United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | 93-7613,No. 93-2008,Nos. 93-2008,AFL-CIO-CLC,No. 93-7613,93-2008,s. 93-2008 |
| Citation | 32 F.3d 53 |
| Parties | , 128 Lab.Cas. P 11,154, 9 IER Cases 1281 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,v. CROWN CORK & SEAL CO., INC., Appellant (in). Charles A. THOMAS; Darren Boop; Robert W. Bower; William D. Bridge; James Clingan; Neal B. Housner; Jonathan L. Noaker; Wayne D. Orner; Gerald W. Ranck; Harold E. Van Sickle, Jr.; Richard A. Winter; Eugene L. Witmer, Sr., Appellants (in), v. NORTH STAR STEEL COMPANY. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Alan D. Berkowitz (argued), Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Philadelphia, PA, for appellant in No. 93-2008, Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.
David I. Goldman (argued), Pittsburgh, PA, for appellee in No. 93-2008, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC.
Robin S. Conrad, Washington, DC, for amicus appellant Chamber Commerce US in No. 93-2008, for amicus-appellee Chamber Commerce US in No. 93-7613.
Paul A. Levy (argued), Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Appellants
in No. 93-7613, Charles A. Thomas, Darren S. Boop, Robert W. Bower, William D. Bridge, James Clingan, Neal B. Housner, Jonathan L. Noaker (whose name is misspelled in some pleadings as "Nooker"), Wayne D. Orner, Gerald W. Ranck, Harold E. Van Sickle, Jr., Richard A. Winter, Eugene L. Witmer, Sr.
Vincent Candiello (argued), Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Harrisburg, PA, for appellee in No. 93-7613, North Star Steel Co., Inc.
Joseph S. Hornack, Cynthia S. Akers, Healey, Davidson & Hornack, Pittsburgh, PA, for amicus-appellants in No. 93-7613, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, United Mine Workers of America, Intern. Union, NLG/Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice, Intern. Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agri. Implement Workers of America, UAW.
Before: COWEN and ROTH, Circuit Judges, ACKERMAN, District Judge *.
These two cases present the following discrete issue: In an action brought pursuant to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 2101 et seq. ("WARN"), a statute which, like so many others, fails to explicitly provide a statute of limitations, should we follow the general rule and borrow a state statute of limitations or should we instead opt for the six-month statute of limitations set forth in section 10(b) of the federal National Labor Relations Act. The two cases present the identical issue for review and we will consider both cases in this Opinion.
For the reasons detailed below, we find that for cases arising under WARN, courts should apply the most closely analogous state statute of limitations. Thus, we will reverse the decision in Thomas v. North Star Steel, 838 F.Supp. 970, and will affirm the decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal, 833 F.Supp. 467.
Both of the underlying cases were filed pursuant to WARN, a federal statute which requires companies with one hundred or more employees to provide their workers with a minimum of sixty days written notice before a plant closing or mass layoff. 1 Employers who fail to provide the requisite notice must compensate employees suffering an employment loss for each day of the violation. The statute creates a private civil action for damages in federal court.
On September 9, 1991, the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, filed a complaint in federal court alleging that the North Star Steel Company ("North Star") had violated the WARN Act by failing to give the union sixty days advance notice of a February 25, 1991 layoff of about 270 people, at the company's Milton, Pennsylvania plant. Although the suit was filed more than six months after the layoff occurred, North Star did not raise the statute of limitations as a defense. On April 9, 1992, the district court granted the union's motion for summary judgment on liability, holding that the layoff constituted a "plant closing" subject to WARN. In a separate Order, dated December 11, 1992, the district judge determined the number of days for which the company was required to pay WARN damages. United Steelworkers v. North Star Steel, 809 F.Supp. 5, 6-7 (M.D.Pa.1992), aff'd 5 F.3d 39 (1993).
Appellants were non-unionized employees of North Star, unrepresented by the union and hence unaffected by the union's successful lawsuit against North Star. They therefore filed a separate action, the instant case also seeking damages pursuant to WARN. On May 25, 1993, the district court granted North Star's motion for summary judgment, finding that the action was barred under what it deemed to be the applicable statute of limitations. The employees' motion for reconsideration was denied on August 26, 1993. This appeal followed.
United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. ("Crown Cork"), arises out of an event that took place on September 30, 1991. On that day, the company ordered a reduction-in-force and shutdown of its Perry, Georgia plant. As a result of this reduction in force, about 85 employees were terminated. On October 15, 1992, the United Steelworkers of America (the union) filed a complaint, alleging that the company violated WARN by failing to give it 60 days notice prior to the shutdown. Crown Cork & Seal then moved for summary judgment, contending that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion on August 24, 1993 but in an order dated September 26, 1993, certified the August order for immediate interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292.
We have jurisdiction over the appeal in Thomas v. North Star Steel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Our jurisdiction over United Steelworkers of America v. Crown Cork & Seal arises from our October 13, 1993 Order granting the company permission to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b). Our review over both cases is plenary.
In this case we visit a general question of federal law that we have repeatedly addressed: When a federal statute does not contain an explicit statute of limitations, when is it appropriate to borrow a statute of limitations from elsewhere in federal law rather than adopting the most closely analogous state statute of limitations.
The companies argue that in this case, a federal statute--the six-month statute of limitations contained in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") for filing a claim of an unfair labor practice with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")--provides the most appropriate limitations period. The employees and the union exhort us to borrow one of various state statutes. Courts addressing the question have adopted both approaches. Some have borrowed the six-month Sec. 10(b) statute; see, e.g., Newspaper and Mail Delivers' Union of N.Y. and Vicinity v. United Magazine Co., 809 F.Supp. 185 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (adopting NLRA statute); Staudt v. Glastron, Inc., No. SA-92-CA-1174, 1993 WL 85356, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 3090 (W.D.Tex. February 23, 1993) (same). Other courts, including the only Court of Appeals to reach the question, have expressly considered and rejected the section 10(b) six-month period, instead opting for various state law limitations periods. See, e.g. United Paperworkers Local 340 v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.1993) (hereinafter United Paperworkers ); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F.Supp. 192 (E.D.Mich.1993) (); Automobile Mechanics' Local No. 701 of the Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Santa Fe Terminal Services, Inc., 830 F.Supp. 432 (N.D.Ill.1993) ().
The two district court opinions before us now reached contrary conclusions. The district court in North Star Steel adopted the six-month statute of limitations set forth in Sec. 10(b); the court in Crown Cork & Seal rejected the Sec. 10(b) statute, and without deciding the appropriate statute of limitations, found the action timely under all of the possibilities.
Our analysis must begin with the general assumption that when a federal statute is silent as to a statute of limitations, the court should apply "the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law." DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355-56, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 2778, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991); Haggerty v. USAir, Inc., 952 F.2d 781, 783 (3d Cir.1992). This general rule is not set in stone, however. Rather, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that, in order to prevent frustration of federal policy, it is sometimes more appropriate to borrow a limitations period from an analogous area of federal law. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162, 103 S.Ct. at 2289. This exception is "closely circumscribed", see Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 621, 625, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989), and should only be applied "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking". DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294.
In following the principles enunciated in DelCostello and Reed, we repeatedly have recognized our duty "to take seriously [the Supreme Court's admonition] that analogous state statutes of limitations are to be used unless they frustrate or significantly interfere with federal policies." Reed, 488 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 627. For instance, the mere fact that a statute touches upon issues of labor law does not mean that the Court must resort to the statute of limitations contained in Sec. 10...
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