Urian v. Scranton Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 January 1933
• Docket Number: 342
• Parties: Urian v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

165 A. 21

310 Pa. 144

Urian v. Scranton Life Ins. Co., Appellant

No. 342

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 3, 1933

Argued December 7, 1932

Appeal, No. 342, Jan. T., 1932, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 5, Phila. Co., March T., 1931, No. 5740, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of Florence C. Urian v Scranton Life Insurance Company. Judgment affirmed on reduced verdict.

Assumpsit on policy of life insurance. Before SMITH, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Verdict for plaintiff for $21,700. Judgment on verdict for plaintiff in opinion by LAMBERTON, J. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were various instructions, quoting them, and in entering judgment on verdict, quoting record.

The verdict in this case is reduced to $10,850, and, as thus reduced, the judgment thereon is affirmed.

W. J Fitzgerald, with him W. Heyward Myers, Jr., and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, for appellant. -- There is no evidence that the death of the insured was the result of accidental means: Keefer v. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 448; Hill v. Ins. Co., 209 Pa. 632; Griffith v. Refining Co., 305 Pa. 386; Hesse v. Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125; Trau v. Ins. Co., 98 Pa.Super. 89.

There was no evidence of a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body.

There is no evidence that the death of the insured occurred as a result of an internal injury proven by an autopsy to have been fatal: Gottlieb v. Ins. Co., 225 Pa. 102.

The death of the insured resulted from poisoning: Pickett v. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79; Levinton v. Ins. Co., 267 Pa. 448; Hesse v. Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125.

George J. Edwards, Jr., with him Robert F. Bonner, for appellee. -- The evidence showed that the death of the insured was effected through accidental means: Ford v. Dick, 288 Pa. 140; Continental Ins. Co. v. Delpeuch, 82 Pa. 225; Rosenthal v. Ostrow, 287 Pa. 87; Mut. Accident Assn. v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100; Biehl v. Assurance Corp., 38 Pa.Super. 110; Pickett v. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79.

The pleadings and proofs meet and satisfy the requirements of the contusion-wound-autopsy clause of the riders: West v. MacMillan, 301 Pa. 344; Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704.

The death of the insured did not result from poison within the meaning of the policy: Pickett v. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79; Montgomery v. Martin, 294 Pa. 25; Kern's Est., 296 Pa. 348; United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. 141; Clum v. Casualty Co., 281 Pa. 464; Trexler L. Co. v. Ins. Co., 289 Pa. 13; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167.

Before FRAZER, C.J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SIMPSON:

Plaintiff, as the beneficiary named in two $5,000 insurance policies, issued by defendant on the life of her husband, sued to recover (1) the amount of the policies payable in case of his death, and (2) an equal additional amount, because his death was said to have occurred under circumstances set forth in what are known as accidental death benefit riders, attached to each policy. She recovered a verdict and judgment for $21,700, which included both amounts with interest. Defendant appeals, alleging that no recovery should have been allowed under the riders, and hence that the verdict should be reduced to $10,850.

So far as relevant, the riders provide as follows: "Upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured occurred while the said policy was in full force and effect, by accidental drowning, or in consequence of bodily injury effected solely through external violent and accidental means, of which injury there is a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, except in case of internal injury if proven by an autopsy to have been fatal; and upon further proof that such death occurred within seventy days after such injury was sustained, and as a direct result thereof, independently and exclusively of all other causes, the Scranton Life Insurance Company will pay an additional amount equal to the amount stated and described on the face of said policy as the amount insured, subject to the further conditions and limitations as follows:

"Further Conditions and Limitations: (1) The accidental death benefit provided for in this Rider shall not be claimed or paid if the death of the insured results directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from bodily or mental disease; or from automobile racing; or from coal mining operations underground; or from self destruction, whether sane or insane; or from military or naval service in time of war; or from submarine operations; or from aeronautics; or from violation of law; or from poisoning; or from any police service whether in a state of riot, war, insurrection or otherwise; or from bodily or mental infirmity; or from residence or travel on land outside the continental limits of the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada; or from ptomaine poisoning; or from infection other than pyogenic infection occurring simultaneously with and in consequence of an accidental wound on the exterior of the body."

