Uranga v. State
Decision Date | 17 November 2010 |
Docket Number | No. PD–0385–08.,PD–0385–08. |
Parties | John URANGA, III, Appellant,v.The STATE of Texas. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Erika Copeland, Abilene, for appellant.John W. Brasher, Asst. Crim. D.A., Wichita Falls, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.WOMACK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KELLER, P.J., and JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.
In this case, the evidence at the punishment stage of the trial revealed that the defendant had damaged a juror's property in a extraneous offense. The issues are (1) whether the doctrine of “implied bias” applies to this case and required a mistrial, and (2) if it did not, whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial. We hold that the implied-bias doctrine does not apply and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
A jury found the appellant guilty of felony possession of methamphetamine of more than one gram, but less than four grams. During the punishment phase of the trial (which also was tried to the jury) the State introduced evidence of two prior convictions and a host of unadjudicated offenses, including the incident in question. It took place in September of 2006 when the appellant drove his car onto someone's yard to elude police. This incident was captured in its entirety by the video camera in the police vehicle that was chasing the appellant.
When the State offered the video recording into evidence and played it for the jury, one of the jurors discovered that it was his lawn that had been damaged by the appellant's car. The court questioned the juror outside the presence of the remaining jury regarding the incident and any potential bias that may have existed as a result of the incident.
After the questioning, the appellant requested a mistrial based on the recently discovered information. The Court denied the request.
The jury found that the appellant was an habitual felony offender,2 and assessed the punishment of life in prison.
On appeal, the appellant argued that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury under the Texas Constitution, because he “contends that we should presume harm from the victim-juror's participation in assessing punishment and, therefore, that we should find error from the rejection of the motion for a mistrial.” 3 The Court of Appeals held that since “neither the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals nor the United States Supreme Court has adopted the implied bias doctrine when it is discovered in the middle of a punishment trial that a juror is a victim of the defendant's extraneous (misdemeanor-level) conduct, we shall not follow Uranga's suggestion that such a doctrine must be applied in this case.” 4
We granted review.
The appellant argues that the doctrine of “implied bias” must always be applied when it is discovered during the punishment stage that a juror was a victim of the appellant's extraneous, unadjudicated offense. He says that “no admonition could effectively cure the bias of that juror.”
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by an impartial jury in all criminal prosecutions. Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution similarly guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.” This Court has held that the right in the state constitution is no greater than that recognized in the Sixth Amendment. 5 Neither the federal nor the state constitution has been held to require an “implied bias” doctrine.
The limited case law about “implied bias” stems largely from Justice O'Connor's 1982 concurrence in Smith v. Phillips.6 After the trial of Phillips began, one of the jurors submitted an application for employment as an investigator in the District Attorney's Office. Although they had learned of this application, the prosecuting attorneys withheld the information from both the trial court and defense counsel until the trial had concluded and the appellant was found guilty of murder.7 The federal District Court granted habeas-corpus relief because of prosecutorial misconduct, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.8 The Supreme Court, while “not condon[ing] the conduct of the prosecutors in this case,” held that their “failure to disclose [the juror's] job application, although requiring a post-trial hearing on juror bias, did not deprive respondent of the fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.” 9 The Court adhered to a principle, established in its precedents, that in order to obtain relief, actual (as distinguished from implied) juror bias must be shown.10 It also held that, while prosecutorial misconduct might be relevant to the juror-bias issue, such misconduct alone would not amount to a due-process violation.11
Justice O'Connor said that she “concur[red] in the Court's opinion, but wr [o]te separately to express [her] view that the opinion does not foreclose the use of ‘implied bias' in appropriate circumstances.” 12 She stated, “Determining whether a juror is biased or has prejudged a case is difficult, partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it.” 13 She gave an illustrative list of examples in which the “implied bias” doctrine may apply, notably referring to 14
This Court has mentioned Justice O'Connor's “implied bias” doctrine twice, first in 2004 in Franklin v. State15 and again in 2008 in State v. Morales.16 Neither case called on us to adopt or reject the doctrine, because neither case turned on the issue of a juror's being disqualified because of bias.
In Franklin, when the victim took the stand, a juror recognized her as a member of the Girl Scout troop of which the juror was a leader. The juror had heard the victim's name during voir-dire examination, but she did not recognize the victim until she saw the child.17 The juror informed the trial judge of their Scouting relationship. The judge questioned her on her ability to judge the case on only the evidence she heard from the stand; the juror stated that she could do so.18 The judge refused to allow defense counsel to question the juror. This Court said, ...
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