Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd. v. Bowman, s. 214

• Decision Date: 09 May 1968
• Docket Number: 297,Nos. 214,s. 214
• Citation: 241 A.2d 714,249 Md. 705
• Parties: UNSATISFIED CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD v. Frances V. BOWMAN et al. Shirley A. BRAMBLE v. UNSATISFIED CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 705

249 Md. 705

241 A.2d 714

UNSATISFIED CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD v. Frances V. BOWMAN et al.

Shirley A. BRAMBLE v. UNSATISFIED CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND BOARD.

Nos. 214, 297.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 9, 1968.

Thomas J. Scanlon, Mt. Rainier, and William E. Brannan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Howard J. McGrath, Mt. Rainier, on the brief), for appellant, Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd.

J. Robert Carey, Silver Spring, for appellees, Bowman and others.

L. Edgar Brown and Marvin H. Smith, Denton, for appellant, Bramble.

William E. Brannan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Raymond S. Smethurst, Jr., Salisbury (Adkins, Potts & Smethurst, Salisbury, and Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellee, Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd.

Before HAMMOND, C.J., and HORNEY, McWILLIAMS, FINAN and SINGLEY, JJ.

HORNEY, Judge.

The question presented by these appeals concerns the maximum amount recoverable from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund on judgments obtained after April 1, 1965 for damages arising out of motor vehicle accidents occurring prior to that date.

Chapter 81 of the Laws 1964, effective April 1, 1965, repealed and reenacted with amendments §§ 119(3)(a), 122, 134(b), 162(a) and 172 of Article 66 1/2 (1967 Repl. Vol.) so as to increase the mandatory minimum amounts of financial responsibility required for bodily injuries or death under the motor vehicle laws and to make corresponding changes in the amounts payable therefor under the UC&JF law. In essence the amendments increased the maximum amounts payable from $10000 to $15000 on account of injury or death of one person in any one accident and from $20000 to $30000 on account of injury or death of more than one person in any one accident.

In a case ¹ in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Moorman, J.), the UC&J Fund (the fund) was directed to pay each of the injured persons the maximum amount payable under § 162 of Article 66 1/2 as of the time of trial. In a case ² in the Circuit Court for Caroline County (Carter, J. DeW., C. J.), the fund was ordered to pay one of the injured persons the maximum amount payable under § 162 as of the date of the accident. We will reverse the order of Judge Moorman and affirm the order of Chief Judge Carter.

The general presumption is that all statutes are to be given prospective application unless the manifest intention of the General Assembly was to the contrary. Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 204 A.2d 54 (1964); Gutman v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 198 Md. 39, 81 A.2d 207 (1951); Dashiell v. Holland Maide Candy Shops, 171 Md. 72, 188 A. 29 (1936). This rule of construction is particularly applicable where the statute affects substantive rights distinguished from procedural rights. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 219 A.2d 820 (1966); Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 205 A.2d 228 (1964). ³ Likewise, the general rule is as applicable to amendments as it is to original enactments. State Tax Commission v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 182 Md. 111, 32 A.2d 382 (1943). We need not, however, rely only on the general rule, for the cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the courts should ascertain the legislative intent (of which there is ample evidence in this case) and give that intention effect. Domain v. Bosley, 242 Md. 1, 7, 217 A.2d 555, 559 (1966).

Considering Chapter 81 as a whole and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, particularly the affinity between the law relating to financial responsibility and that concerning unsatisfied claims and judgments, it is apparent to us that the legislature intended by the amendment to apply prospectively rather than retrospectively. The existence of the relationship was recognized by us in Simpler v. State for Use of Boyd, 223 Md. 456, 463, 165 A.2d 464, 468 (1960). Ever since the inception of the UC&J Fund the maximum amount of its liability has been the same as the minimum insurance coverage required.

In 1963 Governor J. Millard Tawes vetoed a bill increasing the minimum amount of insurance coverage under the law relating to financial responsibility because it did not increase the maximum amount payable out of the fund. As a result, the title of the present amendment makes it clear that it is still the policy of the state to maintain the relationship between the concurrent parts of the statute. The title of the amendment-which may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent, Eisler v. Eastern States Corp., 186 Md. 251, 256, 46 A.2d 630, 632 (1946)-states that its purpose is 'to increase the mandatory minimum amounts of financial responsibility required for bodily injuries under the motor vehicle laws and making corresponding changes (emphasis ours) in the amounts payable for bodily injuries under the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law.'

Taking into account the significance of the title as well as the rule of construction that all parts of a statute are to be reconciled if possible, Thomas v. Police Commissioner, 211 Md. 357, 361, 127 A.2d 625, 627 (1956) and Pittman v. Housing Authority, 180 Md. 457, 464, 25 A.2d 466, 469 (1942), the two parts of the law must be considered together. If this were not done, the inconsistent results that would flow from an interpretation to the contrary would be unfair.

Section 151(d) of Article 66 1/2 requires the fund board to calculate on December 30th in each year the probable amount of funds needed for the ensuing license registration year which begins on April 1st and, if the funds estimated to be on hand as of the latter date are deemed to be insufficient, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, on the recommendation of the board, assesses the deficiency against insurers authorized to write automobile liability insurance and against uninsured motorists who register their vehicles at the beginning of or during the next registration year. Chapter 81 was approved April 7, 1964, but did not take effect until April 1, 1965. This, we think, signifies that the principle reason for giving the amendment prospective effect was to afford the board and commissioner an opportunity to calculate the additional funds needed and to assess the estimated deficiency. If not, then it is obvious that giving the amendment a retrospective effect so as to apply the increased liability to injuries suffered prior to April 1, 1965, would result in making those assessed on December 30, 1964, unjustly liable for deficiencies from prior years for injuries inflicted before April 1, 1965, which had not been theretofore finally adjudicated. It is unlikely that this was the legislative intent.

Furthermore, if Chapter 81 is given retrospective effect, motorists carrying the minimum insurance coverage required under the financial responsibility law would have been uninsured after April 1, 1965, as to accidents occurring before that date because the liability of an insurer is limited to the coverage in effect at the time of the accident. National Indemnity Co. v. Simmons, 230 Md. 234, 243, 186 A.2d 595, 600 (1962); Parks v. Williams, Md., 241 A.2d 400 (1967). In such a situation if an injured person recovered a judgment in excess of $10000 against an insured motorist carrying a 10000/20000/5000 coverage at the time of an accident that occurred before April 1, 1965, but for which judgment was recovered after that date, the injured person apparently would recover $10000 from the insurer and the difference up to $15000 from the fund. Again, it is not likely that this was the legislative intent. Moreover,...