Unknown Parties v. Nielsen
| Decision Date | 19 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | CV-15-00250-TUC-DCB |
| Citation | 611 F.Supp.3d 786 |
| Parties | UNKNOWN PARTIES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Kirstjen M. NIELSEN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Akari Atoyama-Little, Pro Hac Vice, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA, Alvaro M. Huerta, Pro Hac Vice, National Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles, CA, Bree Bernwanger, Pro Hac Vice, Elisa Della-Piana, Pro Hac Vice, Megan Sallomi, Pro Hac Vice, Lwyrs Committee Civil Rights SF Bay Area, Elizabeth Gilmore Balassone, Pro Hac Vice, Jack Williford Londen, John Sebastiano Douglass, Pro Hac Vice, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA, Colette Reiner Mayer, Pro Hac Vice, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Palo Alto, CA, Karolina J. Walters, Pro Hac Vice, Mary Kenney, Pro Hac Vice, American Immigration Council, Washington, DC, Linton Joaquin, Pro Hac Vice, Nora A. Preciado, Pro Hac Vice, Alvaro M. Huerta, Pro Hac Vice, National Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles, CA, Louise Carita Stoupe, Pieter S. DeGanon, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Tokyo, Japan, Aleyda Yvette Borja, Christine Keeyeh Wee, Kathleen E. Brody, Martin Lieberman, William Bradford Peard, ACLU, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiffs.
Carlton Frederick Sheffield, U.S. Dept. of Justice-Civil Division, Christina Parascandola, Colin Kisor, Katelyn Masetta-Alvarez, Michael Anthony Celone, Sarah B. Fabian, William Charles Silvis, U.S. Dept. of Justice-Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs filed this action on June 8, 2015, seeking injunctive relief related to alleged inhumane and punitive treatment of civil immigration detainees by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) in the Tucson Sector at the Brian A. Terry Station/Naco Station, Casa Grande Station, Douglas Station, Nogales Station, Sonoita Station, Tucson Station, Why/Ajo Station, Willcox Station, and Three Points Station. The Tucson Station and Three Points Station process detainees at the Tucson Coordination Center (TCC), which serves as a hub for coordinating the movement of the majority of detainees out of CBP custody. Plaintiffs charge the Defendants with violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment based on alleged deprivations of sleep, of hygienic and sanitary conditions, of adequate medical screening and care, of providing inadequate food and water, and of a lack of warmth in CBP holding cells. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 184-218.) The case is a class action lawsuit. (Order (Doc. 117)).
Following a seven-day trial, the Court grants Plaintiffs' request for a Permanent Injunction because CBP's mission is to arrest, process, and turn detainees over to United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); the United States Marshals Service; or another agency (OA), as appropriate. CBP stations and holding facilities are designed within the context of this mission for short-term holds, lasting hours not days. There is no legitimate governmental interest to hold detainees longer than the time needed to complete this mission.
The evidence reflects that the extended detentions currently occurring at CBP facilities are, in large part, caused when receiving agencies, including ICE, ERO, ORR, the United States Marshals, and other agencies, are unable, usually due to capacity constraints, to accept CBP transfers. The Plaintiffs, who are civil detainees in CBP holding cells, face conditions of confinement after 12 hours which are substantially worse than detainees face upon commitment to either a civil immigration detention facility or even a criminal detention facility, like a jail or prison. The Court finds that the conditions of detention in CBP holding cells, especially those that preclude sleep over several nights, are presumptively punitive and violate the Constitution. The Defendants have overcome this presumption to a limited extent, and the Court limits its injunctive relief, accordingly. CBP shall be enjoined from holding detainees, who are "processing complete," i.e., meaning the detainee has been processed by CBP and the appropriate receiving agency has been identified, longer than 48 hours from book-in time. Detention may not extend into a third night under the "no longer than 48 hours" rule, unless and until CBP can provide conditions of confinement that meet detainees' basic human needs for sleeping in a bed with a blanket, a shower,1 food that meets acceptable dietary standards, potable water, and medical assessment performed by a medical professional.
The Court shall afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding any express terms necessary for the effectuation of the Permanent Injunction not contained herein.
" "When the State takes a person into custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being: Under this rationale, the State must provide for a detainee's ‘basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—.’ " (Order (Doc. 244) at 6 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) ). " ‘The more basic the particular need, the shorter the time it can be withheld.’ " Id. at 20 (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray , 682 F.2d 1237, 1259 (9th Cir. 1982) ). Less critical needs may be denied for reasonable periods of time when warranted by exceptional circumstances such as an emergency or disciplinary need. Id. (citing Hoptowit citing Spain v. Procunier , 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979) ). The Court's task is to "determine whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity," Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238, 282, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), and the Court must carefully scrutinize the challenged conditions and application of realistic yet humane standards, Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 361, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).
It is undisputed that CBP holds the Plaintiffs as civil detainees, pursuant to civil immigration laws.2 "Pretrial detainees cannot be punished because they have not yet been convicted," Lynch v. Baxley , 744 F.2d 1452, 1461 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ); "[civil] detainees cannot be subjected to conditions of confinement substantially worse than they would face upon commitment," Lynch , 744 F.2d at 1461.
As civil detainees, Plaintiffs are protected under the Fifth Amendment from being held without due process of law under conditions that amount to punishment. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237, 16 S.Ct. 977, 41 L.Ed. 140 (1896). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, and medical care, and take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Under the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must act with deliberate indifference to an inmate's health or safety. Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Therefore, conditions of confinement that violate the Eighth Amendment will necessarily violate the Fifth Amendment.
Because Plaintiffs are civil detainees and not prisoners, the Fifth Amendment, mirrored by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,3 apply; both protect a non-convicted detainee from punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 534–35, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). " ‘This standard differs significantly from the standard relevant to convicted prisoners, who may be subject to punishment so long as it does not violate the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment.’ " (Order (Doc. 244) at 7 (quoting Pierce v. County of Orange , 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) ). Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard. Gordon v. County of Orange , 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-35 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying Castro v. Los Angeles , 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), Kingsley v. Hendrickson , 576 U.S. 389, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015). The "more protective" Fourteenth Amendment standard requires more than minimal necessities, Jones v. Blanas , 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004),4 but does not require conditions of confinement free from discomfort, Bell , 441 U.S. at 537, 99 S.Ct. 1861. "[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v. Indiana , 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, (1972). The Court evaluates the conditions in light of contemporary standards of decency "in reference to their severity and duration," with any "resulting injury being merely one factor that may suggest an unjustified infliction of harm compared to being plausibly necessary." (Order (Doc. 383) at 6-7 (citing Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2nd Cir. 2017) (citing Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) ), see also Martinez v. Stanford , 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing same).
To evaluate the constitutionality of a pretrial detention condition under the Fifth Amendment, a district court must determine whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. Bell , 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ; Pierce , 526 F.3d at 1205 ; Demery v. Arpaio , 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004). In the absence of evidence of express intent, a court may infer that the purpose of a particular restriction or condition is punishment if the restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a...
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