United States v. Williams

• Decision Date: 16 September 2022
• Docket Number: 2:19-CR-18-D,2:22-CV-7-D
• Parties: BARRINGTON STRAUCHN, JR., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

BARRINGTON STRAUCHN, JR., Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 2:19-CR-18-D, 2:22-CV-7-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Northern Division

September 16, 2022

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER, III., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

On August 19,2020, Barrington Strauchn, Jr. (“Strauchn” or “petitioned') moved pro se for an emergency sentence reduction based on the COVID-19 pandemic [D.E. 90]. On February 7, 2022, Strauchn moved pro se for compassionate release under the First Step Act (“First Step Act”), Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194,5238-41 (2018) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3582) [D.E. 101] and, through counsel, filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 114]. The same day, Strauchn moved pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his 102-month sentence [D.E. 102]. On April 4, 2022, the government responded in opposition to Strauchn's motion for compassionate release [D.E. 117]. On April 11,2022, Strauchn replied. [D.E. 120]

On April 8,2022, the government moved to dismiss Strauchn's section 2255 motion [D.E. 118] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 119]. On May 25,2022, Strauchn moved for leave to file a motion in response to the government's motion to dismiss, and the court has considered Strauchn's response [D.E. 126]. As explained below, the court denies Strauchn's motions for compassionate release, grants the government's motion to dismiss, and dismisses Strauchn's section 2255 motion.

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I.

In 2018, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) was investigating firearms found during drug and homicide investigations in Canada. See Revised Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) [D.E. 61] ¶ 11. Kadarius Williams purchased the firearms. See id. On January 28,2019, Williams spoke with ATF agents. Id. at ¶ 12. Williams told agents that he purchased approximately 17 firearms for Strauchn. Id. Williams explained that he purchased the firearms for Strauchn because Strauchn was a felon and unable to purchase the weaponshimself. Id., Williams told agents that Strauchn told Williams what kind of firearms to buy and confirmed that he had purchased for Strauchn the four firearms found in Canada. Id. The ATF's investigation found ATF Form 4473s submitted for 13 firearms that Williams purchased for Strauchn. Id. at ¶13.

On August 2,2019, under supervision of ATF investigators, Williams made a recorded phone call to Strauchn. Id. at ¶ 14. During this call, Strauchn confirmed that Strauchn had taken firearms to Canada and still had eight firearms in his possession. See Id. On December 2, 2018, deputy marshals from the United States Marshals Service obtained a warrant and arrested Strauchn at the home of his girlfriend, Trina Spivey. Id. Following the arrest, Spivey told agents that Strauchn had a weapon under the mattress in the master bedroom. Id. There, agents found a loaded Ruger P90 pistol. Id. Strauchn admitted that the gun belonged to him, but denied purchasing any firearms from Williams. Id.

On February 10, 2020, pursuant to a written plea agreement [D.E. 36], Strauchn pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (count twelve). See [D.E. 31,36]; Rule 11 Tr. [D.E. 91] 24-34. During the Rule 11 proceedings, the court informed Strauchn of the elements of possession of a firearm by a

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convicted felon in accordance with Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2121 (2019). See Rule 11 Tr. 24-34. Strauchn's plea agreement also properly recounted the elements under Rehaif. See Plea Ag. [D.E. 36] ¶ 3.a. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss one count of conspiracy to deal in firearms without a licence (count one). Id. at ¶ 4.a.^[1]

The PSR calculated Strauchn's total offense level to be 25, his criminal history category to be I, and his advisory guidelines range on count twelve to be 57 to 71 months' imprisonment. See PSR ¶ 75. On June 11,2020, the government moved for an upward departure based on Strauchn's understated criminal history. See [D.E. 65].

On June 18,2020, the court held Strauchn's sentencing hearing. The court adopted the facts in the PSR and resolved the parties' objections. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)-(B); Sent. Tr. [D.E. 94] 5-50. The court found Strauchn responsible for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, engaging in a conspiracy to traffic at least 18 firearms and to possess or transfer firearms with the knowledge, intent, or reason to believe they would be transported out of the United States, and having an aggravating role in gun trafficking. Sent. Tr. at 5-50; PSR ¶ 15. After considering arguments from both parties, the court denied the government's motion for upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 but added two levels to Straunch's offense level for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. See Sent. Tr. at 6-34. The court adopted atotal offense level of 27, a criminal history category of I, and an advisory guideline range of 70 to 87 months' imprisonment. See id. at 33-34. After thoroughly considering the arguments of counsel (including defense counsel's arguments about CO VID-19), Strauchn's allocution, and all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court upwardly varied and sentenced Strauchn to 102 months'

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imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Id. at 40-47; [D.E. 77].

On June 30, 2020, Strauchn appealed [D.E. 74]. On March 24, 2021, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Strauchn. 846 Fed.Appx. 215 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished). The Fourth Circuit held that the “102-month sentence is substantively reasonable.” Id. at 216. The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court “reasonably determined” Strauchn's sentence given his “serious offense conduct and the extensive evidence” that Strauchn “actively attempted to obstruct law enforcement's ongoing investigation into an international firearms trafficking conspiracy.” Id.

II.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment if (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” or (2) “the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison,” and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has determined the defendant is not a danger to another person or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); see United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189,194 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181,185-86 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied, 142 S.Ct. 383 (2021); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271,275-77 (4th Cir. 2020). A section 3582(c)(1)(A) sentence reduction must comport with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194.

Before filing a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a defendant must “fully exhaust[] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This requirement is

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nonjurisdictional, and the government waives a defense based on section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirements if the government does not timely raise it. See United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126,129-30 (4th Cir. 2021).

When considering a defendant's compassionate release motion, the court determines whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist and whether, in the court's discretion, those circumstances warrant relief in light of relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. See Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194-95; High, 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 330-32. In evaluating the section 3553(a) factors, the court considers, inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the defendant's post-sentencing conduct, the need to deter criminal behavior, the need to promote respect for the law, and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1959, 1966-68 (2018); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480-81 (2011); High, 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 331-32; United States v. McDonald, 986 F.3d 402,412 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389,398 (4th Cir. 2019). Although a court considers a defendant's post-sentencing conduct, rehabilitation alone is not an extraordinary and compelling reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.3; McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286 n.9.

No Sentencing Commission policy statement currently applies to a defendant's compassionate release motion. See Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194; High, 997 F.3d at 186; Kibble, 992 F.3d at 330-31; McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281-82. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is a policy statement that applies to compassionate release motions filed by the BOP Director. Nonetheless, section 1B1.13 “remains helpful guidance even when motions are filed by defendants.” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 282 n.7; see Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194. Application Note 1 of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 lists several extraordinary and

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compelling circumstances, including (A) a defendant's serious medical condition, (B) a defendant's age, when coupled with serious physical or mental deterioration due to age and having served 10 years or 75 percent of his or her sentence, (C) certain family circumstances in which a defendant's minor children, incapacitated spouse, or registered partner would otherwise have no caregiver, or (D) any other extraordinary and compelling reason. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.l. “[T]he fact that an extraordinary and compelling reason reasonably could have been known...