University of Nevada v. Tarkanian

• Decision Date: 07 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 23494,23494
• Citation: 879 P.2d 1180,110 Nev. 581
• Parties: , 97 Ed. Law Rep. 927 UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA; University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Dr. Leonard Goodhall, as President of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and Officer of the University of Nevada; and Frankie Sue Del Papa, Lilly Fong, Dorothy Gallager, Chris Karamanos, Joan Denny, Daniel J. Klaich, John McBride, JoAnn Sherrin and June Whitely as Members of the Board of Regents of the University of Nevada, Appellants, v. Jerry TARKANIAN, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 1180

879 P.2d 1180

110 Nev. 581, 97 Ed. Law Rep. 927

UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA; University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Dr.

Leonard Goodhall, as President of the University of Nevada,

Las Vegas, and Officer of the University of Nevada; and

Frankie Sue Del Papa, Lilly Fong, Dorothy Gallager, Chris

Karamanos, Joan Denny, Daniel J. Klaich, John McBride, JoAnn

Sherrin and June Whitely as Members of the Board of Regents

of the University of Nevada, Appellants, v. Jerry TARKANIAN, Respondent.

No. 23494.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

July 7, 1994.

Jones, Jones, Close & Brown and Gary R. Goodheart, Las Vegas, Donald Klasic, Gen. Counsel University System, Reno, for appellants.

Lionel Sawyer & Collins, Las Vegas, for respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This litigation between basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian (Tarkanian) and his former employers--the University of Nevada at Las Vegas and its Board of Regents (collectively referred to as UNLV)--has had a long and tortuous history. It began in 1977, when the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) concluded that Coach Tarkanian had violated numerous NCAA rules and urged UNLV to suspend him from his coaching duties.

Coach Tarkanian responded by filing this lawsuit, in which he ultimately sued both UNLV and the NCAA for allegedly violating his federal due process rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). Coach Tarkanian prevailed in the district court. The case then commenced a lengthy appellate journey--making two trips to this court and one to the United States Supreme Court--which eventually resulted in affirmance of the judgment against UNLV and reversal of the judgment against the NCAA. At the conclusion of these initial appeals, the case returned to the district court, which ordered UNLV to pay Tarkanian's costs and attorney's fees in an amount of $150,725.58 plus interest.

UNLV now appeals from the district court's order granting Coach Tarkanian his costs and attorney's fees. In what we hope will be the final ruling in this lengthy litigation, we affirm the district court's order.

FACTS

In 1977, following a lengthy investigation, the NCAA concluded that UNLV and Tarkanian had violated numerous NCAA rules. ¹ The NCAA accordingly imposed sanctions against UNLV and recommended that UNLV suspend Tarkanian or else face even stiffer sanctions. UNLV decided to follow this recommendation and thereafter informed Tarkanian of its decision.

The day before the suspension was to take effect, however, Tarkanian sued UNLV in district court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Tarkanian alleged, inter alia, that UNLV's suspension of him would violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution by depriving him of property and liberty interests without due process of law.

Tarkanian prevailed at trial, and UNLV appealed to this court. This court reversed the judgment of the district court on the grounds that Tarkanian had failed to join a necessary party, the NCAA. See University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 594 P.2d 1159 (1979).

Tarkanian again sued in district court, this time adding the NCAA as a party. On June 25, 1984, after a bench trial, the district court held that both UNLV and the NCAA had deprived Tarkanian of procedural and substantive due process in attempting to suspend Tarkanian from his position as head basketball coach for two years. Tarkanian was denied his claim for attorney's fees as damages under state law but obtained his requested injunctive relief as well as attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980). The district court permanently enjoined both defendants from severing Tarkanian's relations with the UNLV intercollegiate athletic program.

The NCAA brought a motion to retax and settle costs, which was heard on December 4, 1984. On January 21, 1985, the district court entered an order denying the NCAA's motion to retax and settle costs and awarding Tarkanian $195,951.92 in costs, including attorney's fees. The district court further ordered that the costs were to be apportioned as follows: (1) the NCAA was to pay ninety percent ($176,356.73) of the award, and (2) UNLV was to pay ten percent of the award ($19,595.19).

