United States v. Wooten

• Decision Date: 14 April 1930
• Docket Number: No. 184.,184.
• Citation: 40 F.2d 882
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. WOOTEN et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

40 F.2d 882 (1930)

UNITED STATES v. WOOTEN et al.

No. 184.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 14, 1930.

George A. H. Fraser, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen.

Carl H. Gilbert, of Santa Fé, N. M. (M. W. Hamilton, of Santa Fé, N. M., on the brief), for appellees.

Before COTTERAL, PHILLIPS, and McDERMOTT, Circuit Judges.

McDERMOTT, Circuit Judge.

The United States, as guardian of the Indians of the Pueblo of Taos, sued to quiet the title to 78 tracts of land; the decision of the trial court was adverse to the government as to part of the tracts; and this appeal challenges the correctness of the decree as to twelve of them. While the facts differ somewhat in the twelve cases, one fact is common to all of the cases, and that is that taxes levied by the state upon the lands prior to June 7, 1924 (the date of the Pueblo Lands Act 25 USCA § 331 note), were not paid by the defendants prior to delinquency. When claimants must pay taxes in order to avail themselves of the rights given adverse possessors by the Pueblo Lands Act is the principal question in the case.

I. Before coming to the merits, a preliminary objection of the government to the form of the decree should be noticed. The decree, inter alia, provides:

"Now therefore it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the title of each of the defendants hereinafter and in this paragraph named and as to the tracts hereinafter and in this paragraph designated, * * * be and it hereby is decreed to be quieted and set at rest in each of said claimants respectively as against the United States of America, the Pueblo of Taos and the Indians thereof. * * * It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that this decree shall have the effect of a Deed of Quitclaim as against the United States of America, the Taos Pueblo and the Indians thereof."

The government contends, as to that part of the decree quieting title in the claimants, that the statute does not authorize an affirmative decree as against the United States; that no judgment or decree may run against the sovereign without its consent; and, there being no such consent, that part of the decree is erroneous. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 245 U. S. 493, 38 S. Ct. 170, 62 L. Ed. 425; Schaumburg v. United States, 103 U. S. 667, 26 L. Ed. 599; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 18 L. Ed. 700. Furthermore, that the defendants asked no affirmative relief, and that a decree must be responsive to the pleadings. Stanwood v. Des Moines Savings Bank (C. C. A. 8) 178 F. 670; Washington Railroad v. Bradley, 10 Wall. 299, 19 L. Ed. 894.

These general principles are not questioned. However, Congress has the power to authorize an affirmative decree without a prayer therefor. Section 4 of the statute (43 Stat. 636 25 USCA § 331 note) authorizes claimants to interpose a plea of limitations. Section 5 then proceeds:

"The plea of such limitations, successfully maintained, shall entitle the claimants so pleading to a decree in favor of them, their heirs, executors, successors, and assigns for the premises so claimed by them, respectively, or so much thereof as may be established, which shall have the effect of a deed of quitclaim as against the United States and said Indians, and a decree in favor of claimants upon any other ground shall have a like effect."

The act answers the contentions of the government. It provides that the plea here interposed, if successful, entitles the claimants "to a decree in favor of them" for the premises claimed. This directs an affirmative decree on a defensive plea. It further provides that such decree "shall have the effect of a deed of quitclaim as against the United States and said Indians." The decree here so provides. Did the court err when it further decreed that defendants' titles should be quieted against the United States and the Indians? It is immediately apparent that the objection, if sound, is without substance. A decree dismissing the bill, after a trial on the merits, forever bars the United States and the Indians from reasserting any claim to the land against the defendants and their privies in title. The decree as entered does no more. But the statute provides that the decree shall "have the effect of a deed of quitclaim." A quitclaim deed conveys whatever interest the grantors possess at the time. Devlin, Real Property and Deeds (3d Ed.) § 27. The words objected to have no further effect than a deed of quit-claim. They are superfluous, but harmless, and do not justify reversal or further attention.

