University of Kentucky v. Guynn
| Decision Date | 08 November 1963 |
| Citation | 372 S.W.2d 414 |
| Parties | UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, etc., Appellants, v. James GUYNN, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
John B. Breckinridge, Atty. Gen., Frankfort, W. L. Matthews, Jr., College of Law, Elwood Rosenbaum, Lexington, for appellants.
George E. Barker, Shouse, Barker & Coplin, Lexington, for appellee.
CLAY, Commissioner.
The judgment appealed from affirms an award of $10,000 made by the Board of Claims in a personal injury proceeding against appellants. The award is attacked on several grounds. Court review is limited by KRS 44.140 and KRS 44.150.
Donna Mae Guynn, nine years old, was seriously injured when struck by a station wagon owned by the University of Kentucky and operated by its agent, appellant West. The child was crossing the street from a parked automobile on the south side to attend a school located on the north side. West was proceeding westwardly in the north lane and the child was struck in that lane.
Appellants first contend there was no substantial evidence to support the findings of fact by the Board. Since the Board is only authorized to make an award if the claimant would be entitled to a judgment in an action at law (KRS 44.120), they maintain the evidence would not have been sufficient to submit the issue of liability to a jury. To sustain this argument would require us to hold as a matter of law there was no evidence of substance that West was negligent in the operation of his automobile. We cannot so conclude.
In substance the Board found that the accident occurred in an area marked as a school zone at a time when other children were playing or walking along the sidewalk in front of the school; that West was familiar with this area; that he negligently failed to keep a lookout to observe the safety of pedestrians; and West's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the child's injuries.
Because circumstantial evidence played an important part in this case, it was peculiarly one for a trier of fact to determine the issue of negligence. The fact that the child had to traverse at least the width of a traffic lane before reaching the point of impact, coupled with the testimony of West that he did not see her until just before she was struck, would permit a reasonable inference that he was not keeping a proper lookout, particularly when he knew school children were moving about in this area. The testimony of West tended to prove he was not at fault, but he was contradicted with respect to one important physical fact (the presence of a double parked car), and some circumstantial evidence was not favorable to him. There was certainly ample substantial evidence to support the Board's determination of liability.
There was an issue of contributory negligence on the part of the child's father concerning which the Board did not make a specific finding. Under the circumstances we must assume the Board decided this issue adversely to appellants, and the evidence justified such a determination.
It is next contended the findings of fact by the Board (required by KRS 44.086) were not 'sufficient to fix liability' on appellants. While some of these purported 'findings of fact' constituted a discussion of the evidence, when considered with the conclusions of law they constituted a sound basis for the Board's decision. They were therefore adequate.
It is next contended the...
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White v. State
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