The NCAA alone appealed from the district court judgment and order apportioning costs. UNLV did not appeal, and Tarkanian cross-appealed only from the district court's denial of his state law attorney's fees as damages claim. ² This court upheld the injunction but partially reversed the award of attorney's fees because it included fees for the first trial and $5,000.00 in undocumented costs. See Tarkanian v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Association, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987). Accordingly, this court remanded the matter for a recalculation of attorney's fees. Id.

On September 9, 1987, Tarkanian filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal to this court. By order entered February 25, 1988, this court denied Tarkanian's motion without prejudice to his right to file the same in district court and stated that Tarkanian was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees for services rendered on appeal. Pursuant to this court's mandate, Tarkanian moved to recalculate costs. The district court granted the motion, awarding costs and attorney's fees of $336,859.78 against the NCAA, which included costs of the appeal to this court.

In the meantime, the NCAA appealed to the United States Supreme Court. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 109 S.Ct. 454, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988). In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed, concluding that the NCAA could not be held liable because its actions did not constitute state action and were not performed under color of state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). The Court held that UNLV was the entity that actually suspended Tarkanian, which suspension was the state action that created liability under the statute. The case was then remanded to this court for further proceedings.

Upon remand from the United States Supreme Court, this court remanded the case to the district court and ordered the district court to enter an order vacating the injunctive decree against the NCAA and also vacating any orders assessing attorney's fees against the NCAA. This court refused to address the NCAA's request for vacatur of the injunction against UNLV, stating: "[W]e remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings in which all the original parties to this litigation shall have an opportunity to address the propriety of the NCAA's request." Tarkanian v. NCAA, Docket No. 16256 (Order of Remand at 6, September 28, 1989). This court further suggested that the district court "receive appropriate evidence, entertain appropriate legal argument from all concerned parties, and enter appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law on any or all matters it deems pertinent to a proper constitutional and equitable result." Id. at 3.

Accordingly, the district court vacated all prior orders holding the NCAA liable for Tarkanian's attorney's fees and vacated the injunctive decree insofar as it pertained to the NCAA. The district court left undisturbed the injunction against UNLV, stating that it remained in full force and effect. Additionally, the district court expressly declared: "This order is without prejudice to plaintiff's right to file an application for costs and fees against all defendants other than the NCAA, and the Court hereby retains jurisdiction for that purpose."

Tarkanian subsequently moved for an order seeking to impose his costs, including attorney's fees, against UNLV. On June 8, 1992, the district court granted Tarkanian's motion. The district court found that as a prevailing plaintiff in a civil rights action, Tarkanian was entitled to reimbursement for his costs, including attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1980) and Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). ³ Accordingly, the district court awarded Tarkanian $150,725.58 in costs, plus interest thereon. UNLV appeals.

DISCUSSION

Tarkanian was awarded attorney's fees as costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) as a prevailing plaintiff in a section 1983 civil rights action. In pertinent part, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), provides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ... of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Notwithstanding the discretionary language of section 1988, "[t]he legislative history indicates that a prevailing plaintiff should receive fees almost as a matter of course." Davis v. Murphy, 587 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir.1978); accord Ackerly Communications, Inc. v. City of Salem, 752 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 3503, 87 L.Ed.2d 634 (1985). The Supreme Court has recently explained that a civil rights plaintiff "prevails" when "actual relief on the merits of his [or her] claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, ----, 113 S.Ct. 566, 569, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).

The civil rights statutes were enacted "to vindicate the rights of parties who had suffered violations of civil rights laws and to encourage private enforcement of these laws through compensation to attorneys." Hall v. Hall, 738 F.2d 718, 721 (6th Cir.1984). "[T]he purpose of § 1988 [is] to enable litigants with valid claims to present their claims without having to bear the burden of the costs." J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1474 (10th Cir.1985). In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), the Supreme Court stated, "the logical place to look for recovery of fees is to the losing party--the party legally responsible for relief on the merits." Id. at 164, 105 S.Ct. at...