United Steelworkers of America v. New Park Min. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 December 1958
• Docket Number: No. C-26-58.,C-26-58.
• Parties: UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA (AFL-CIO), LOCAL UNION NO. 4264, Plaintiff, v. NEW PARK MINING COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

169 F. Supp. 107

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA (AFL-CIO), LOCAL UNION NO. 4264, Plaintiff, v. NEW PARK MINING COMPANY, Defendant.

No. C-26-58.

United States District Court D. Utah, Central Division.

September 3, 1958.

Additional Opinion December 16, 1958.

Algerdas N. Cheleden, Los Angeles, Cal., A. Wally Sandack (of Draper, Sandack & Draper), Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.

Calvin A. Behle, Keith Taylor (of Dickson, Ellis, Parsons & McCrea), Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendant.

CHRISTENSON, District Judge.

On September 27, 1957, New Park Mining Company, a corporation, discontinued its mining operations and discharged approximately one hundred seventeen employees represented by the plaintiff union. On October 3, 1957 defendant entered into a leasing contract, referred to as the "Mayflower Lease", with a number of these former employees for the working of its mine. The collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff union and the defendant corporation by its terms did not expire until June 30, 1958.

Relying upon the jurisdiction of this Court conferred by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, plaintiff on March 6, 1958 filed this action for the purpose of compelling the defendant company to arbitrate with reference to the discharge of said employees; for a declaration that the so-called "Mayflower Lease" is invalid and subordinate to the prior collective bargaining agreement; for judgment in favor of the plaintiff union as trustee for the defendant's employees as a class for full salary and back pay, including vacation pay from September 27, 1957 through June 30, 1958; and for costs and general relief. In its answer the defendant admits that it has refused to arbitrate the grievances asserted by the union but denies that plaintiff is entitled to relief. It also has moved for summary judgment, and the latter matter is before me for decision.

It is now firmly settled that performance of an agreement to arbitrate may be specifically enforced. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972; see also Local 19, Warehouse, Processing and Distributive Workers Union, Retail Wholesale and Dept. Store Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 6 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 776, certiorari denied 354 U.S. 910, 77 S.Ct. 1293, 1 L.Ed.2d 1428; Butte Miners' Union No. 1 of International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers v. Anaconda Company, D.C.D.Mont.1958, 159 F.Supp. 431; cf. Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421.

However, recourse to the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, which agreement is set out as an exhibit to the complaint, and also as an exhibit to the answer, is dispositive of this phase of the case. The only reference therein to arbitration is as follows:

"Step 3: Failing satisfactory adjustment, the staff representative of the Union and the Grievance Committee and the general manager and his representatives shall make a final effort to settle the grievance within five (5) days from the signing of the written statement of the issues, before resorting to (c) below.

"(c) Before resorting to economic force the Company and the Union shall have completed the procedure provided for herein and shall further make an effort to agree to dispose of the difference or grievance by means of arbitration."

It is true that Exhibit B, "Procedural Agreement for Job Evaluation", by reference incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement, contains detailed provision with regard to the procedure to be followed "* * * in regard to the review of job classification and job descriptions * * *", including a stipulation that such matters shall be binding, and that in event of any such arbitration the parties will utilize the services of the American Arbitration Association. Article III, § 1(f). It is manifest that the latter provisions concerning review of job descriptions and job classifications do not suggest either expressly or by implication that with respect to any other matters there shall be arbitration or that it shall be final and binding. As to these other grievances, the arbitration provision is only that the company and the union shall "* * * make an effort to agree to dispose of the difference or grievance by means of arbitration."

Is an undertaking to make an effort to agree to dispose of questions or grievances by means of arbitration such a one as to be specifically enforceable? I think not. It is not so by operation of the general federal law with regard to arbitration, since contracts of employment are specifically excluded. 9 U.S.C. A. § 1. There appears no reason why the basic principle applicable to other claims for specific performance should not apply here to preclude the remedy where there is no agreement for performance which is reasonably susceptible of enforcement. United Furniture Workers of America v. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co., D.C.E.D.Ark., W.D., 1957, 148 F. Supp. 129; Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Company, 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.2d 104, 31 A.L.R.2d 867.

From some contracts there may be implied the adoption of general or other arbitration procedures, and certainly the Court should be favorably inclined toward the resolution of labor disputes by this means. Marine Transit Corporation v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 52 S.Ct. 166, 76 L.Ed. 282; see also annotation, "Contract providing that it is governed by or subject to rules or regulations of a particular trade, business or association as incorporating agreement to arbitrate." 41 A.L.R.2d 872. But we have found no case where the language of a contract is less susceptible to an implication that other arbitration procedures were intended and we have found no case which more clearly negates the idea that enforceable arbitration was contemplated than the case at bar. The fact that there was included an enforceable arbitration provision concerning job descriptions and classifications only underscores the intention of the parties that there should be no enforceable, final or binding arbitration with respect to other matters.

It remains to inquire whether relief other than specific performance of the alleged agreement to arbitrate may be granted in this action. Section 185, 29 U.S.C.A. provides in part as follows:

"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

"Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for purposes of suit; enforcement of money judgments.

"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets."

If the collective bargaining agreement itself was violated by the company in terminating its operations and entering into the lease agreement in a way basically affecting the rights of the union itself, could this Court grant relief under section 185 notwithstanding that there was no enforceable agreement for arbitration? It is true that the individual rights of the discharged employees might be affected by any such determination, but it would seem appropriate for the union itself to object to the effectual termination of its contract with the employer through such means if there are no other provisions of law limiting the application of section 185. See annotation, "Substitution of independent contractor for employees as violation of collective labor contract," 57 A.L.R.2d 1399. See also New Bedford Defense Products Division of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local No. 1113 of International Union Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, D.C.D.Mass.1958, 160 F.Supp. 103, affirmed, 1 Cir., 258 F.2d 522.

If the cessation of operations and the substitution of a leasing arrangement were in good faith, I am of the opinion that there would be no violation of the contract involved. See Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of America, Division 1326 v. Greyhound Corp., 5 Cir., 1956, 231 F.2d 585, 57 A.L.R.2d 1394; Local Union No. 600, United Automobile Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., D.C.E.D.Mich., S.D., 1953, 113 F.Supp. 834; American Brake Shoe Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 1957, 244 F.2d 489; Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 1944, 211 F.2d 365; National Labor Relations Board v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 5 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 848; National Labor Relations Board v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 8 Cir., 1954, 215 F.2d 908; National Labor Relations Board v. Adkins Transfer Co., 6 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 324, and the cases cited in the annotation at page 57 A.L.R.2d 1399. The agreement between the New Park Mining Company and the United Steelworkers in effect so provided:

"XIX. Management Prerogative. The right to hire, to discharge and to manage operations and the direction of the working forces are invested in the Company and the Union shall not abridge that right."

There are suggestions in the complaint that the discharge and lease were for the purpose of avoiding defendant's obligations under the collective bargaining agreement. This,...