United States v. Weber

• Decision Date: 25 March 1902
• Citation: 114 F. 950
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. WEBER et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

114 F. 950

UNITED STATES v. WEBER et al.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Virginia.

March 25, 1902

Bullitt Kelly & Hull and Blackford, Horsley & Blackford, for the United States.

H. M Ford and Harrison & Long, for defendants.

Before SIMONTON, Circuit Judge, and McDOWELL, District Judge.

MCDOWELL District Judge.

The defendants Weber and Haddow have been attached and brought before the court on a charge of violations of orders of this court made in the case of the Morton Trust Company against the Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Company. The defendants Tom Braley, Cass Braley, and David Clarkson have been summoned by rule to show cause why they should not be held guilty of contempt for violations of these same orders. All the defendants have, in effect, denied the charges made against them. Both the attachment and the rule were issued upon information contained in a verified petition filed by the receivers appointed in the above-named cause.

It is well in the outset to state that the court fully recognizes the limitations on its powers as to contempts committed neither in the presence of the court nor so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice. Rev. St. Sec. 725. That there must have been disobedience of, or resistance to some order of the court is essential to constitute contempt in the case at bar.

By the first order entered in the case of the Morton Trust Company against the Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Company the receivers thereby appointed were directed to take possession of and to operate the properties of the defendant company. By an order entered by the late Judge Paul, district judge, on February 12, 1901, certain named persons (not including any of these defendants), and 'all other parties concerned whose names be hereafter ascertained,' were enjoined from entering upon the property of the Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Company, from trespassing thereon, and from intimidating or coercing, or attempting to intimidate or coerce, or in any manner interfering with the employes of said receivers with intent to induce them to quit the service of said receivers, and from entering into any conspiracy or combination for the purpose of hindering or obstructing the said receivers in the operation of their business at the 'Looney Creek Lease.' The Looney Creek Lease is the same operation that is now alleged to have been obstructed and crippled by the acts of these defendants.

As to the last-mentioned order, the point is made by counsel for the defendants that, as the order was made by a district judge, it ceased to be operative long before the acts here complained of are alleged to have been committed, because of section 719, Rev. St. The statute referred to was intended to limit the life of injunctions issued by district judges, acting as judges of the circuit courts, only when issued in vacation, 1 Bates, Fed. Eq. Proc. § 528; Vulcanite Co. v. Folsom (C.C.) 3 Fed. 509. But upon inquiry of the clerk at Abingdon, where this cause is docketed, it appears that the October term, 1900, of the circuit court was adjourned sine die on October 13, 1900. The next regular term there commenced by law in May, 1901. It follows, therefore, that said order ceased to be effective before the commission of the acts here complained of, and consequently the said order is not of moment in this discussion, except in so far as it served as a warning that the plant at Inman was under the charge of the court, and that interference with the employes with intent to induce them to quite the service, or intimidating them to that end, had been regarded by the court as a violation of its order.

With the petition for the attachment is filed, as Exhibit A, a printed poster giving, in effect, the terms of the above order. It appears that many copies of this poster had been conspicuously displayed, and that the defendants Weber and Haddow knew its contents. In fact Haddow testified that he knew the terms of the poster so thoroughly that he could repeat it almost verbatim. On October 26, 1901, one of the circuit judges of this circuit issued an order by which the defendants Weber and Haddow, by name, were ordered to show cause why they should not be attached for contempt in attempting to interfere with the conduct of the business of the receivers in the management of the properties intrusted to their hands by former orders of this court. And, further ordering, 'that the employes of said receivers be enjoined from conspiring and agreeing with any person or persons whomsoever in attempting to interfere with the conduct of the business of the receivers. In the meantime, and until the further order of this court, that the said Haddow and Weber desist from any interference with the employes of said receivers, so as to affect the conduct of the business of the receivers. ' A writ of injunction, issued in pursuance of said order, was served on the defendant Weber, and knowledge of the contents of the writ appears to have been brought home to the defendant Haddow. But it does not appear that further action was then taken by the court. This was in November, 1901. It appears that all the defendants knew that the plant at Inman-- the 'Looney Creek Lease'-- was being operated by the receivers of this court; that Weber and Haddow knew the purport of the injunction orders above mentioned; and it is entirely improbable that the other defendants were ignorant of the purport of the injunction order issued by Judge Paul.

Having thus set out the orders of this court, some or all of which are alleged to have been disobeyed or resisted by the defendants, it may further tend to clearness of thought to briefly consider some questions of law involved in this matter. It is admitted by defendants Weber and Haddow that they are officers of the organization known as the 'United Mine Workers of America'; that their duties consist in part in organizing mine workers into local lodges of said order; that they came to Virginia both in October, 1801, and March, 1902, for the purpose of organizing such lodges among the miners working for the receivers at Inman and at Tom's Creek, as well as among miners working at other nearby plants. It appears from the evidence that in Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois the coal miners are so nearly all members of the organization that said regions may be considered as 'union' territory. Further, that in West Virginia and Virginia a great many-- perhaps a majority--of the miners are not members of the union. It also appears that when, on a former occasion or occasions, a general strike was ordered, the hopes of the organization were in some measure, at least, defeated because of the fact that the miners in West Virginia continued at work, and the coal thus produced went into the markets that would otherwise have been largely dependent upon the output of the union territory. Hence, it seems, that the object in organizing lodges in the Virginias is to bring the Virginia mines under the control of the organization.

The right of the employes of the receivers to voluntarily join a union that has only legal purposes in view cannot be denied. Moreover, the right to induce, by legal methods and fair moral suasion, the employes of the receivers to join such an organization is not denied. But if the object of the union is illegal, or if the methods employed by it, either to induce acquisitions to its ranks or to accomplish its ulterior purposes, are illegal, it appears to be well settled that the persons who combine in such efforts are conspirators. In Bish. Cr. Law (7th Ed.) Sec. 171, it is said:

'Conspiracy is the corrupt agreeing together of two or more persons to do, by concerted action, something unlawful, either as a means or an ends.'

In 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (1st Ed.)p. 131, under the head of 'Strikes,' is a quotation from Com. v. Shelton, 11 Va.Law J. 324, in which the court of appeals of Virginia said:

'The authorities seem to agree that the gist of the offense is the conspiracy, and that a conspiracy is a confederacy to do an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means, whether to the prejudice of an individual or the public. But by 'unlawful' it is not intended to mean that the acts agreed to be done must be criminal; it is enough if they be wrongful and with improper or evil intent. Thus, it has been held that threats, intimidation, or any forcible means, other than lawful competition, are unlawful. To threaten another in order to deter him from doing some lawful act * * * has always been considered a misdemeanor at common law.'

See, also, Crump's Case, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620, 10 Am.St.Rep. 895, which contains such valuable learning on the subject of conspiracy, and is indirectly authority for the proposition that a combination for the purpose of effecting a legitimate object be illegitimate means is a criminal conspiracy.

It is an equally well-settled doctrine that each of the confederates is liable for all such illegal acts of the others as may be reasonably...