Universal Air Acad. v. Am. Airports Corp., B267164
| Decision Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | B267164 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | UNIVERSAL AIR ACADEMY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRPORTS CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC510022)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Randolph M. Hammock, Judge. Affirmed.
The Mathews Law Firm, Charles T. Mathews and Beverly Bickel for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cunningham Swaim, Michael J. Terhar, Steven D. Sanfelippo, Kathy Schmeckpeper, and Jonathan E. Hembree for Defendant and Respondent.
* * * * * * A flight school owned by two Iranian-American brothers and operating out of two regional airports in Los Angeles County sued the company managing those airports for racial and national origin discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51 et seq.1 The trial court granted summary judgment to the management company, reasoning that the flight school had not adduced sufficient evidence to raise an inference of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or national origin. We independently conclude that this ruling was correct, and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The County of Los Angeles (County) owns several regional airports, including the El Monte Airport (in El Monte) and Brackett Field Airport (in La Verne). The County has contracted management of these airports to defendant American Airports Corporation (American), subject to County oversight.
Alex and Majid Khatib (collectively, the Khatibs) are brothers who co-own two sister businesses: (1) plaintiff Universal Aviators Academy, Inc. (Universal), which operates a flight school under the name Universal Air Academy; and (2) non-party UAA International, which operates a full-service business offering fuel, rental cars and other services to private aircraft making stopovers and which does so under the name Billion Air Aviation (Billion Air). Universal is no small concern; it is the largest consumer of airplane fuel at the El Monte Airport.
Universal has operated at the El Monte Airport since 1993. In 2004, Universal entered into a five-year lease directly with the County to lease space on the airport's grounds. In 2009, Universal exercised its option to renew the lease for five more years. In 2014, the lease converted to a month-to-month tenancy. In 2011, Billion Air starting renting space at the El Monte Airport by taking over a lease from Lightning Aircraft Corporation (Lightning).
In May 2012, Universal—but not Billion Air or the Khatibs—sued American. In the operative first amended complaint (FAC), Universal alleged a single claim for racial and national origin discrimination in violation of the Unruh Act.2 The Khatibs are Persian and from Iran. Although Majid does not specifically recall discussing his race or national origin with any employee of American, Alex recalls such discussions and both brothers state that they bring up their race and national origin in nearly every conversation they have.3 Majid asserted in his declaration that he and Alex are the only Persian tenants at the El Monte Airport, but he and Alex simultaneously admitted in their depositions that they do not know all of the other tenants or their national origins. In the FAC, the Khatibs generally allege that American began treating them differently after the events of September 11, 2001, and specifically allege 18 different incidents of perceived racial or national origin discrimination spanning a 12-year period that includes events prior to September 11, 2001.
American moved for summary judgment. Following briefing and argument, the trial court granted American's motion. The court sided with Universal in holding that corporations have standing to bring an Unruh Act claim and in rejecting American's argument that Universal's single cause of action was functionally 18 different causes of action, some of which were time-barred. However, the court agreed with American that there were no triable issues of material fact. Applying the three-step, burden-shifting mechanism set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (McDonnell Douglas) for evaluating evidence of discriminatory intent,the court found that Universal had not adduced sufficient evidence (1) to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination (McDonnell Douglas's first step), or (2) to rebut the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons American proffered for its allegedly discriminatory acts (its third step). More specifically, the court noted that no American employee had ever made a "disparaging comment, statement or remark about the national origin" of Universal's owners. Thus, Universal's sole evidence of intent was its request that the court infer American's intent to discriminate on the basis of race and national origin from the fact that American had subjected Universal, but no other airport tenant, to the "'list of [18] grievances' [set forth in the FAC], amassed over [several years], including alleged price charging differences for rent and gas, lack of free lighting, unwarranted complaints for noise and other types of violations." The court declined to draw that inference, finding that it was not reasonable and "pure[ly] speculat[ive]" in light of the evidence presented.
After the trial court entered judgment, Universal filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Universal challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
The Unruh Act (Act) creates a civil cause of action for anyone who is "denied the right" to "full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever" on the basis of "their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status." (§§ 51, subd. (b) & 52.) Except for claims under the Act grounded in violations of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), the Act requires proof of "'intentional acts of discrimination'" on any of the bases it specifies as prohibited; disparate impact alone will not suffice. (Koebke v. Bernardo Heights County Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 853-854 (Koebke); Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1175, superseded on other grounds by § 51, subd. (f); Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1502 [], italics added; cf. Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 670 [].)
To "'sharpen[] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination' [citation]" in employment cases (St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks (1993) 509 U.S. 502, 506), the United States Supreme Court developed a three-step, burden-shifting mechanism in McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. 792. Because discriminatory intent is as difficult to prove in Unruh Act cases as it is in employment discrimination cases, we will take the lead from other courts and apply McDonnell Douglas to the Unruh Act as well. (Lindsey v. SLT Los Angeles, LLC (9th Cir. 2006) 447 F.3d 1138, 1144-1145; Simonelli v. Univ. of Cal.-Berkeley (N.D.Cal., Nov. 15, 2007, No. C 02-1107 JL) 2007 U.S.Dist. Lexis 86952, pp. 3-4 (Simonelli); Trigueros v. Southwest Airlines (S.D.Cal., Aug. 30, 2007, No. 05-CV-2256-L(AJB)) 2007 U.S.Dist. Lexis 64234, pp. 9-10.)
Tailored to the Unruh Act, a plaintiff bringing a claim under that Act bears the initial burden of producing evidence establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354-355 (Guz).) To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant "discriminated or made a distinction that denied full and equal accommodations" as proscribed by the Act; (2) the defendant's "motivating" or "substantial motivating reason" for its conduct was "its perception" that the plaintiff possessed one or more of the characteristics protected by the Act; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant's "conduct was a substantial factor in causing [the plaintiff's] harm." (CACI No. 3060; Cheng et al., Cal. Fair Housing and Public Accommodations (The Rutter Group 2015) § 12:3 [].) If this prima facie showing is made, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence indicating that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its treatment of the plaintiff. (Guz, at pp. 355-356.) "A reason is 'legitimate' if it is 'facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which, if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.'" (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th512, 520, fn. 2, quoting Guz, at p. 358.) If the defendant carries this burden, then the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving that the defendant's proffered reasons are a smokescreen or pretext for its "intentional discrimination based on [an] impermissible motive." (Simonelli, supra, 2007 U.S.Dist. Lexis 86952, at p. 4; Guz, at p. 356.)
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting mechanism works differently where, as here, a court is evaluating a motion for summary judgment. (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 861 (Serri).) Summary judgment functions to...
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