United Teachers of Ukiah v. Board of Education

• Decision Date: 17 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. A037354,A037354
• Citation: 251 Cal.Rptr. 499,201 Cal.App.3d 632
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 49 Ed. Law Rep. 299 UNITED TEACHERS OF UKIAH, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, UKIAH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 499

251 Cal.Rptr. 499

201 Cal.App.3d 632, 49 Ed. Law Rep. 299

UNITED TEACHERS OF UKIAH, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, UKIAH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. A037354.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 17, 1988.

Review Denied May 19, 1988.

[201 Cal.App.3d 635] Kerry Cunningham, San Rafael, for Board of Education, et al., defendants and appellants.

A. Eugene Huguenin, Jr., Burlingham, for United Teachers of Ukiah, et al., plaintiffs and respondents.

Sandra Woliver, San Rafael, for Ukiah Unified School Dist., defendants and appellants.

KLINE, Presiding Justice.

This case presents an appeal by the Board of Education of Ukiah Unified School District, the District Superintendent On appeal, appellants assert the writ of mandate was erroneously granted because: (1) the Public Employment Relations Board had exclusive initial jurisdiction over the issues involved; (2) contrary to respondents' claims, appellants' actions did not violate Education Code section 45028; ¹ and (3) respondents' action was barred by laches. Appellants further contend that the court imposed an inappropriate remedy by reclassifying certain individuals rather than ordering payment of adequate back pay. We reject these arguments and therefore affirm the judgment in its entirety.

George A. Gustafson, and the School District (collectively, appellants) from the granting of a writ of mandate in a proceeding instituted by respondents, the United Teachers of Ukiah (the collective bargaining representative of the District's certificated employees) and three individual teachers employed by the District (collectively, respondents).

BACKGROUND

For a period beginning before January 1, 1970 and ending February 1, 1985 the contract between the United Teachers of Ukiah (the Teachers) and the Ukiah School District (the District) provided that any teachers hired from outside the district initially would be given up to five years credit for prior teaching experience in determining his or her position on the salary schedule. In September 1982 the District hired a teacher from outside the district and, for the first time, gave him credit for more than five years experience. Subsequently, three more teachers were hired from outside the district and received credit in excess of the five year maximum. At trial, appellants asserted that all four teachers were granted the special credit because they were exceptionally gifted teachers who filled particular needs in the school district.

Respondents sought a writ of mandate, arguing that appellants' actions violated the requirement that "each person employed by a district in a position requiring certification qualifications ... be classified on the salary schedule on the basis of uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience." (Ed.Code, § 45028.) In response, appellants asserted their conduct was justified by a clause in the negotiated agreement between the Teachers and the District which provided that "The Board also reserves the right to make desirable adjustments and to grant reimbursements for certain extra duties and assignments." Carl Morgansen and Oscar Groves, past members of the District's negotiating team, testified in support of appellants' position. They stated that the Teachers were told the provision was intended to reserve to the District the right to place teachers on a higher salary schedule when the District had exceptional needs or wished to hire a teacher with outstanding qualifications.

The court accepted this testimony and concluded the parties had agreed to this interpretation of the provision. However, the court further determined that before July 28, 1983, the effective date of Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (d) ²--which permits negotiated deviations from section 45028's uniformity requirement--the parties were legally prohibited from contracting in violation of section 45028. (See Ed.Code, § 44924. ³ ) Consequently, it held that the District had improperly granted to certain teachers additional The court granted the writ of mandate and ordered the District "to permanently reclassify all teachers who were in its employ anytime during the period September, 1982, to August 31, 1983, who had more than five years of outside experience to credit them with all their years of teaching experience."

credit based on a void contract provision and that such actions violated section 45028. The court went on to note that there was no Education Code violation after August 31, 1983 when the parties signed a new contract containing the "reservation of rights" clause which was then valid under Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (d).

