United States v. Zack
Decision Date | 30 April 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. LV-2162 RDF. |
Citation | 375 F. Supp. 825 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America and Hubert J. Goodrich, Special Agent, Internal Revenue Service, Petitioners, v. Thomas F. ZACK, as President, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
V. DeVoe Heaton, U. S. Atty., Las Vegas, Nev., for petitioners.
Goodman, Snyder & Gang, Las Vegas, Nev., for respondents.
ORDER DENYING PETITION TO ENFORCE INTERNAL REVENUE SUMMONS
FACTS
This is a proceeding under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, sections 7402(b) and 7604(a) (26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a)), to judicially enforce an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administrative summons of books, records and documents for IRS examination (26 U.S.C. § 7602).
On March 7, 1973, an administrative summons, Treasury Form 2039, was served on Thomas F. Zack, DDS Chartered, and Thomas F. Zack, an individual, as President of the corporation. Both entities are named as respondents in the instant petition. Respondents appeared pursuant to the summons on March 23, 1973, but refused to produce the books or records demanded or to testify fully. The IRS seeks an order directing respondents to testify and produce the data as is required and called for by the terms of the summons. The IRS petition alleges that Special Agent Hubert J. Goodrich, the officer issuing the summons, is participating in an investigation for the purpose of ascertaining the correct federal tax liabilities of the respondent corporation for the years 1970 and 1971.
This alleged civil investigation began after an informant contacted the IRS and conveyed information which was immediately relayed to Special Agent Goodrich, who in turn immediately began an investigation into possible criminal violations of the tax laws by Dr. Zack. After corroborating the fact that a double set of books was maintained in Dr. Zack's office, one for cash payments by patients and one for payments by check, and the possibility that only the check records were used to report taxable income, Special Agent Goodrich obtained a search warrant on March 1, 1973, on the basis that there was probable cause to believe that a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 ( ) was and had been occurring. On that same day, the records identified in the warrant were seized during a search of Dr. Zack's office by three IRS agents.
Exactly one week after the search warrant had been carried out, Special Agent Goodrich issued the administrative summons. This summons specified that:
The factual circumstances thus clearly show that the administrative summons is part of, and merely a continuation of, the investigation for which the search warrant was issued.
Under the particular facts of this case, should this Court refuse to enforce the IRS administrative summons?
Yes. As discussed below, this Court finds that the facts of this case, and the sequence in which they occurred, indicate that the civil investigative tool of an administrative summons is here sought to be improperly used for the sole purpose of obtaining information in a criminal investigation. It will not, therefore, be judicially enforced.
The area of administrative summonses, as utilized by the IRS, has seen extensive litigation and appellant discussion, but this Court has been unable to find, and has not been referred to, any case law dealing with the enforceability of such a summons when it is issued on the heels of a prior search pursuant to a search warrant. To ascertain whether the IRS summons presented should be civilly enforced, then, the Court must delineate not only any relevant considerations that have heretofore been judicially expressed, but also the manner in which the accommodation of concerns for administrative effectiveness of the tax laws and protection of legal safeguards for the individual can most soundly be achieved under the unusual circumstances of this case.
The relatively recent history of the law of administrative summonses or subpoenas embodies a significant shift in judicial approaches to enforcement of such process. Prior to the 1940's, the Supreme Court was firmly against the use of subpoenas for investigations not related to law enforcement. See, e. g., Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 29 S.Ct. 115, 53 L.Ed. 253 (1908); FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 267 U.S. 586, 45 S.Ct. 461, 69 L.Ed. 800 (1924); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 654, 80 L.Ed. 1015 (1936). The shift which then occurred is perhaps best seen in a dictum found in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-209, 66 S.Ct. 494, 505, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946):
This latter approach is applicable to cases involving an IRS administrative summons. In Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84 S.Ct. 508, 513, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964), the Supreme Court stated in dictum that:
It is interesting to note the full reversal that is evidenced by the above dictum: not only is exercise of the summons power no longer required to be in furtherance of a criminal investigation, but a criminal investigative purpose is considered improper. The broad language of Reisman, however, was quickly narrowed by the interpretations given it in the circuit courts. For example, in Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206, 208-209 (9th Cir. 1966), the Ninth Circuit stated:
A narrow reading of Reisman was specifically approved by the Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 533, 91 S.Ct. 534, 545, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971):
To successfully challenge an IRS summons on the ground that it was issued for an improper purpose, then, a Court must be satisfied that the only purpose of the summons is to further a criminal tax investigation; for it is no defense to an enforcement proceeding that a duality of purposes exists, only one of which is improper. United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 516 (3rd Cir. 1971); United States v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361, 1364 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Stamp, 147 U.S.App.D. C. 340, 458 F.2d 759 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 975, 92 S.Ct. 2424, 32 L. Ed.2d 675 (1971).
The burden is upon a challenger to prove that there is no proper civil purpose for the summons. See United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 2188, 29 L.Ed.2d 430 (1971); United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700-701 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Vey, 324 F.Supp. 552 (D.Pa.1971); contra, United States v. Rabinovitz, 305 F.Supp. 1218 (D.Wis.1969); United States v. Mothe, 303 F.Supp. 1366 (D. La.1969). This may well be an impossible burden to meet. The IRS is initially aided by the presumption that it is complying with its public duty, "and it cannot be assumed that (IRS agents) will abuse their authority in carrying out the examination (pursuant to an administrative summons)." United States v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile, 67 F.Supp. 616 (D.Ala.1946). And there is a general policy against judicial intervention in the investigative stage of tax matters because of the danger of undue delay in the collection of the revenues. DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 87 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 936, 84 S.Ct. 341, 11 L.Ed.2d 269 (1963). The IRS need give no assurance that records demanded in an administrative summons are unconnected with any criminal investigation, since the IRS may use such a summons if its investigation has both civil and criminal ramifications. United States v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 415 F.2d 1284 (6th Cir. 1969). Further, if the summons is issued by an IRS Special Agent, and it is conceded that such an agent principally—if not totally—is assigned to investigate possible criminal...
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U.S. v. Zack
...Upon Zack's failure to comply, the government sought to enforce the summons. The district court denied enforcement. United States v. Zack, 375 F.Supp. 825 (D.Nev.1974). We reverse and remand. An IRS administrative summons may be issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602 in furtherance of an inves......