URBAN REDEV. COM'N OF STAMFORD v. Katsetos
Decision Date | 30 November 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 24732.,24732. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | URBAN REDEVELOPMENT COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF STAMFORD v. Steve KATSETOS et al. |
Brenden P. Leydon, Stamford, with whom, on the brief, was Peter V. Lathouris, for the appellant (named defendant). Robert P. Dolian, with whom were Rachel Goldberg and, on the brief, Kevin P. Broughel, Stamford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
LAVERY, C.J., and FOTI and SCHALLER, Js.
The defendant Steve Katsetos1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to open the judgment rendered in the underlying action filed by the plaintiff, the urban redevelopment commission of the city of Stamford. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied the motion because the plaintiff acted without statutory authority in obtaining the defendant's property and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render the underlying judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the appeal. Pursuant to General Statutes § 8-124 et seq., the city of Stamford authorized the plaintiff to adopt an urban renewal plan and to acquire properties to further the goals of that plan. In December, 1999, the plaintiff sought to obtain the defendant's property located at 1017 Washington Boulevard and, pursuant to General Statutes § 8-129, filed a statement of compensation. The plaintiff deposited $620,000 with the clerk of the Superior Court as compensation for the property. On January 7, 2000, the parties signed a settlement agreement. In exchange for an additional $100,000, the defendant agreed to transfer his property to the plaintiff and to waive any and all claims.2 The defendant filed a motion for payment of the deposit in the amount of $620,000, and the court ordered payment on January 31, 2000. The defendant received both the $620,000 deposit and the additional bargained for $100,000, and transferred the property to the plaintiff. The court rendered judgment accordingly.
Nearly three years later, on November 6, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to open the judgment and to dismiss the plaintiff's action. He alleged that the court was without jurisdiction over the parties and, therefore, the judgment was void ab initio. The basis for the motion was our Supreme Court's decision in Aposporos v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 259 Conn. 563, 790 A.2d 1167 (2002). In Aposporos, which also concerned the Stamford urban renewal plan, the court held that the condemnation proceedings were invalid as a result of the commission's failure to follow the relevant statutory requirements. Id., at 579-80, 790 A.2d 1167. In this case, the court denied the defendant's motion and subsequently issued an articulation on March 4, 2004. The court denied the motion to open the judgment, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a, on the ground that it was filed more than four months after judgment was rendered.3 This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied the motion to open. Specifically, he argues that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render the 2000 judgment because the plaintiff had acted without statutory authority in obtaining the defendant's property. Because the defendant's motion implicated subject matter jurisdiction, the court had inherent authority at any time to open and to modify a judgment rendered without jurisdiction. See Bove v. Bove, 77 Conn.App. 355, 367, 823 A.2d 383 (2003); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Pumphrey, 13 Conn.App. 223, 229, 535 A.2d 396 (1988). It was, therefore, incorrect to deny the defendant's motion solely on the ground that more than four months had elapsed since the judgment was rendered. We affirm the judgment, however, for a different reason.4
As a threshold matter, we address our standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Canterbury v. Rocque, 78 Conn.App. 169, 173, 826 A.2d 1201 (2003).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727-28, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999).
Even if we were to assume arguendo that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time it accepted the agreement between the parties and rendered judgment accordingly, we would conclude that consideration of the defendant's motion to open the judgment was not warranted under the facts and circumstances of this case.
It often is stated that "a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time" and that "[o]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented... and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Honan v. Dimyan, 85 Conn.App. 66, 69, 856 A.2d 463 (2004); see also ABC, LLC v. State Ethics Commission, 264 Conn. 812, 822-23, 826 A.2d 1077 (2003); Fish v. Igoe, 83 Conn.App. 398, 402, 849 A.2d 910, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 577 (2004).
Our Supreme Court, however, has stated that there are boundaries to challenges concerning the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Upjohn Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 224 Conn. 96, 103-104, 616 A.2d 793 (1992); see also Torrington v. Zoning Commission, 261 Conn. 759, 767-69, 806 A.2d 1020 (2002); Vogel v. Vogel, 178 Conn. 358, 362-63, 422 A.2d 271 (1979).
We are further guided in the application of that rule by our decisions in Daly v. Daly, 19 Conn.App. 65, 561 A.2d 951 (1989), and Morris v. Irwin, 4 Conn.App. 431, 494 A.2d 626 (1985). In Daly, the parties divorced in 1969 and there was no direct appeal from the trial court's judgment. Daly v. Daly, supra, at 65-66, 561 A.2d 951. In 1988, the plaintiff wife filed a motion for execution of the terms of the 1969 judgment with respect to the distribution of a trust. Id., at 66, 561 A.2d 951. The defendant husband responded by filing a motion to open and to correct the original judgment for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The trial court determined that the dissolution court had jurisdiction when it rendered judgment in 1969. Id.
On appeal, we concluded that, even if the dissolution court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant's collateral attack, filed in 1988, did not warrant consideration. Id., at 69, 561 A.2d 951. First, we noted that litigation regarding subject matter jurisdiction must take into account the important principle of the finality of judgments, particularly when the parties had the opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the dissolution court. Id., at 69, 561 A.2d 951. We then stated that "[l]itigation about whether subject matter jurisdiction exists should take into account whether the litigation is a collateral or direct attack on the judgment, whether the parties consented to the jurisdiction originally, the age of the original judgment, whether the parties had an opportunity originally to contest jurisdiction, the prevention of a miscarriage of justice, whether the subject matter is so far beyond the jurisdiction of the court as to constitute an abuse of authority, and the desirability of the finality of judgments." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 69-70, 561 A.2d 951. Applying those factors, we declined to consider the defendant's claim. Id., at 71, 561 A.2d 951.
Similarly, in Morris v. Irwin, supra, 4 Conn.App. at 432, 494 A.2d 626, the parties were divorced in 1979 and entered into a stipulated agreement. In 1982, the plaintiff husband sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity of certain of the court's orders. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dispose of the marital property as it did. Id. We first identified the modern approach as to when a subsequent collateral attack on the dissolution court's subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Id., at 433, 494 A.2d 626. We then further...
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