United Teachers of L.A. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. S177403.,S177403.
• Citation: 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7433,54 Cal.4th 504,142 Cal.Rptr.3d 850,2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8943,280 Ed. Law Rep. 1090,278 P.3d 1204
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: UNITED TEACHERS OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

54 Cal.4th 504
278 P.3d 1204
142 Cal.Rptr.3d 850
280 Ed. Law Rep. 1090
12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7433
2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8943

UNITED TEACHERS OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S177403.

Supreme Court of California

June 28, 2012.

[142 Cal.Rptr.3d 853]Holguin, Garfield & Martinez, Holguin, Garfield, Martinez & Quiñonez, Jesús E. Quinonez and John J. Kim for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Altshuler Berzon, San Francisco, Stephen P. Berzon and Matthew J. Murray for California Teachers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Miller Brown & Dannis, Dannis Woliver Kelley, Long Beach, and Sue Ann Salmon Evans for Defendant and Respondent.

Lozano Smith, Monterey, Martha Buell Scott and Edward Sklar for California School Boards Association's Education Legal Alliance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Law Offices of Middleton, Young & Minner, James E. Young and Chastin H. Pierman for Green Dot Public Schools as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, San Diego, Gregory V. Moser and Alyssa Aiko Osugi for California Charter Schools Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

LIU, J.

[278 P.3d 1207]

[54 Cal.4th 509]After the Los Angeles Unified School District (District) approved the conversion of an existing public school into a charter school, the United Teachers of Los Angeles (UTLA) filed a number of grievances claiming that the District failed to comply with provisions of the collective bargaining [54 Cal.4th 510]agreement that concern charter school conversion. Unable to resolve the grievances informally, UTLA sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The District argued that the collective bargaining provisions regulating charter school conversion were unlawful because they conflicted with the statutory scheme for creation and conversion of charter schools. Accordingly, the District urged, arbitration of those unlawful provisions should not be compelled.

The trial court agreed and denied UTLA's petition. But the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that it was not for the court, on a petition to compel arbitration, to decide whether there was a conflict between the collective bargaining provisions and the charter school statutes. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the court's function in adjudicating a petition to compel arbitration was limited to determining whether there was a valid arbitration agreement that had not been waived. Because that was the case here, the court ordered the petition to be

[278 P.3d 1208]

granted. The District claims this ruling was erroneous.

We conclude that a court faced with a petition to compel arbitration to enforce collective bargaining provisions between a union and a school district should deny the petition if the collective bargaining provisions at issue directly conflict with provisions of the Education Code—that is, if they would annul, replace, or set aside Education Code provisions. We further hold that, under the Education Code, an arbitrator has no authority to deny or revoke a school charter, as UTLA requests. Nevertheless, we express no view on whether the collective bargaining provisions cited in UTLA's grievance are necessarily in conflict with the Education Code. As explained below, UTLA has not identified[142 Cal.Rptr.3d 854]with sufficient specificity which collective bargaining provisions the District allegedly violated. We thus remand this case to the trial court to give UTLA an opportunity to identify those specific provisions, and to allow the parties to address whether the provisions so identified conflict with the Education Code.

I.

On May 11, 2007, Green Dot Public Schools filed a charter petition with the District Board of Education. The petition sought to convert Alain Leroy Locke High School (Locke High School) to a charter school. The board granted the charter school petition on September 11, 2007.

On May 9, 2008, the UTLA, a union representing Los Angeles teachers and certificated support personnel, filed a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to a written collective bargaining agreement. The petition alleged that UTLA had exhausted the preliminary steps of the grievance process in [54 Cal.4th 511]Article V of the collective bargaining agreement and was submitting the matter to arbitration pursuant to the same article. Article V, section 1.0 of the collective bargaining agreement defines a grievance as “a claim that the District has violated an express term” of the collective bargaining agreement.

