Sydney E. Foster, Ronald M. DeHaan, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

William G. Clark, Robert F. Nix, Chicago, Ill., John J. O'Toole, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel, for appellee.

Before MAJOR, Senior Circuit Judge, and KILEY and FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judges.

KILEY, Circuit Judge.

The district court for the Southern District of Illinois dismissed, without a hearing, appellant Larry Richardson's petition for habeas corpus, and he has appealed. We affirm.

Richardson was arrested at his home in the early morning of August 14, 1961, in connection with the investigation of the robbing and fatal beating of a man on a Chicago street shortly after midnight on August 12. Richardson was then fifteen years old and in the eighth grade. After a trial in the Cook County Criminal Court, he and four others were convicted of the murder. Richardson was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment and is eligible for parole in November, 1969.

In his petition Richardson asserts that his rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated at his trial by the admission into evidence of in-custody statements which he had "involuntarily" made to the police.

The following facts are alleged to support Richardson's claim that his admissions were involuntary: Richardson was in custody without arraignment for thirty-four hours before the statements were given. He was not advised of his right to counsel or his right to remain silent. His whereabouts were not communicated to his family after he was arrested in their presence. He was questioned by police from the time of his arrest at 2:30 a. m. August 14 until 7:30 a. m. with no opportunity of sleep. He was questioned again starting at 2:00 p. m. until 7:30 p. m. when the statements were made to an assistant state's attorney. He signed the statement at 12:30 p. m. August 15 without reading it.

At Richardson's trial in the state court he was represented by the public defender who made a motion to suppress the statements because of involuntariness. This motion was denied after a factual hearing. Richardson appealed and challenged the voluntariness of the statements in the Illinois Supreme Court. The trial court's determination that the statements were voluntary was affirmed. People v. Richardson, 32 Ill.2d 472, 207 N.E.2d 478. The United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari. 384 U.S. 1021, 86 S.Ct. 1935, 16 L.Ed.2d 1023.

Richardson's brief here states that the question before the district court on the petition for habeas corpus and this court on appeal is "precisely the same" as that presented to the Illinois courts. He also states that the question has been presented to each court in a "substantially similar manner" with reliance on "essentially the same evidence."

The district court in dismissing the habeas corpus petition without a hearing carefully adhered to the standards for consideration of habeas corpus petitions outlined in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770, and the revised provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. The court found that the merits of the issue upon the confession had been resolved in the state court hearing by an adequate procedure; that the material facts were adequately developed in a full, fair and adequate hearing from which relevant findings, supported by the record, were made; and that the Richardson petition alleged no substantial newly discovered evidence.

The district court after examining the state record found that Richardson had not requested counsel before giving the statement, had been advised of his right to remain silent, was able to inform his parents of his whereabouts, was not denied opportunity to sleep or subjected to long or extensive periods of questioning, and that the statement he signed was read to him before he signed it and was freely given.

The court concluded, "after a careful examination" and independent study of the entire record, that the "files and records clearly show" that Richardson is not imprisoned in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), and was not denied due process. In reaching its conclusions the court properly disregarded the rules established in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.¹

The district court reached its conclusions on the same record which the Illinois Supreme Court had previously considered. The Illinois Supreme Court had interpreted the record in substantially the same way as the district court, stating that Richardson was arrested in the presence of his father, so that his father knew his son was in police custody; that Richardson's sister was told he would be at the Fillmore Station; that the boys were questioned for a "short period of time" after the arrest, were fed and permitted to watch television at the Audy Detention Home, and were given an opportunity to sleep before Richardson's statement was taken; and that Richardson testified that he was treated well and was promised nothing. The Illinois Supreme Court also found that Richardson was not subjected to lengthy or extensive questioning periods. It stated...