United States v. Woznichak

• Docket Number: Criminal 21-242
• Decision Date: 07 November 2023
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ZACKARY WOZNICHAK
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ZACKARY WOZNICHAK

Criminal No. 21-242

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

November 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

W Scott Hardy United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is Defendant Zackary Woznichak's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, wherein he argues that Count Three of the Indictment, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), should be dismissed because that provision is unconstitutional as applied to him in violation of the Second Amendment under recent authority from the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (Docket Nos. 55 at 4-7; 66 at 2-19). Defendant also argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face, unconstitutionally vague and violates the Commerce Clause. (Docket Nos. 55 at 7-11; 66 at 19-23). Further, he contends that Count Four of the Indictment, charging a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), should be dismissed because it violates the Second Amendment. (Docket No. 55 at 11-14). The Government opposes Defendant's Motion. (Docket Nos 61, 69). After careful consideration of the parties' respective positions, the Court concludes that Defendant's arguments lack merit, thus his Motion will be denied in all respects.^[1]

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant is charged in a four-count Indictment as follows: at Count One with possession with intent to distribute a quantity of marijuana and a quantity of MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 841(b)(1)(D); at Count Two with possession of a short-barreled shotgun and a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 924(c)(1)(B)(i); at Count Three with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and at Count Four with possession of an unregistered shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). (Docket No. 1).

Defendant now moves to dismiss Count Three of the Indictment,^[2] challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) following the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Range v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023). (See generally Docket Nos. 55, 66). In light of these decisions, Defendant contends the Government will be unable to show that § 922(g)(1), as applied to him, is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. (Docket Nos. 55 at 6-7; 66 at 3-19). Defendant further argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face, unconstitutionally vague and violates the Commerce Clause. (Docket Nos. 55 at 7-11; 66 at 19-23). Additionally, Defendant moves to dismiss Count Four of the Indictment, contending that 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) is unconstitutional under the standard enunciated in Bruen. (Docket No. 55 at 11-14).

The Government advocates that the Court should reject Defendant's as-applied constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1). (Docket Nos. 61 at 3-13; 69 at 1-8). According to the Government, Defendant's Motion should be denied because he does not contend that he possessed the firearms in question for self-defense, which is the only Second Amendment-protected purpose that the Supreme Court has recognized. (Docket No. 61 at 3). Even if Defendant could overcome that deficiency, the Government maintains that he cannot overcome the facts that he possessed firearms while on state probation, in furtherance of drug trafficking, and after prior drug convictions, thus § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a person in his circumstances under the historical analysis set forth in Range. (Id. at 6-13). The Government further contends that Defendant's facial challenge fails because he has not shown that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in all circumstances. (Id. at 13-15). Additionally, the Government argues that § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague, and it does not violate the Commerce Clause. (Id. at 15-17). Finally, the Government submits that 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)'s prohibition on unregistered short-barreled shotguns does not violate the Second Amendment, either as applied or facially. (Id. at 17-20).

In Reply, Defendant reiterates that there is no historical tradition of permanently prohibiting firearm possession by someone like him, who previously was convicted of trafficking controlled substances. (See Docket No. 66 at 3-19). Defendant also amplifies his arguments that § 922(g)(1) is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutionally vague. (Id. at 19-23). The Government filed a Sur-reply further advocating that Defendant has failed to establish that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him. (See Docket No. 69). Defendant's Motion is now ripe for disposition.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B), an alleged defect in the indictment “must be raised by pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available and the motion can be determined without a trial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B); see United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 60 (1969) (observing that Rule 12 permits pretrial resolution of a motion to dismiss indictment when “trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the defense.”). “An indictment is defective if it alleges [a] violation of an unconstitutional statute.” United States v. Ho Ka Yung, Crim. No. 17-14-LPS, 2018 WL 619585, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2018) (quoting United States v. Dean, 670 F.Supp.2d 457, 458 (E.D. Va. 2009) and citing United States v. Boffa, 513 F.Supp. 444, 459-64 (D. Del. 1980) (resolving motion to dismiss indictment where defendant alleged statute was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and unconstitutional as applied)). As stated, Defendant lodges several constitutional attacks on Counts Three and Four of the Indictment, including that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him. See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (In contrast to a facial attack, an as-applied challenge “does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.”) (citation omitted).

Importantly, in analyzing a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, a district court's review is confined to the facts alleged in the indictment, see United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2011), and the court “must accept as true the factual allegations set forth [therein].” United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012) (abrogated on other grounds by Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019)). The scope of review remains the same where, as here, a defendant lodges an as-applied challenge to a statute that he is charged with violating.^[3] See id. at 601 (in assessing on appeal a defendant's Second Amendment challenge to a charge of aiding and abetting possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the Third Circuit emphasized that it was “limited to determining whether, based on the allegations in the Indictment-and only the allegations in the Indictment-[defendant's] Second Amendment rights have been violated”). Against this legal standard, the Court considers Defendant's Motion.

IV. DEFENDANT'S AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE TO 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

Count Three of the Indictment charges that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (see Docket No. 1 at 3), which makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Defendant argues that Count Three should be dismissed because § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him following Bruen and Range. (See Docket Nos. 55 at 4-7; 66 at 3-19). Conversely, the Government maintains that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a person in Defendant's circumstances under the historical analysis set forth in those cases. (See Docket Nos. 61 at 6-13; 69 at 1-8). The applicable decisional law interpreting the Second Amendment compels the Court to concludes that the Government is correct.

A. Applicable Second Amendment^[4] Law

To start, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630, 635 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767-68 (2010), the Supreme Court recognized that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual's right to possess a handgun in the home for the “core lawful purpose of self-defense.” The Supreme Court stressed, however, that the right is not unlimited. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. To illustrate, “[f]rom Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the [Second Amendment] right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. at 626. Accordingly, the Supreme Court instructed that “nothing in [Heller] should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” Id. at 626-27. Later, in McDonald, the Supreme Court reiterated that its holding in Heller did not cast doubt on such longstanding “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” among other prohibitions. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786.

In Bruen, the Supreme Court held that the Second and Fourteenth...