This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

1. Deferral to Public Employment Relations Board

Appellants assert that because their defense rested on an interpretation of the parties' negotiated agreement the PERB had initial jurisdiction over respondents' claim, since a violation of the agreement would constitute an arguable violation of the Educational Employment Relations Act. ⁴ The trial court determined that respondents' petition was founded upon preferential treatment assertedly violative of Education Code section 45028 and concluded that despite appellants' attempts to cast the dispute as a contractual question, "the solid substance of [the] Teacher's claim is unequal treatment in violation of the statute, and their petition fairly pleads only that grievance." Finally, the court observed, "I doubt that the Legislature ... intended that a trial court be ousted from jurisdiction to hear and decide a clear Section 45028 claim whenever a respondent asserts a contractual defense...."

Government Code section 3541.5 provides that "[t]he initial determination as to whether the charges of unfair practices are justified ... shall be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [PERB]." Subdivision (b) of that section states that the PERB shall not have the authority to enforce agreements between the parties or to issue complaints on alleged violations of such agreements "that would not also constitute an unfair practice" under the EERA. It thus appears from the plain language of the statute that the Legislature intended the PERB to handle cases directly based upon unfair practices, i.e., violations of the EERA.

A recent appellate decision supports the view that the PERB's jurisdiction does not extend to all disputes brought by an employee against a school district employer. In Wygant v. Victor Valley Joint Union High School Dist. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 319, 214 Cal.Rptr. 205 the plaintiffs argued that the school district's "professional growth policy," which was used to set teacher salaries, violated section 45028. The school district maintained the PERB had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim since the complaint raised a question as to whether the Board of Trustees had satisfied its obligation under the EERA to meet and negotiate in good faith. (Gov.Code, § 3543.5, subd. (c).)

The court noted that the cases cited by the District in support of their position all involved allegations of unfair practices or other violations of the EERA. It further noted that Government Code section 3540 provides that " '[n]othing contained [in Government Code sections 3540-3549.3] shall be deemed to supersede other provisions of the Education Code and the rules and regulations of the public school employers which establish and regulate tenure or a merit or civil service system...." (168 Cal.App.3d at p. 323, 214 Cal.Rptr. 205.) It thus concluded that the "PERB does not have exclusive initial jurisdiction where a plaintiff's allegations are confined solely to a unilateral violation of Education Code section 45028 by a school district." (Id.)

We agree with Wygant. ⁵ We find nothing in the case or statutory law which requires that claims which assert only violations of the Education Code be directed to the PERB simply because the defendant contends the EERA may be implicated in the resolution of the claim. To the contrary, we reject appellants' implicit contention that defendants may divest the courts of jurisdiction over Education Code violations simply by framing their defense in a fashion that arguably involves the EERA.

Two recent appellate decisions have reached conflicting conclusions on the question of when disputes founded upon asserted Education Code violations must be brought before the PERB before proceeding to the courts. In McCammon v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 661, 241 Cal.Rptr. 1 (petn. for review den. Dec. 22, 1987), a teacher argued that certain negotiated pay classifications violated Education Code section 45028. The trial court held that the PERB had initial jurisdiction over the claim; the decision was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court emphasized the fact that McCammon was challenging negotiated provisions of the bargaining agreement and thus concluded that his claim involved an arguable violation of the union's duty under the EERA to fairly represent McCammon's interests. (195 Cal.App.3d at p. 665, 241 Cal.Rptr. 1.)

Appellants urge us to follow McCammon since this appeal also involves conduct assertedly justified by a negotiated provision in the teachers' contract. We decline to do so. In our opinion, McCammon is fatally flawed because it is premised on the erroneous notion that any agreement, whether negotiated before or after the effective date of Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (d), "renders the violation non-unilateral, and appropriately before the PERB." (Id.) As the trial court correctly noted, prior to the effective date of Government Code section 3543.2, subdivision (d), provisions which contravened the Education Code were completely invalid, regardless of whether they resulted from fair negotiations with the teachers' representatives. (Ed.Code, § 44924.) Consequently, we...