UTLA's grievance alleged that the District had violated Article XII–B of the collective bargaining agreement, which sets forth procedures for converting a school to a charter school. Article XII–B states in part, “The primary purpose of this Article is to mitigate the potentially disruptive effect upon employees assigned to schools which are converting (or considering converting) to independent charter status.” Article XII–B, section 2.0 sets forth the District's obligations to UTLA and to school employees in processing a conversion charter petition. Article XII–B, section 3.0 requires disclosures by a charter school operator to employees of a proposed charter school. These provisions are discussed in greater detail below.

Specifically, UTLA's grievance alleged that the District had violated sections 2.0 and 3.0 of Article XII–B in connection with the Locke High School charter conversion by failing (1) to present the complete charter to employees; (2) to give affected employees and the community a reasonable opportunity to review and discuss the plan; (3) to give the union a copy of the proposed charter for review; and (4) to clearly and fully disclose the conditions of employment within the charter school. The District refused to arbitrate the controversy, prompting UTLA's petition to compel arbitration.

The District opposed the union's petition. Relying upon Board of Education v. Round Valley Teachers Assn. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 269, 277–288, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 115, 914 P.2d 193( Round Valley ), the District argued that UTLA's grievances could not be arbitrated because the collective bargaining provisions that UTLA sought to enforce conflict with Education Code section 47611.5, subdivision (e), which provides that the approval of a charter school petition shall not be controlled by a collective bargaining agreement. Further, the District argued that Article XII–B of the collective bargaining agreement is invalid because it requires the District to take procedural steps beyond what is required under Education Code section 47605. (All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.)

[278 P.3d 1209]

Citing Round Valley, the trial court denied the petition to compel arbitration, essentially agreeing with the District's arguments. The Court of Appeal reversed. Relying on [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 855]California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State of California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 717( California Correctional Peace Officers ), the court held that its inquiry was limited to whether there was a valid arbitration agreement that had not been waived, and it found that there was such an agreement here. The court interpreted [54 Cal.4th 512]Round Valley to stand for the proposition that courts may vacate an arbitration award in conflict with the Education Code, not that courts may decline to order arbitration. Thus, the Court of Appeal held that the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration provision should be enforced and that the alleged conflict between the collective bargaining provisions on charter school conversion and the Education Code should be decided in the first instance by the arbitrator. We granted review.

The resolution of this appeal requires us to address two arguments made by UTLA. First, UTLA argues that the question of whether the collective bargaining provisions on charter school conversion conflict with the Education Code is irrelevant to determining whether to grant a petition to compel arbitration. Like the Court of Appeal, UTLA contends that courts faced with a petition to compel arbitration should ask only whether there is a valid arbitration agreement that has not been waived, and not whether the underlying claim to be arbitrated has merit. Second, UTLA argues that, in any event, the collective bargaining provisions at issue do not conflict with the Education Code.

II.

In defining a court's role in ruling on a petition to compel arbitration to enforce a collective bargaining agreement between a school district and its employees, we are required to resolve a tension between two principles: (1) collective bargaining provisions in conflict with the Education Code are unenforceable, and (2) courts generally do not examine the merits of the underlying dispute in deciding whether to enforce arbitration agreements.

A.

In reconciling these principles, our analysis begins with San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850, 191 Cal.Rptr. 800, 663 P.2d 523( San Mateo ), a case arising from disputes in several school districts regarding their obligation to bargain with employee unions under the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA). As we explained: “The EERA establishes a system of collective bargaining for employees of public school districts educating students in grades kindergarten through 14. It was enacted in 1975 (Stats.1975, ch. 961, § 2, p. 2247, operative July 1, 1976; codified as [Gov.Code,] §§ 3540–3549.3). The Act requires the school district employer to meet and negotiate in good faith with the duly selected exclusive representative of its employees as to subjects within the statutorily defined scope of representation. (§§ 3543.3, 3543.5.) The parties may enter into a binding agreement (§ 3540.1, subd. (h)), and they...