II. Coming to the merits: Section 4, after authorizing a plea of limitations, provides in subsection (a) that, to support such plea, defendants who claim under color of title must prove "open, notorious, actual, exclusive, continuous, adverse possession" from January 6, 1902, to the date of the passage of the act, June 7, 1924. Subsection (b) makes the same requirements as to claimants without color of title, except they must prove possession from March 16, 1889. The trial court found that such requirements had been met, and no error is assigned as to such findings. In addition to these requirements as to adverse possession, a taxpaying requirement is made in both subsections. Subsection (a) provides that the claimants must prove that they "have paid the taxes lawfully assessed and levied thereon to the extent required by the statutes of limitation, or adverse possession of the Territory or of the State of New Mexico, since the 6th day of January, 1902, to the date of the passage of this Act, except where the claimant was exempted or entitled to be exempted from such tax payment."

Subsection (b) is identical, save that, while it requires possession from March 16, 1889, tax payments are required only from 1899.

The undisputed facts are that all of the taxes for the period prior to June 7, 1924, had been paid by the claimants prior to the filing of this suit, excepting in certain instances where the trial court held the taxes were not "lawfully assessed." In each of the cases, the claimant had failed to pay the lawful tax for one or more of the years prior to 1924, until after such tax had become delinquent under the New Mexico statute; in one instance none of the taxes for the years 1919 to 1924 was paid until 1926, when all were paid. In one instance a tax of $2.84 for the year 1915 was not paid until 1926. In several instances ex-soldiers, in reliance upon a state exemption statute later held unconstitutional, did not pay their 1920 tax until after 1924. But in no case did the land go to tax sale, nor did any one else, except the claimants or their predecessors in interest, pay the taxes. This suit was filed in August, 1927.

Before considering the time element in the payment of taxes, it is appropriate to refer to the claims of appellees that no tax payments at all are required of any of the defendants, or from any claimants of lands acquired by the Indians by grant from the governments of Spain, Mexico, or the United States, as distinguished from lands acquired by the Indians by purchase. The Pueblo Lands Act requires the payment of only such taxes as may be "lawfully assessed and levied" on the land. Appellees argue that these Indian lands were never subject to lawful assessment. It is true, of course, that Indian lands are not subject to state taxation, except with the consent of Congress. It is likewise true that by the Act of March 3, 1905 (33 Stat. 1069), Congress expressly exempted Pueblo lands from taxation; and the Constitution of the state of New Mexico carries a like exemption. Article 21, § 2. The argument is plausible, but does not fit into the provisions of the act. Congress undoubtedly was advised of the situation when it passed the act. It cannot be presumed that the requirement as to taxes was inserted for no purpose. Yet, if the tax requirement is limited to Indian purchase land, it is conceded in argument that it is of no practical effect, for the reason that, as far as is known, no Indian land has been acquired by purchase since 1848, and the statute concerns itself with the years 1899 to 1924. Furthermore, several times in the act Congress differentiated between "grant" and "purchase" lands. If Congress had intended to so differentiate in section 4, it would have used the same apt language it employed elsewhere in the act for that purpose.

Nor does appellees' argument fit into the intent of the statute, which is, after all, the criterion. Where doubt exists the courts may, and should, look to the situation which confronted Congress. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 43 S. Ct. 65, 67 L. Ed. 199; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226; United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds (C. C. A. 8) 139 F. 961, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185; Hughes v. Com'r (C. C. A. 10) 38 F.(2d) 755. In reliance upon the Joseph Case, 94 U. S. 614, 24 L. Ed. 295, and decisions of the New Mexico Territorial Court (United States v. Lucero, 1 N. M. 422; United States v. Santistevan, 1 N. M. 583; United States v. Joseph, 1 N. M. 593; Pueblo of Nambe v. Romero, 10 N. M. 58, 61 P. 122) the public had treated the Pueblo Indian as sui juris, with a perfect and alienable title to his lands. His lands had been purchased, improved, mortgaged, and sold. The Sandoval Case, 231 U. S. 28, 34 S. Ct. 1, 58 L. Ed. 107, and the Candelaria Case, 271 U. S. 432, 46 S. Ct. 561, 70 L. Ed. 1023, held to the contrary. Congress confronted a situation where people had purchased lands in reliance upon existing law, paid for them, improved them, and claimed to own them. These people had strong moral claims which Congress expressly recognized by section 4 of the act. But Congress laid down the specifications for such claimants; if their proof measured up, their titles were good; if not, they were not. One of the specifications was adverse possession; another was the payment of taxes, for a claimant naturally would have paid taxes on the land, if...