United Transportation v. Foster

• Decision Date: 17 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-31304,98-31304
• Citation: 205 F.3d 851
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION; BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, Plaintiffs - Appellees, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, Intervenor - Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MICHAEL FOSTER, as Governor of the State of Louisiana; RICHARD IEYOUB, as Attorney General of the State of Louisiana and as representatives of all other similarly situated, Defendants - Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 851

205 F.3d 851 (5th Cir. 2000)

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION; BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, Plaintiffs - Appellees ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, Intervenor - Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MICHAEL FOSTER, as Governor of the State of Louisiana; RICHARD IEYOUB, as Attorney General of the State of Louisiana and as representatives of all other similarly situated, Defendants - Appellants.

No. 98-31304

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

March 17, 2000

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 98-CV-2443-E. Marcel Livaudais, Jr, US District Judge.

Before DAVIS and JONES, and MAGILL,^* Circuit Judges.

MAGILL, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises the issue of whether federal law preempts three Louisiana railroad transportation laws. The district court answered this question in the affirmative and granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, United Transportation Union (UTU)¹, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE)², and the American Association of Railroads (AAR)³. Louisiana's Governor and Attorney General (Appellants) appeal the district court's ruling. For reasons to be discussed, we affirm in part and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

On May 6, 1998, Louisiana's Governor signed the following three railroad transportation bills into law: 1) Senate Bill No. 26, enacted as Louisiana Revised Statute 32:661.2 (Act 81), which authorizes Louisiana law enforcement officers to administer post-collision toxicological testing of railroad crews involved in collisions at railroad crossings;⁴ 2) Senate Bill No. 30, enacted as Louisiana Revised Statute 32:168 (Act 83), which requires the equipping of locomotives with audible signaling devices and requires train operators to use the devices at specified locations;⁵ and 3) Senate Bill No. 100, enacted as Louisiana Revised Statute 32:176 (Act 87), which requires railroad employees to inform state authorities as to whether a train involved in an accident at a railroad crossing possesses an event recorder.⁶

On August 17, 1998, BLE and UTU filed a lawsuit seeking pre-enforcement review of Louisiana's newly enacted railroad safety laws. Their complaint alleged the following claims: 1) federal law preempts Acts 81, 83, and 87; 2) Act 81 violates the Fourth Amendment because it allows a Louisiana law enforcement officer who lacks probable cause to administer post-collision toxicological testing to a railroad employee as part of a criminal investigation; and 3) all three acts create an undue burden on interstate commerce. On August 27, 1998, the AAR intervened in the present action. On October 26, 1998, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees, finding that federal law preempts all three acts, that Act 81 violates the Fourth Amendment, and that Act 83 creates an undue burden on interstate commerce. Based on these findings, the district court permanently enjoined the enforcement of Acts 81, 83 and 87.

II. Justiciability

A. Ripeness

No one has challenged the ripeness of this case for adjudication. However, we must consider possible objections to our Article III jurisdiction sua sponte. See Lang v. French, 154 F.3d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1998). "Every federal appellate court has a special obligation to 'satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review,' even though the parties are prepared to concede it." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1013, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 79 L. Ed. 338, 55 S. Ct. 162 (1934)).

Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, 2. In an attempt to give meaning to Article III's "case or controversy requirement", the courts have developed a series of principles termed "justiciability doctrines." One such doctrine that "clusters about Article III" is ripeness. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 226 U.S. App. D.C. 14, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring). Ripeness separates those matters that are premature because the injury is speculative and may never occur from those that are appropriate for judicial review. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 18 L. Ed. 2d 681, 87 S. Ct. 1507 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192, 97 S. Ct. 980 (1977).

In the present case, appellees bring suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201⁷, which provides the statutory mechanism for seeking pre-enforcement review of a statute. Declaratory judgments are typically sought before a completed "injury-in-fact" has occurred, see Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 1298 (3d Cir. 1996), but still must be limited to the resolution of an "actual controversy." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40, 81 L. Ed. 617, 57 S. Ct. 461 (1937). In other words, despite the nature of appellees' action, we will not hear their pre-enforcement challenge unless their suit is ripe for review.⁸

In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1987), we set forth the prevailing standards for determining whether a dispute is ripe for adjudication. We stated:

A court should dismiss a case for lack of "ripeness" when the case is abstract or hypothetical. The key considerations are "the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." A case is generally ripe if any remaining questions are purely legal ones; conversely, a case is not ripe if further factual development is required.

Id. at 586-87 (internal citations omitted).

B. Act 81

Appellees allege that federal law preempts Act 81 because the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has completely subsumed the subject matter of alcohol and drug testing in the railroad industry.⁹ Appellees also allege that Act 81 offends the Fourth Amendment because it authorizes Louisiana law enforcement officers to administer post-collision toxicological testing to railroad employees as part of a criminal investigation even when the officers lack probable cause. For reasons to be discussed, appellees argument is entirely too speculative and hypothetical to establish the existence of an Article III "case or controversy." In short, we find that the appellees' pre-enforcement challenge to Act 81 is not ripe for review.

Appellees' challenge sits atop a mountain of conjecture and speculation. In order for Act 81 to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, the following train of events would necessarily have to occur: First, a train must be involved in a collision at a Louisiana railroad crossing. Although the law of probability suggests such a collision may be inevitable, we cannot determine with any degree of certainty when such an event will occur. Indeed, the Louisiana legislature may amend Act 81's challenged terminology,¹⁰ or repeal Act 81 it in its entirety, before another locomotive collision at a railroad crossing in Louisiana. Second, even assuming that such a collision occurs, Act 81 does not operate automatically in the event of a collision. Rather, a law enforcement officer must have "reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been operating or in physical control of the locomotive engine while under the influence" of alcohol or other illegal controlled substances. Clearly, there will be many cases where an officer's suspicion does not rise to the level necessary to trigger Act 81's application. Third, "reasonable grounds to believe" would have to be interpreted to mean something other than "probable cause."¹¹ The appellees ask this court to interpret "reasonable grounds to believe" to mean "reasonable suspicion," a level of suspicion clearly below the "probable cause" generally needed to justify a search in a criminal investigation.¹² Finally, a Louisiana officer would have to order such testing without actually having "probable cause."¹³ In light of the extreme prematurity of this action, we refuse to allow appellees' Fourth Amendment facial challenge to Act 81.¹⁴

We are particularly concerned about granting pre-enforcement review in this situation given the slight, if any, harm that appellees may suffer if we withhold review on ripeness grounds. First, assuming the previously outlined train of events actually occurs, Act 81 expressly allows railroad employees to refuse a law enforcement officer's request to undergo toxicological testing. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 32:661.2(D) (West 1999). If an employee refuses an officer's request, Act 81 merely authorizes the law enforcement officer to report this refusal to the Department of Transportation. See id. This potential hardship does not convince us that pre-enforcement review is appropriate in this case.

C. Acts 83 and 87

We find Act 83 ripe for judicial resolution. Act 83 imposes immediate obligations on the railroad, including potential equipment modifications and operating procedures. We also find Act 87 ripe for adjudication. Similar to Act 81, Act 87's requirements depend upon a future railroad collision. However, unlike Act 81, the only questions we need to decide are purely legal, and thus, are appropriate for judicial review. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 833 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1987).

III. Preemption

A. General Preemption Principles

The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to preempt state law. See U.S. Const. art VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has instructed federal courts that the historic police powers of the states are not to be superceded by federal law unless "that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice...