United States v. Wilkins
| Decision Date | 08 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION 19-390 (RC),Re Document 107,108,112,113,116 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. MICHAEL JABAAR WILKINS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Defendant Michael Jabaar Wilkins was charged with trafficking three victim--complainants from Norfolk, Virginia, to Washington, D.C. to engage in prostitution and other commercial sexual acts between 2011 and 2019, as well as the assault of one of the victim-complainants that was captured on a surveillance camera. United States v. Wilkins, 538 F.Supp.3d 49, 62 (D.D.C. 2021). Specifically, he was indicted on two counts of sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion; four counts of transportation of an individual with an intent to engage in prostitution; two counts of coercion and enticement to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution; one count of interstate travel and transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises; and one count of assault. Superseding Indictment at 1-5, ECF No. 61.
The case was scheduled for trial in April 2021, see Pretrial Order ¶ 3, ECF No. 68, and was later postponed to July 26, 2021, see Pretrial Order ¶ 3, ECF No. 77. Less than two weeks before the trial was set to begin, on July 13, 2021, Mr. Wilkins's appointed counsel, Joseph Caleb, moved to withdraw. Mot. Withdraw as Counsel, ECF No. 90. As grounds for withdrawal, he stated that the attorney-client relationship had broken down and that Mr. Wilkins had demanded he withdraw from the case. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Mr. Caleb had been representing Mr. Wilkins for nearly a year at that point. Id. ¶ 1. The Court promptly heard argument on the motion and denied the request to withdraw within two days. Min. Entry of July 15, 2021. The trial was set to continue as planned, and the parties continued filing pretrial motions in the following days. Id.; see, e.g., Mot. Protective Order, ECF No. 93; Mot. Limine, ECF No. 95.
On July 20, 2021, however, the parties informed the Court that they had reached a lastminute plea agreement. Min. Entry for July 20, 2021. Under that agreement, Mr. Wilkins agreed to plead guilty to Count 1 of the Superseding Indictment, which charged him with “sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion” of the victim-complainant J.J. in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1). Superseding Indictment at 1-2; Plea Agreement at 1., ECF No. 102.[1]The Court held a lengthy colloquy at the plea hearing and determined that Mr. Wilkins entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. See generally, Sealed Tr. Proceedings on July 21, 2021 (“Tr.”), ECF No. 106. A pre-sentence report was ordered, and sentencing was scheduled to take place in early December. Sentencing Sched. Order, ECF No. 99.
On August 12, 2021, Mr. Caleb filed a second motion to withdraw, citing “irreconcilable differences” and Mr. Wilkins's renewed request that he withdraw. 2d Mot. Withdraw as Counsel ¶ 6, ECF No. 103. Following another hearing, the Court granted the motion. Min. Entry of Aug. 31, 2021. Before new counsel could be appointed, Mr. Wilkins sent a pro se motion to the Court in October 2021 attempting to withdraw his guilty plea. Am. Mot. Withdraw Plea at 7, ECF No. 108. New counsel, Paul Enzinna, was appointed and entered his appearance in November 2021.Notice Att'y Appearance, ECF No. 104. After consulting with his new counsel, Mr. Wilkins advised the Court of his continued desire to withdraw his guilty plea. Min. Entry of Feb. 23, 2022. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. See Mot. Withdraw Plea, ECF No. 107, Am. Mot. Withdraw Plea;[2] Mem. Opp'n, ECF No. 11; Reply in Supp. Mot. Withdraw Plea, ECF No. 116.[3]
A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after the Court has accepted it but before sentencing for “a fair and just reason.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The burden is on the defendant to establish that there are valid grounds for withdrawal. United States v. Robinson, 498 F.Supp.2d 328, 331 (D.D.C. 2007), aff'd, 587 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (). A guilty plea is “a grave and solemn act” that cannot be automatically withdrawn merely because “the defendant decided to alter his tactics and present his theory of the case to the jury.” United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 (1997). “[P]ermission to withdraw rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
In the D.C. Circuit, courts consider three factors when evaluating whether there is a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea:
First, a defendant generally must make out a legally cognizable defense to the charge against him. Second, . . . the defendant must show either an error in the taking of his plea or some ‘more substantial' reason he failed to press his case rather than plead guilty. Finally, . . . the court may then inquire whether the Government would have been substantially prejudiced by the delay in going to trial.
United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The second factor-whether there was a constitutional or procedural defect in the Rule 11 plea hearing-is by far the most significant. See id. (). Therefore, “a defendant who fails to show some error under Rule 11 has to shoulder an extremely heavy burden if he is ultimately to prevail,” id. at 1208, but “if the initial plea proceeding was not in substantial compliance with [Rule] 11, then the defendant should almost always be allowed to withdraw his plea,” United States v. Abreu, 964 F.2d 16, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
The Court therefore begins with the most important question: whether a procedural or constitutional defect tainted the Rule 11 plea hearing. The Court need not spend long on Mr. Wilkins's first allegation, that “at the time of his plea negotiations and the entry of his plea,” he “was regularly smoking synthetic marijuana,” which affected his decision-making ability. Am. Mot. Withdraw Plea at 6. This claim is contradicted by Mr. Wilkins's sworn testimony on the day of the plea hearing that he was not presently “under the influence of alcohol or any narcotic drugs.” Tr. at 5:13-15. It is also made in a conclusory fashion in the brief, without “any affidavit, declaration, or other evidence to lend factual support” to it. United States v. Sibblies, 562 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2008), aff'd, 358 Fed.Appx. 181 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Moreover, the Court had the opportunity to observe Mr. Wilkins's demeanor and behavior at the Rule 11 hearing and was satisfied that he was fully competent to enter the plea. The Court accordingly does not credit this assertion and finds that there was no defect in the Rule 11 hearing based on Mr. Wilkins's alleged drug use around that time.
Mr. Wilkins's more substantial argument is that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his prior attorney, Mr. Caleb, failed to provide him with effective assistance of counsel. Am. Mot. Withdraw Plea at 5. “A plea based upon advice of counsel that ‘falls below the level of reasonable competence such that the defendant does not receive effective assistance' is neither voluntary nor intelligent.” United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). To establish that a defense attorney's services fell below the constitutional threshold of effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that: 1) “counsel's performance was deficient,” and 2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In the context of ineffective assistance challenges to guilty pleas, an attorney's performance is deficient if it falls outside of “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). The “‘prejudice' requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process,” meaning “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59.
There is evidence that the attorney-client relationship between Mr. Caleb and Mr. Wilkins was strained by the time Mr. Wilkins decided to plead guilty. Trial was scheduled in April 2021 and continued, according to Mr. Wilkins because Mr. Caleb had failed to adequately prepare and did not “have a defense” to present. Am. Mot. Withdraw Plea at 5. Mr. Caleb moved to withdraw at Mr. Wilkins's request less than two weeks before the new trial date, but that request was denied. Mot. Withdraw as Counsel; Min. Entry of July 15, 2021.
Evident throughout Mr. Wilkins's submissions is his dissatisfaction with Mr. Caleb's level of preparation. Indeed, this exact concern was raised and explored at the plea hearing. When asked whether he had sufficient time to consult with Mr. Caleb about the case, Mr. Wilkins responded that: “I had sufficient time to talk to him about this plea agreement, but as far as the case, no.” Tr. at 6:8-13. The Court then inquired further, asking whether Mr Wilkins “had...
To continue reading
Request your trial