The facts in relation to the death of the insured are thus succinctly stated in the opinion of the court below: "Decedent lived at Llanerch, near Philadelphia, in a home, at the rear of which was a two-car garage. On the morning of September 11, 1930, after eating breakfast, he went out at his usual time, a few minutes before nine o'clock. It was his custom to drive his automobile to his place of business in Philadelphia. He was not seen again until some three hours later, when his small son went into the garage, found it filled with smoke, and his father sitting behind the steering wheel of his automobile. Other persons quickly came, and the testimony showed that the engine of the automobile was not running, but the motor was hot. The gasoline tank was empty. Decedent sat behind the wheel, his hands being greasy, a pair of pliers grasped in one of them and other tools on the dashboard. The hood was up on one side and the fuse case on the dashboard was off. A doctor was summoned and testified that decedent was dead when he arrived, and that he had died of carbon monoxide poisoning. The physician and other witnesses described his flushed cheeks and 'cherry red' lips, which the physician stated invariably accompanied death from this cause."

Defendant avers that, on several grounds, plaintiff was not entitled to recover the double liability provided for by the riders. The court below, after a careful and painstaking consideration of these points, decided each and all of them in favor of plaintiff; without this, she could not have recovered the additional sum. In the main, we are in full accord with its reasoning and conclusions with respect to them, as will appear from our opinion in Florence Urian v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 310 Pa. 342, but on one point, not arising in that case, we do not agree, and, as the conclusion we reach in regard to it is fatal to plaintiff's claim to recover the double liability provided for by the riders, we shall limit our opinion to a discussion of and a ruling upon that point.

It will be noted that the policy says "The accidental death benefit provided for in this Rider shall not be claimed or paid if the death of the insured results directly or indirectly in whole or in part, . . . from poisoning."

On this point the court below said: "The word 'poison' is used in many different senses. It has been defined as 'any substance (liquid, solid, or gaseous), which by reason of an inherent deleterious property tends to destroy life or impair health when taken into the system (as into the stomach, blood or lungs).' The death of decedent was from poisoning within this broad definition. But this is not conclusive upon us. 'The standard for the interpretation of words is their natural meaning to the parties who have contracted at the time and place where the contract is made, considering all the circumstances surrounding it;' Foundation and Construction Co. v. Franklin Trust Co., 307 Pa. 10. Ordinary persons in using the word 'poison' have in mind something that is taken internally into the stomach. They do not have in contemplation germ poisons, disease poisons or gas poisons. We believe that the word 'poisoning' in the policy is used in its familiar sense, that is, in the sense of something taken through the mouth into the stomach. The parties in making the contract did not contemplate poison by gas.

"But even if the word 'poisoning' were used in its broader sense so as to include poisoning by gas, we would still hold that death in this case was not from poisoning within the meaning of the policies. In Pickett v. Pacific Ins. Co. , the policy contained a provision that the insurance should not cover death attributable to 'inhalation of gas.' Decedent went down in a well, unwittingly inhaled gas therein located and died. It was held that the provision of the policy applied only to voluntary inhalation of gas and not to involuntary or accidental inhalation. We believe that the same distinction should be made in this case. The word 'poisoning' refers to a deliberate act. It may be, and probably is true, that it would include the act of another as well as the act of decedent, but upon the authority of the Pickett Case, it would not include death by poison accidentally taken.

"The fact that the doctor in his testimony said that death was from carbon monoxide poisoning [as it was here] is of no importance. If he had said that death was from uremic poisoning the death would none the less have been from Bright's disease."

Apparently plaintiff does not fully agree with this reasoning; she concedes that if the policy had used the words "from poison," instead of "from poisoning," the defense under consideration would prevail; for, as she argues, the...